

Patterns of Power

Habsburg Galicia

The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria

1772 — 1918

A case study in the Patterns of Power series

Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed

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FRONT MATTER

PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its thirteen parts

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The collaboration

This is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series, applying the series' framework to the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, from the first partition of Poland in 1772 to the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and the proclamation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1918. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the formation that installs the belief in each new generation, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam through which what may be known is managed, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction — and, running through all of it, position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Galicia was chosen to test the one claim in the framework that had never been tested. The collection now holds some thirty accounts of foreclosure, and every one of them finds liberty absent, captured or confined to an estate. The framework's positive proposition — that liberty is the residue left by factions inside a hierarchy defending

themselves against each other, drafted generally enough that parties nobody had in mind can later pick it up — had therefore only ever been observed by its absence. A conditional tested on one arm is not tested. Galicia is the case where the residue accumulated, and it is that case on ground the collection had just finished studying under a later overlord, with one variable changed: under the Soviet arrangement no faction in western Ukraine possessed anything the state had not issued, and nothing accumulated in fifty years; under the Habsburgs the same people, on the same ground, lost for seventy years and finished holding a share of the provincial government.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction and the judgement of the whole, and set the question each module was to answer before it was researched; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying load-bearing quotations, dates and figures by search against sources reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Galician application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry: setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground and letting the distance speak. A patent abolishing the houses that kept no school and nursed no sick, beside the barracks the state no longer had to build. A constitution guaranteeing every people an inviolable right to its own language, beside a census schedule with no box for the language of eight hundred thousand of them. A secret protocol granting a crownland, beside the tonnage of grain it was priced at. The study lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader, on the principle that a verdict accepted from an author is a transfer of deference and lasts exactly as long as the deference does.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — patents, constitutions, treaty articles, parliamentary speeches, ecclesiastical instruments — are quoted exactly, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording *is* the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution or figure is invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never

guessed. This case demanded that discipline more than most: three national historiographies and a fourth, largely Anglophone and largely nostalgic, own this ground, and its most-quoted statistics come from a polemic of 1888 with an author, a date and a policy to argue for. Contested figures are given as ranges with the estimators named, and where a single source carries a claim the module says so at the point of use.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its watchword is *legibility is not pardon*.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section. The final module then sorts them, and says which are genuine additions and which are applications in a contribution's coat.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

What Galicia added to the framework

The study makes one central contribution and the rest of it is that contribution's supporting structure. **The claimant is the ratchet, not the gains.** Openings in an order are exogenous — nobody in the periphery causes them or can predict their date — and gains are reversible, as 1867 proved when everything won in 1861 was taken back within six years. What therefore decides a subject faction's trajectory across a long period is not what it wins but whether it can be liquidated between openings. A faction whose position *is* its concession disappears when the concession is withdrawn, and nobody is left to present the bill next time. A faction with holdings outside the state's gift survives, and is on the doorstep within the year. Prosvita was founded in 1868, one year after the most complete defeat these people ever suffered, by the men who had just been beaten.

Around that finding the modules assemble its preconditions: that an apex which endows an existing formation gets a stronger version of what was already there, while one which tries to install a new formation against the existing carriers gets nothing and pays for the nothing; that an apex funding a counterweight cannot own it, because a counterweight in the apex's own hand weighs nothing; that a category in the state's own instruments — a box on a census schedule, a named people in a constitutional article — is a form of standing, without which a population may prosper individually

and accumulate nothing collectively; that an elite is bound by the ladder above it rather than the anchor beneath it; and that, because the crack when it comes is exogenous, assembly beats pressure — sixteen days separated the emperor's manifesto from a proclaimed republic, and nothing is assembled in sixteen days.

Four further additions are separable and are defended on this case's evidence: a fourth settlement fiction, the *purpose test*, which converts a perpetuity into a revenue by redefining what an institution exists to do; the *devotional levy*, the finding that the extractor's ideal base is an act the subject cannot decline and that formation manufactures that inelasticity more cheaply than law can; *non-enumeration as pre-emptive foreclosure*, the observation that what a regime declines to count maps what it intends never to have to answer; and *emigration as metabolic debt service*, with its corollary that an exit the order does not own is an exit it cannot reopen. The family of solutions the field manual calls *divide and balance* has also now been run as a full case, and ends not when one party wins but when the arbiter becomes irrelevant.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the societies on the eve of conquest. **Old Claims Which the Archives Will Produce.** Four parties on one ground, each the residue of an older conquest: a Polish nobility holding the most extensive liberties in Europe and the harshest serfdom on the continent by the same statutes; a Ruthenian peasantry whose own elite had been absorbed upward four centuries earlier; a Jewish population whose corporate institution the Commonwealth had abolished eight years before Austria arrived; and a monarchy with a genealogist at work in the archives.

1 — *The Floor of Force.* **The Castle Had Already Fallen.** A state that had voted away its own army, a partition executed against ground another empire's army had cleared four months earlier, a conscription that took the province's young men away and posted other provinces' men in their place — and the year the question of who held organised violence was settled by peasants against their own landlords.

2 — *The Settlement.* **Neither Schools Nor the Sick.** A decree defining what a religious house exists to do, and the four centuries of endowment that fell to the sovereign when houses failed the test; the fund it built; the barracks the state no longer

had to build; the seminaries that housed a counter-elite; and the survey that was kept when the redistribution it was built for was withdrawn.

3 — *The Robe. Our People Have Not Forgotten Him.* Josephinism as one text addressed to three audiences at once, and therefore quotable back by all of them; the expenditure test returning a very large figure; a lecturer reprimanded in 1797 for teaching Ruthenians in Polish; and the year the dynasty dropped the people who had been loyal to it.

4 — *Formation. Azbuka and Abecadlo.* Three peoples sharing no calendar; a state that tried to install a new formation on one of them with compulsion, imported teachers and a catechism examined at the marriage office, and failed in nineteen years; and a state that merely endowed the formation already running on another, and could not afterwards move its alphabet.

5 — *The Cost Column. You Cannot Solve Social Problems with Prison Sentences.* A peasantry with a constitutional right to emigrate from 1867 that it did not exercise for twenty years because the fare cost more than the family had ever held — and the trial at which a defence advocate named both terms of the ledger in open court.

6 — *Extraction. Two Kreuzer for Every Sabbath Candle.* A hundred and thirty-three days a year converted at emancipation into a debt charged to the people who had worked them; four centuries of compulsory purchase of the lord's spirits; and the tax that replaced a failed poll tax by attaching itself to an act formation had already made impossible to decline.

7 — *Information and Suppression. Rus' Does Not Exist.* A censorship that faced inward at the province's own peoples; an ecclesiastical censor more effective than the state's; and the classification schedule that recorded eight hundred thousand Yiddish speakers as Poles while their own daily newspaper was printing in the provincial capital.

8 — *Elite Coordination and the Default. Left to the Discretion of the Galician Diet.* A province paid for with itself; two factions who despised each other and governed together because neither had a majority alone; the two levers Vienna kept; and the elite that was bound for fifty-one years by holdings that would have travelled anywhere.

9 — *Plurality or Foreclosure. An Inviolable Right.* Every Ruthenian gain in seventy years dated to somebody else's factional need; every retention dated to the base; and the control case inside the province, where one people had a category in the constitution and the census and the other had neither.

10 — *Change and Collapse. A Crownland for a Million Tons of Grain.* A floor destroyed from outside by four years of industrial war; a wartime repression that sorted the opposition rather than destroying it; a nation's constitutional status drafted as a delivery contract with a destruction clause; and sixteen days from a manifesto to a state.

11 — *The Grim Accounting. Forty-Five Per Cent.* A population raised above the land's carrying capacity by coordination alone, servicing its metabolic debt continuously in emigration rather than periodically in famine — until the valve shut in August 1914 — set beside a century without invasion, and against a column of omissions that no casualty return records.

12 — *Convergence and Divergence. Two Hundred Thousand Signatures.* Galicia placed beside the same ground under a later overlord; the study's claims sorted into contributions and applications; and the strongest case for the defence stated in its own voice, answered by four refusals, and set beside the alternative that was actually on offer and was actually refused.

A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources and with its limits marked, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

LANDSCAPE

OLD CLAIMS WHICH THE ARCHIVES WILL PRODUCE

The Landscape: the three societies Austria found between the San and the Zbruch in 1772 — each of them the settled residue of an older conquest, and none of them expecting a fourth.

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The country and the people in it

The territory the Habsburg monarchy took in the summer of 1772 was about eighty-three thousand square kilometres of the southern Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, running east from the Carpathian foothills across the upper Vistula and the Dniester, and it carried something on the order of two and a half to two and three-quarter million people — the treaty parties’ own working figure was around 2,650,000, and the first Austrian count of 1789 returned 3,039,391 for a province that had by then been slightly redrawn. It was the largest single share of the partition by population and by far the most densely settled. Prussia’s slice was smaller and richer; Russia’s was larger and emptier. Austria took the people.

Who those people were is the first fact of the study, because almost nothing about the next hundred and forty-six years is legible without it. The province was not one country but two stapled together at the San. West of that river the population was overwhelmingly Polish, Roman Catholic, and — squire and peasant alike — spoke the same language and knelt at the same altar. East of it the arrangement was quite different and the difference was vertical rather than horizontal. The countryside was Ruthenian and Greek Catholic; the manor house was Polish and Roman Catholic; the market town held a Jewish majority or near-majority; and there was very little in between. The historian Ivan Rudnytsky quotes the Austrian statistician A. J. Brawer’s reconstruction of 1772 to the effect that the Roman Catholic Poles of Ruthenia were a small minority made up chiefly of noblemen and town-dwellers, with here and there an unfree peasant; and the first reliable count for the eastern half, in 1857, still put Roman

Catholics at only 21.5 per cent. A Polish social historian of the next century put the same fact from the other side: the Poles of eastern Galicia were spread across the whole of it and nowhere in a majority except in Lviv and its district, being concentrated in the towns and on the estates.

The Jewish population is where the figures diverge sharply and the divergence should be reported rather than resolved. The estimate carried by the YIVO literature and by Rachel Manekin's work puts the Jews of Galicia at annexation at between 150,000 and 200,000, or five to six and a half per cent; the older *Encyclopaedia Judaica* tradition gives a precise 224,980, or 9.6 per cent, distributed across 187 cities, 93 small towns and something over five thousand villages and homesteads. The Austrian counts of the following decade fluctuate wildly — 171,851 in 1773, 144,200 in 1776, 151,302 in 1780, 212,002 in 1785 — which is a statement about the reliability of early Habsburg enumeration and about flight from registration rather than about demography. What is not in dispute is the shape: this was one of the densest concentrations of Jewish population anywhere in Europe, and it was a town-and-village population with no land and no territorial claim of any kind. There were Armenians in Lviv with their own archbishop and their own rite, and there would soon be German colonists; but the load-bearing structure was three-sided, and the third side owned no ground.

So: a Ruthenian peasantry, a Polish nobility, and a Jewish population standing between them at the point where the extraction was actually collected. None of these three was the conqueror. That is the first thing to hold about Galicia and it is what makes the case unlike almost everything else in this collection.

The conquest before the conquest

Nobody in 1772 thought of Polish lordship in Ruthenia as a conquest, and they were right not to, in the sense that matters: it had stopped being one. But it began as one, and the date is knowable.

Yuri II Boleslav, the last prince of the Rus' principality of Halych–Volhynia, died on 7 April 1340, poisoned — the chroniclers say — by his own boyars. Casimir III of Poland moved within a fortnight. The campaign was not quick and it was not clean: the boyar leader Dmytro Dedko held the country with Tatar help, there was a battle on the Vistula in January 1341, and Lithuanian claims under Liubartas kept the war going for a generation. Casimir took Halych properly in 1349, the Lithuanian settlement

came in 1366, and the whole business runs from 1340 to 1366 with a long tail. By 1434 the country was administered as the Ruthenian Voivodeship under Polish law, and Lviv, a Rus' foundation of the 1250s, was a Polish royal city with Magdeburg rights.

Four centuries later Austria arrived. And what had happened in those four centuries is the thing this collection has learned to look for and which the record here shows with unusual clarity: the conquest naturalised not because the conquered were crushed but because the conquered *elite was admitted*. The Ruthenian boyars were not exterminated and were not held down as a defeated caste. They were made szlachta. They took the Latin rite, the Polish tongue, Polish coats of arms and Polish marriages, and within a few generations they were indistinguishable from the nobility of Kraków — so completely that by the nineteenth century it was a commonplace, repeated by Ukrainian and Polish writers alike, that the Polish nobility of eastern Galicia was largely of Rus' ancestry. There is a Galician saying, recorded later, that the Polish–Ukrainian frontier ran through the marriage bed.

This is the cheapest method on the whole menu and it works better than any of the expensive ones. Nothing had to be policed. No belief had to be installed by force in a hostile population, because the population that mattered politically had been absorbed rather than subdued, and everyone below it was left where he had always been, in the same villages, under lords who spoke a different language from his grandfathers' lords and were frequently descended from them. A conquest that ends this way does not look like a conquest afterwards. It looks like the furniture of the world.

Two things follow, and the study will spend a great deal of time on both. The first is that naming the Polish order a former conquest is not an argument against it. A built thing that has become real is more durable than a lie and more genuine, and the szlachta of 1772 who believed Galicia a Polish country were not dupes; they were correct about the world they had been born into, which is the only kind of correctness formation ever produces in anyone. The second is the price. Absorbing the conquered elite empties the conquered nation of everything except its bottom. What was left of Rus' in Galicia by 1772 was a peasantry and a village clergy, and nothing whatever in between — no nobility, no merchants of consequence, no schools above the parish, no court, no chancery, no press. That is a conquest completed. It is also, as it turned out, a population whose entire surviving institutional life ran through one channel, which meant that anybody who later chose to fund that channel would be funding the only counter-elite available, and would be doing it very cheaply, because there was no competitor to outbid.

What the szlachta had, and whom it was for

The Commonwealth that Austria dismembered held, at the top, one of the most extensive and most genuinely enforced systems of liberty in Europe, and this study will not diminish it in order to make a point. The protections were real, they were written, they bound the crown, and men went to law under them and won.

On 4 March 1430, at the Sejm of Jedlnia, Władysław II Jagiełło granted the guarantee known from its Latin as *neminem captivabimus nisi iure victum* — we shall imprison no one who has not been defeated at law — and confirmed it at Kraków in 1433. No arrest without a prior judicial conviction: the king could not seize a man at his pleasure. In 1505 the constitution *nihil novi* established that nothing new should be enacted by the king without the common consent of the senators and the land deputies. From 1573 the king was elected, and the Henrician Articles bound each new one before he was crowned; the Warsaw Confederation of the same year guaranteed peace between the faiths. There was a right of confederation, and behind it the *de non praestanda oboedientia* — a lawful right to renounce obedience to a king who broke his oath. From the mid-seventeenth century a single deputy could stop the Sejm.

Now set beside that the other set of statutes, made by the same assemblies, often in the same generation, sometimes in the same session.

The Piotrków statutes of 1496 ended peasant mobility: one holder per village might leave in a year, and one son. Townsmen were barred from buying noble land. The same body of legislation confirmed to the szlachta the *propinacja* — the exclusive right to produce and sell alcohol — which will matter enormously later. The Sejm decisions of 1518 and 1520 fixed a minimum of one day's labour a week from each full peasant holding, a *łan*, and named no maximum at all; by the eighteenth century the demand on a full holding commonly ran to several days a week and in the worst-documented cases far beyond. And in 1518 the crown's jurisdiction over peasants on private estates was surrendered to their lords; by 1521, on Norman Davies's account, the peasant's right to complain to the royal court was gone. The landlord was now owner and judge in one person.

The man who could not be imprisoned without a verdict and the man who had no court but his master's were manufactured by the same parliament in the same half-century. Roughly nine per cent of the Commonwealth's people were szlachta; roughly three-quarters were peasants. The liberties were not principles awaiting extension to those not yet ready for them. They were the terms of a settlement between a nobility

and a crown, drawn up by the winners, and their scope was the winners' scope. Nothing in the drafting is coy about this and nobody at the time was confused by it.

It is worth being exact about the economy that these two statute-books together produced, because it explains why the second one was written. The *folwark* — the lord's own demesne, worked by his tenants' compulsory labour and producing rye and wheat for the Vistula barges and the Gdańsk merchants — was the Commonwealth's engine, and its input was not money but days. A lord who wanted more grain did not hire; he demanded. The liberties above and the bondage below were not in tension. They were the same arrangement seen from its two ends: the nobility's freedom from the crown was precisely what allowed it to legislate the peasant's unfreedom without interference, and the peasant's labour was what made the nobility rich enough to defend its freedom. This is the sharpest inside-and-outside in early modern Europe, and it is the ground on which the whole of the study's central question will be fought.

A church built in 1595, and a clause left open for two centuries

The other institution Austria found, and the one it would spend money on, had also been built — and recently enough that the negotiation survives in full.

By the 1590s the Orthodox hierarchy of the Commonwealth was in a bad position and knew it. Its aristocratic patrons were drifting to Calvinism and then to Rome; its own laity, organised into urban brotherhoods with charters from the eastern patriarchs, was challenging episcopal authority from below; Constantinople was under Ottoman rule and had just, in 1589, elevated Moscow to a patriarchate that might claim jurisdiction. Six or seven bishops did what men in that position do. In June 1595 they drew up thirty-three articles setting out the terms on which they would enter communion with Rome, and they sent Hypatius Potii and Cyril Terletsky to get them guaranteed in advance by the Pope and the King.

Read as a document rather than as theology, the thirty-three articles are a straightforward negotiation over position, and three of their clauses will run through the rest of this study.

Article 9 asked that the marriages of priests remain intact. Article 12 asked, in terms, for standing: so that their authority should be greater, the metropolitan and the bishops requested seats in the Senate, on the express ground that they held the same office and hierarchical dignity as the Roman bishops. And article 21, which is the one to hold, asked that the Ruthenian clergy enjoy the same liberties as the Latin clergy —

and then, in the same clause, conceded that any priest holding church property within the territories of the senators and nobility was subject to them and must obey them, must not go to the courts or quarrel with the landlords, and must acknowledge the right of patronage.

That is a hierarchy bargaining for a hierarchy. What the bishops asked for themselves was a seat in the upper chamber. What they wrote down about the village priest was that he was the lord's man and should not sue. Both halves were drafted by the same hands on the same day.

The union was proclaimed at Brest in October 1596 and immediately split the Ruthenian church, with a rival synod meeting in the same town and anathematising it; the conflict ran for generations and produced its own martyrs. Galicia itself was the last ground to come over: the Przemyśl eparchy accepted the union in 1691 or 1692 (the sources differ), Lviv in 1700, Lutsk in 1702. So on the eve of the Austrian annexation the Greek Catholic Church had been the settled confession of eastern Galicia for about seventy years — well within living family memory — and its parish clergy were poor, thinly educated, and in the ordinary run of things subject to the Polish landowner on whose estate the church stood.

And article 12 had produced nothing. Not in 1596, not under John III Sobieski, not when the Galician eparchies finally joined, not in 1720 when the Synod of Zamość regularised the church's internal life. The Uniate metropolitan was admitted to the Senate of the Commonwealth in 1790, at the Four Years' Sejm, one hundred and ninety-five years after the request — by a legislature under existential pressure from Russia, in the middle of a reform programme aimed at making the state defensible, and two years before the second partition began dismembering it anyway.

The clause had been in the text the whole time. It was honoured at the moment a faction inside the hierarchy calculated that honouring it was cheaper than continuing without it.

The population that stood at the till

The third society had no land, no arms, and a legal existence entirely composed of grants that could be withdrawn.

The structural position is what matters, not the people occupying it, and the position was *arenda*: the lease. A nobleman with an estate and an aversion to administering it leased out its rights — the mill, the fishery, the dues, above all the

tavern under the propination monopoly the szlachta had voted itself in 1496 — for a fixed sum paid in advance, and the lessee kept whatever he could collect. He then ran the tavern, took the dues, worked the mill, and in many places exercised a delegated authority over the peasants who used them. The lord received money in Warsaw or Vienna without leaving his house. The peasant, at the one point in the year where the arrangement touched him hardest, met not his lord but the lord's lessee.

This is an ordinary structure and this collection has met versions of it on four continents: an extraction whose beneficiary is invisible and whose interface is staffed by a population that owns none of the gain and absorbs all of the resentment. It requires no malice from anybody in it to work exactly as described. It should be stated without the antisemite's story and without the apologist's, because the arrangement is legible without either: the noble monopoly was created by statute in 1496 for the benefit of the men who voted for it, and the leasing of its collection to a population that could be blamed and could not retaliate was a rational disposal of a liability. Where that liability eventually detonated — and it did, repeatedly, and most terribly in the western Galician rising of 1846 — the men who held the monopoly were not the ones standing in the road.

Against that, the same population held, until eight years before the annexation, the most developed institution of corporate Jewish self-government anywhere in Europe. The Council of Four Lands — the *Va'ad Arba' Aratzot* — had met from about 1580, twice a year at the Lublin and Jarosław fairs, apportioning the crown's poll tax among the communities, adjudicating between them, legislating, licensing printing, funding relief. Its formal warrant was fiscal; everyone including the crown understood it to be a government. On 17 July 1764 the Sejm abolished it, replacing the apportioned levy with collection from each Jewish subject directly, per head — because a body that assessed its own communities collected a surplus for its own purposes, and the treasury wanted the whole sum.

So the Commonwealth, in its last decade, stripped out the buffer between one of its populations and its own revenue officers, and replaced a negotiated corporate levy with a head tax. Austria did not have to flatten that leg of the structure. It arrived to find it already flat, and the instrument that had flattened it was a Polish statute passed for money.

How it ended, and who ended it

The Commonwealth did not fall to a rising. It fell the way this collection almost always finds orders falling: from inside the hierarchy, and from above.

The liberties described earlier had, by the eighteenth century, produced a state that could not tax, could not keep an army, and could not legislate against the objection of a single deputy — which is to say that the szlachta's victory over its kings had been complete enough to leave nobody able to defend the country the szlachta owned. In 1768 a body of nobles formed the Confederation of Bar against Russian influence and a king they held to be Russia's creature, exercising a right of confederation that was itself one of the golden liberties; four years of civil war followed, with Russian troops in the country throughout. The peasants were in it as they are in everything, as recruits and as corpses. They were not in it as agents.

Austria's first move was not an invasion. In 1769 and 1770 Habsburg troops threw a cordon around the Spisz starosty and then Nowy Targ and Czerwona — territory pledged to Poland by Hungary in 1412 and never redeemed — and began exercising sovereign rights inside it. Warsaw complained. Kaunitz answered, and here the record produces an unusually clear-sighted witness, because Frederick II of Prussia was watching the whole thing from outside and wrote down what he saw.

In a despatch to his envoy at St Petersburg on 20 February 1771, Frederick reported the cordon, the ninety-seven villages inside it, the sovereign acts already performed, and Kaunitz's vague replies to the Polish protests — replies which, he observed, plainly signalled an intention to assert ancient rights, and which meant that Vienna was very probably already at work constructing a case to support the seizures. He then drew the obvious conclusion. If the Austrians were going to truncate Poland, the thing to do was to imitate them: to assert, as Vienna was asserting, "*old claims which the archives will produce for me*", and to take a province that could be handed back if Vienna desisted or kept if it did not.

That is a reigning monarch describing the manufacture of legal title in advance, in writing, to a subordinate, without embarrassment, as a normal instrument of state. He is not deceived and he does not expect the Poles to be deceived. Nor does he need them to be: the archive is not for them. Nobody in this transaction is confused about what is happening, which is why this framework holds that the fiction in such an instrument is almost never aimed at the people it dispossesses. It is aimed at the audience whose belief the acquiring state actually runs on — the chanceries of Europe, the courts of law, and, in the century that followed, the taxpayer and the conscript at home.

Vienna's case duly appeared. Kaunitz had already encouraged research into the medieval claims of the Hungarian crown, and in 1772 the names of the old Rus' principalities of Halych and Volodymyr surfaced in Habsburg deliberations: Hungary had asserted a claim to them as early as the twelfth century and had briefly held them in the thirteenth and again in the fourteenth, Poland having acquired the region only under Casimir; therefore Maria Theresa, as queen of Hungary, could be furnished with a title to a "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria" whose boundaries could be construed to cover, near enough, the share on offer. The historian Larry Wolff has traced the manoeuvre in detail, including its purpose: Vienna could then affirm a *revindication* — a recovery of what was already hers — and avoid the word *partition*, which the empress found repugnant. The kingdom being revindicated had not existed for four hundred years, and the Hungarian occupations on which the whole thing rested had lasted a few years each. The province had had no such name the day before, and Pergen, the man appointed to govern it, was as late as the end of August 1772 still unsure what it was to be called.

The agreement was signed at Vienna on 19 February 1772 and the partition treaty at St Petersburg on 5 August. Troops of all three powers had entered the country before the signatures. Maria Theresa's objection is documented and it was not a performance: she is recorded as asking what right they had to rob an innocent nation they had made it their boast to protect, and, returning the signed agreement to Kaunitz, as writing on it that she assented "*because so many great and learned men wish it*" — adding that long after her death people would see what came of violating everything that had until then been held holy and just. Frederick's reported comment, that she wept but she took, has been quoted ever since; it is the kind of line that gets attached to an occasion, and its exact provenance is looser than its fame.

The framework's sharpest diagnostic applies here and returns a clean reading. Force never pays for what it does not need. Austria's army was on the ground, the Commonwealth's was in pieces, and there was no military obstacle whatever to a plain announcement of conquest — Prussia and Russia were making theirs in the same month. Vienna nonetheless spent chancery time, scholarly labour and diplomatic ingenuity on excavating a dead Árpád title, and then spent decades printing that title on every coin, seal and letterhead of the new crownland. The expenditure is the evidence. It tells us that some audience required a currency the sword could not mint — and it tells us which audience, because it certainly was not the Ruthenian peasant, who would not hear the word *Lodomeria* for a century and would not have known

what to do with it, and it was not the szlachta, who knew precisely what had been done to them and needed no explanation.

On the eve, then: a Ruthenian peasantry under an unlimited *corvée* with no court to appeal to, whose nation had been absorbed upward four centuries earlier and whose only remaining institution was a poor married clergy that had entered communion with Rome within living memory on terms that gave the bishops a promise and the village priest a landlord. A Polish nobility holding the most extensive liberties in Europe and the harshest serfdom on the continent, by the same statutes, at the same time. A Jewish population of somewhere between a hundred and fifty and two hundred and twenty-five thousand souls, standing at the collection point of an extraction it did not own, with its one corporate institution abolished eight years earlier by the state that had chartered it. And, approaching from the west, a monarchy with an army, an empty treasury, a fresh loss in Silesia to make up, and a genealogist at work in the archives.

Reading the eve of 1772 against the framework

The framework holds that liberty is residue — that it accumulates where factions with independent bases fight each other for protection *from each other*, and that the protections they win for themselves later become available to people they were never meant for. Galicia's eve supplies an unusually clean specimen of the second half of that mechanism, and it suggests the collection has been describing it slightly wrong.

This collection has previously found that a legitimating formula starts to behave like a right at the point where some institution is obliged to receive people repeating it back. Article 12 of the Brest articles complicates that. There was no shortage of fora in the Commonwealth: there was a Sejm, a Senate, royal and land courts, a whole architecture of petition and privilege, and the Ruthenian bishops knew how to use it, since drafting the thirty-three articles was itself an expert exercise in it. The clause failed for one hundred and ninety-five years not because there was nowhere to press it but because no faction in the hierarchy had any reason to pay for it. The Latin episcopate did not want the competition, the szlachta did not want another interest in the upper house, and the crown was too weak to impose it against either. Then, in 1790, a legislature trying to save a state from Russia found that it needed its Ruthenian subjects, and the clause was executed at once — not because anyone had finally won the argument, and not because

the age had grown more just, but because a faction had come to hold the option and had found it cheaper to exercise than to fight without it.

The refinement this returns to the framework: a written promise left unredeemed is not a dormant right waiting for the law to catch up with it. It is an unexercised option, and the option is held not by the party named in the clause but by whichever faction inside the hierarchy later finds honouring it cheaper than the alternative. The promisee does not hold the option. He can only wait to become useful, and make himself as useful as he can. This is the same shape as the more famous English case — the free man of 1215 was the tenant-in-chief, the villein was outside the word, and the word waited centuries for parties who found it convenient — and stating it as a rule rather than as an English peculiarity is what the case is for. It also converts the study's central question into something testable: everything the Ruthenians gained between 1772 and 1918 should be datable to the moment some faction found it cheaper to concede than to refuse, and where a gain cannot be so dated, the framework is in trouble and the module concerned must say so.

Two observations follow which are not contributions yet and should not be dressed as ones. The first is that the absorption of the Ruthenian boyars into the szlachta — the cheapest and most complete naturalisation of a conquest in this collection — left the conquered nation with exactly one institution, which is a condition that ought to make an incoming power's counterweight-buying unusually cheap and unusually consequential. Whether Vienna's expenditure on the Greek Catholic clergy is best read as counterweight politics, as the price of a claim that had to be performed, or as both, is precisely what the robe and formation modules must establish, and it is the thing the previous study on this ground asserted in a paragraph and never tested. The second is that the married-clergy clause of 1595 turned the Ruthenian priesthood into a set of households rather than a payroll, which means that any later investment in it should compound across generations instead of stopping when the funding stops. That is a prediction. It has a date range attached to it and it can fail.

A note on sources.

Exact primary quotation is confined to three items and each is flagged. Frederick II's despatch to Count von Solms from Potsdam, 20 February 1771, is quoted from C. A. Macartney's English translation in *The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1970), as reproduced by German History in

Documents and Images; the French original is in Koser's *Aus der Vorgeschichte der ersten Teilung Polens* and in the *Politische Korrespondenz Friedrich des Großen*, vol. XXX, which I have not been able to consult, so the English wording quoted is Macartney's and not Frederick's. Maria Theresa's note returning the signed partition agreement to Kaunitz is quoted from an English rendering in the public-domain *Great Men and Famous Women* (ed. C. F. Horne, 1894/1904); I could not verify the German original and the rendering should be treated as a nineteenth-century translation of uncertain fidelity. Her remark about robbing an innocent nation, and Frederick's reported jibe that she wept but she took, are widely attributed and I have not traced either to a manuscript; both are given here as reported rather than documented, and neither carries any weight in the argument. The clauses of the Union of Brest are from the thirty-three articles subscribed in June 1595, in an English translation reproduced identically on several ecclesiastical sites whose translator I could not identify; I have not checked it against the Ruthenian or Polish original, and anyone building further on articles 9, 12 and 21 should. *Neminem captivabimus nisi iure victum* (Jedlnia, 4 March 1430, confirmed Kraków 1433) and *nihil novi* (1505) are cited by their standard Latin titles.

Everything else is paraphrased from modern scholarship and credited where it does work. Larry Wolff's *The Idea of Galicia* (2010) supplies the account of Kaunitz's commissioning of research into the Hungarian claims, the surfacing of Halych and Vladimir in 1772, the framing of the seizure as a revindication to avoid the word partition, and Pergen's uncertainty about the province's name. Ivan L. Rudnytsky's "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule" (1982) supplies the social structure of the province and the Brawer and Bujak figures on the distribution of the Polish population; Brawer's *Galizien wie es an Oesterreich kam* (1910) and Bujak's *Galicya* (1908) are cited there and I have not consulted either directly. Norman Davies is the source, at second hand, for 1521 as the terminus of the peasant's appeal to the royal courts; accounts vary between 1518 and 1521 for when seigneurial jurisdiction became total and I have given both dates rather than choosing. Rachel Manekin's work, via YIVO, and the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* tradition are the two estimators for the Jewish population of 1772, and their figures — 150,000–200,000 at 5–6.5 per cent against 224,980 at 9.6 per cent — differ by more than a third; I have reported the range and named the estimators rather than splitting the difference, and the Austrian counts of 1773–85 are given as evidence of the instrument's unreliability rather than of population change.

Three limitations weaken parts of this module and should be recorded at the point of use. First, I have no figure for the actual corvée burden in eastern Galicia in the decades immediately before 1772; the statutory minimum of 1518–20 and the reported extremes are not a distribution, and the Austrian ceiling of three days a week and 156 days a year, imposed after annexation, is evidence about what Vienna thought excessive rather than about what was being demanded. The extraction module will need the Rozdolski material and should not proceed on my ranges. Second, I have not established what proportion of Galician estates were actually under *arenda* in 1772, nor the terms, and the structural account of the lease given here therefore describes an institution whose incidence I cannot quantify — which matters, because how much of the peasant's world ran through that interface is exactly the question Module 6 turns on. Third, the claim that the Greek Catholic parish clergy were commonly subject to labour obligations to their landlords rests on article 21's own drafting and on the Habsburg reform measures that later relieved them, not on estate records; that is inference from the remedy backwards to the grievance, and it should be checked against Galician visitation records before Module 4 leans on it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 1 · THE FLOOR OF FORCE

THE CASTLE HAD ALREADY FALLEN

Module 1, the floor of force: what organised violence it took to make the annexation of 1772 mean something on the ground — counted honestly across a century, and across the armies that were not Austria's.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The state that had voted away its army

Begin with the arithmetic, because everything about August 1772 follows from it and nothing else needs to be invoked.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had the money to keep something on the order of twenty-four thousand men under arms, and by the eve of the partition the figure was nearer sixteen thousand. Russia's standing army was around three hundred thousand. Prussia's and Austria's were around a hundred and fifty thousand each and rising toward two hundred thousand within a generation. The Commonwealth was the third-largest territory in Europe and it could field a force smaller than a single corps of any of the three states surrounding it — smaller, in the field, than the Confederation of Bar's own irregulars at their height.

This was not an accident of poverty and it was not incompetence. It was a constitutional achievement, and the men who achieved it had understood exactly what they were doing. A standing army is the crown's instrument, paid for by taxes the crown collects, officered by men the crown promotes, and available to the crown on the day it decides to govern without asking anybody. A nobility that has spent three centuries establishing that the king may not imprison it without a verdict, may not legislate without its consent, may not raise a levy without its vote and may be lawfully disobeyed if he breaks his oath, has by that very success removed the instrument that would have made a Polish state capable of defending Polish liberty. The Silent Sejm of

1717, which fixed the military establishment on paper in the presence of Russian troops, and every subsequent session that declined to raise it, were not failures of the szlachta's constitution. They were the constitution operating correctly. It had been built to prevent a Polish absolutism and it succeeded completely, which is why by 1772 there was nothing in the country that could stop a foreign one.

Hold that beside the other half of the same settlement — the peasant who could not leave his village, whose corvée had a statutory floor and no ceiling, and who by the 1520s had no court but his lord's — and the picture is complete. The liberties and the defencelessness were one fact. The men who could not be arrested arbitrarily were the same men who had voted not to pay for an army, and the men who might have filled that army were the same men who had been made unable to leave the estates of the first group. A country cannot be defended by subjects who are forbidden to move and will not be armed, and it will not be defended by a nobility that has made taxation contingent on its own unanimity. Somebody was going to present that bill, and it happened to be Vienna, Berlin and St Petersburg together.

The four months before August

What Austria actually did in 1772 was walk in. The interesting question is why it cost nothing, and the answer is not that Galicia was undefended. It is that Galicia had been defeated four months earlier by somebody else's army.

The Confederation of Bar, formed at Bar in Podolia on 29 February 1768, had been fighting Russia and its own king for four years. It was a szlachta rising conducted under the szlachta's own constitutional right of confederation, it drew in something between one and one and a half hundred thousand men across its life, it acquired French officers and French money from 1770, and by the end it had been ground down by Russian regulars. Its fortified line on the upper Vistula — Lanckorona, Tyniec, the approaches to Kraków — was reduced by Alexander Suvorov in 1771: three engagements at Lanckorona in February and May, the last of them a rout in which some five hundred confederates were killed and two hundred taken. In February 1772 a French-led detachment under the Marquis de Choisy got into the castle of Kraków by a sewer and held it. Suvorov besieged it from 4 February to 26 April 1772 and took it.

The partition treaty was signed at St Petersburg on 5 August 1772. The Wawel had fallen fourteen weeks earlier, to Russian troops, in a war Austria was not fighting. When the imperial columns crossed the line that summer there were no formed bodies

left in the Austrian zone to oppose them; the sieges the record remembers from 1772 — Tyniec, Częstochowa, Kraków — are Russian operations against Poles, concluded before or during the Austrian entry rather than caused by it.

Two further details belong here because they are what the framework calls reading against the grain. Austria had been sheltering the Confederation's executive board at Cieszyn and expelled it when the arrangement with Berlin and St Petersburg matured; and Austria's own first physical move into Commonwealth territory, in 1769 and 1770, had been the cordon thrown around the Spisz starosty and then Nowy Targ and Czerwona, which by Frederick II's count enclosed several towns and ninety-seven villages and inside which Vienna began exercising sovereign rights before it possessed any title to them.

So the honest entry in the first column for 1772 is not "a bloodless annexation." It is that the violence required to make the annexation possible was performed, over four years, by the Russian army, and that Austria's own contribution to clearing the ground was a police cordon and the eviction of the losers from its territory. This is a real thing and the framework should name it: **a conqueror's floor need not be his own**, and where it is not, counting only the acquirer's casualties will report a cheapness that never existed. It existed for Austria. It did not exist. The bill had been paid in a different currency by a different treasury, and the province Vienna received had been beaten into acquiescence by men whose flag it never flew.

What the floor actually was: a permanent draft of bodies

The organised violence that held Galicia for the next century was not a garrison in the old sense. It was a recruiting system, and it ran continuously from the 1780s to 1918.

Conscription on the Josephine model operated in the Hereditary and Bohemian lands from 1781, worked off population rolls assigned to each regiment's district. From 1782 the German regiments were given *Aushilfsbezirke* — supplementary districts — in Galicia, and the province became a reservoir. By 1802 Galicia was contributing something on the order of fifty-four thousand Poles and Ruthenians to the imperial army, and in 1808, when the recruiting districts were reorganised, eleven regiments were transferred to the province. Liability ran to able-bodied men between seventeen and forty, with those between eighteen and twenty-six taken first. Before 1802 the term was twenty-five years, which for a peasant conscript meant the rest of his working life.

The exemption schedule is the document to read, because it says who the state had decided the burden should fall on. Nobles were exempt. Priests were exempt. Skilled workers, miners, men in licensed factories and a great many townsmen were exempt. Free peasants and their eldest sons were exempt. What remained was the younger sons of the unfree villages and the urban poor. The recruiting system did not need a law naming the Galician serf; it needed only a list of the people it would not take, and the arithmetic did the rest.

And then the detail that turns the whole apparatus into an instrument rather than a payroll. Through the nineteenth century it was Habsburg policy to quarter regiments far from the districts that raised them, so that troops used against a rising would have no ties to the people in front of them. The Galician uhlan regiments — raised in Galicia, from Galicians — were garrisoned in Italy into the 1840s. The men who stood in Lviv and Tarnów were Bohemians, Hungarians, Croats and Germans. It is only in the 1890s, when the general staff had concluded that the next war would open on this ground, that the five Galician uhlan regiments were brought home to Lviv and Jarosław.

Set that against the framework's ordinary expectation and it reads clearly. The empire took the province's young men, sent them a thousand miles away, and used somebody else's young men to hold the province. Both halves are the same policy, and the policy is a solution to a problem the framework names precisely: the floor is only credible if the man holding the musket will actually fire. Distance is the cheapest way to guarantee that, and it costs the treasury nothing beyond the marching.

Two tests, and one that mattered

The floor was tested three times before 1867 and the results were not uniform.

In the spring of 1809 it failed outright. Archduke Ferdinand invaded the Duchy of Warsaw with some thirty thousand men, was fought to a standstill by Józef Poniatowski at Raszyn on 19 April, took Warsaw — and then found Poniatowski, instead of defending it, marching south into Galicia and taking the province apart. Lublin fell on 14 May, Sandomierz on 18 May, Zamość on 20 May, Lviv on 27 May, and a Provisional Central Military Government of Galicia was established in the provincial capital. Austrian garrisons surrendered. Where the Polish army came, Polish administration reappeared within days, which is an unambiguous statement about how deep the Austrian floor had gone in thirty-seven years. The Austrians retook Lviv

in June; the war was decided elsewhere, at Wagram on 6 July; and at Schönbrunn on 14 October 1809 Austria gave up the whole of the Third Partition acquisition — West Galicia, with Kraków and Lublin, some fifty-one thousand square kilometres and one and three-quarter million people — to the Duchy of Warsaw, and the Tarnopol district to Russia. Most of it came back in 1815. The lesson Vienna took from 1809 was about garrisons and loyalty, and it kept the uhlans in Italy.

The second test came in 1846 and it is the event this module exists for.

The Polish democratic emigration had planned a general rising across all three partitions. What actually happened was that the Kraków rising went off, and in the Tarnów country the peasants rose against the manors instead. Between mid-February and the end of March, mainly around Tarnów, Jasło, Bochnia, Wieliczka and Stary Sącz, at least four hundred and seventy manor houses were destroyed — something like ninety per cent of them in the Tarnów district — and estimates of the dead among landowners, their families and estate officials run from about a thousand to about two thousand, with the wider count of all deaths given in some accounts as high as three thousand. At Gdów the peasants fought alongside Austrian regulars against the Polish insurgents. The *corvée* was the grievance; the manorial prison and the manorial rod were the grievance; the men who had been beaten by their lord's bailiff came for their lord.

Whether Vienna made this happen is genuinely contested, and this study will not pretend to settle it. A substantial body of scholarship holds it as established that the Austrian bureaucracy deliberately exploited peasant discontent, and points to the district officer of Tarnów, Johann Breindl von Wallerstein, and his contacts with the peasant leader Jakub Szela from at least 1845. Alan Sked's work holds the opposite — that the authorities knew nothing of what was coming and were appalled by the result — and Hahn, who accepts the general finding, still records that the bureaucracy's role has never been fully explained. What is *not* contested is that peasants were told, in the districts, that helping to put down the noble insurgents would relieve them of their obligations; that Szela was afterwards resettled in Bukovina with a land grant rather than tried; and that the peasants who had done the killing were then returned to the *corvée* they had risen against, which continued for another two years.

And there is the picture. Jan Lewicki's lithograph of 1846 shows Austrian officers paying out salt and coin to peasants delivering the severed heads of Polish noblemen. Historians are broadly agreed that this did not happen. The image is nonetheless one of the most valuable documents of the episode, because it is not evidence about what the

Austrian administration did; it is evidence about what the Polish nobility of Galicia believed the Austrian administration had done, believed it immediately, and went on believing for seventy years. A study of how orders hold has to record both facts and keep them apart.

The structural outcome does not depend on resolving the dispute. After the spring of 1846 the Polish landed nobility of Galicia knew that it could not raise the Galician countryside against Austria, because the one time it tried, the countryside came for the manor. That is a demonstration of where organised violence actually sat, and it was made without the Habsburg army being the principal instrument. The Free City of Kraków was annexed in November of the same year and the last fragment of Polish statehood on the map disappeared, against no resistance at all.

The third test was 1848, and the two halves of that year should be stated in one breath because they were performed by the same administration seven months apart. On 22 April, Governor Franz Stadion abolished the *corvée* and hereditary tenancy in Galicia by decree, without waiting for imperial legislation, in order to take the peasant question out of the hands of the Polish democrats who had intended to claim it. In the first week of November, General Hammerstein bombarded Lviv from the citadel for some three hours, burning the town hall, the academy building, the library and the museum. A committee of prominent residents surrendered the city; a state of siege was proclaimed; martial law followed; houses were searched; the Academic Legion was disarmed and the National Guard reorganised. Kraków had been bombarded in April. The concession and the artillery were not a contradiction and were not a change of policy. They were the two dials of one instrument, and 1848 in Galicia is the clearest place in the case to watch a single administration turn both of them inside a single year.

After that, very little

The count for the remaining seventy years is thin, and the thinness is itself the finding. There was no rising in Galicia after 1848. The Polish nobility was given the province to administer in 1867 and had no further use for insurrection; the Ruthenians never attempted one and said so repeatedly in public; the Radicals were prosecuted rather than shot, and Franko's trial in 1878 produced a career rather than a martyr. The single lethal political act of the constitutional era was the assassination of the viceroy, Count Andrzej Potocki, by a Ukrainian student, Myroslav Sichynsky, in 1908 — the act of one man, not the outcome of a plot, and it changed nothing.

What the state built instead was a fortress and a mobilisation plan aimed at Russia. Przemyśl grew into one of the largest fortified complexes in Europe, the Galician cavalry came home in the 1890s, and by 1914 Lemberg was one of the monarchy's principal eastern garrisons. That armament was never pointed at the Galicians. It was pointed east, and when it was finally used the province became a battlefield rather than a policing problem, which belongs to a later module.

Reading the floor of force in Galicia against the framework

The seed handed to this study warned against forcing a war narrative onto 1772 because the founding column is nearly empty. Counted the ordinary way it is: Austria lost almost nobody taking a province of two and a half million people. But counted the way this module has counted it, the column is not empty. It is displaced, twice, and both displacements are the same correction.

The first displacement is in the acquisition. The armed force that broke Galicia's capacity to resist was Russian, it did its work between 1768 and April 1772, and Austria arrived afterwards to occupy ground that had already been cleared. The second is in the holding. The demonstration that settled who held organised violence in the province was made in February and March 1846 by Galician peasants against Galician landlords, with Habsburg regulars present at Gdów but not principal, and with the question of Vienna's instigation unresolved and probably unresolvable. In between and around both, the standing apparatus was a conscription system that took the province's young men away and posted other provinces' young men in their place.

The refinement this returns to the framework is that the floor of force is not necessarily composed of the conqueror's own men, and a study that counts only the men in his uniform will systematically misprice his acquisitions. Three forms show up in this one case and they should be looked for in every other. A floor can be *subcontracted*, where another power's army does the breaking and the acquirer takes the ground — which makes a cheap-looking annexation a claim about whose blood rather than about how much. It can be *rotated*, where the conqueror's soldiers are deliberately drawn from populations with no tie to the ground they stand on, so that the credibility of the threat is manufactured by distance rather than by discipline. And it can be *delegated downward*, where the population beneath an intermediate class is the instrument that disciplines that class, and the state at the top is a beneficiary whether or not it was an author.

The third of these is the one worth carrying, because it is the framework's own default mechanism operating on the violence leg rather than the wealth leg. The framework holds that a settled order reproduces itself without a conspiracy, because each position-holder defending his own position defends the whole arrangement by accident. Galicia in 1846 shows the same structure producing a floor: the arrangement Austria had inherited placed a Polish nobility between an imperial state and a peasantry it held in *corvée*, judged in its own manorial courts, and flogged in its own manorial prisons — and the moment that nobility moved against the state, the alignment fired on its own. Vienna did not need a plan for that to happen. Whether it had one is a question about the moral standing of particular officials in Tarnów; it is not a question about the mechanism, which was already loaded and pointed before anybody in Tarnów did anything at all. **The cheapest floor available to any conqueror is a grievance already standing between him and the class he needs disciplined, and its cheapness is exactly what makes it impossible afterwards to establish whether he pulled the trigger.**

Two things this module cannot yet do, which the following ones must. It cannot say what the *corvée* burden actually was in the villages that rose, and therefore cannot price the grievance it has just made load-bearing. And it has deliberately not asked what story was told about any of this — what a partition dressed as a revindication, a conscription dressed as a duty, and a peasant massacre dressed as loyalty to the emperor were said to mean. That is the next question, and the answer will turn out to be addressed to more audiences at once than this collection has previously had to track.

A note on sources.

This module rests almost entirely on paraphrased modern scholarship and reference literature, and no primary text is quoted in it; the one primary voice carried over — Frederick II's despatch of 20 February 1771 describing the Austrian cordon and its ninety-seven villages — was quoted and its translation flagged in the preceding section of this study, and is used here only in summary.

Figures. The Commonwealth's funded military establishment (about 24,000 in mid-century, nearer 16,000 by the partition) and the comparative strengths of Russia, Prussia and Austria are from the standard reference literature on the Commonwealth's military and should be treated as orders of magnitude rather than musters; the Silent Sejm of 1717 is named here as the moment the establishment was fixed under Russian

pressure, and readers should note I have not verified the statutory figure it set against the text of its constitutions. The Bar Confederation's cumulative strength of roughly 100,000–150,000 is a total across four years, not a field army, and the distinction matters. Suvorov's siege of Kraków castle is dated 4 February to 26 April 1772 New Style; the Lanckorona casualty figures (about 500 killed, 200 taken in the third clash of 21 or 23 May 1771 — the sources give both dates) are Russian-side reports and should be treated accordingly.

The conscription material — the 1781 system, the Galician supplementary districts from 1782, the figure of about 54,000 Galician soldiers by 1802, the transfer of eleven regiments in 1808, the twenty-five-year term before 1802, and the exemption schedule — comes from the Napoleonic-era Austrian army literature and I have not seen the underlying muster returns; the 54,000 figure in particular is a single reported number and I would not build an argument on its precision. The policy of quartering regiments away from their recruiting districts, and the specific fact that the Galician uhlan regiments were garrisoned in Italy into the 1840s and returned to Lviv and Jarosław in the 1890s, comes from the regimental histories deriving from Wrede's *Geschichte der k. und k. Wehrmacht* (1898–1909); it is the most load-bearing single fact in the module and deserves checking against Wrede directly.

The events of 1809 follow the standard accounts of the Austro-Polish campaign and the Treaty of Schönbrunn of 14 October 1809; note that “West Galicia” in that treaty means the Third Partition acquisition of 1795, including Kraków and Lublin, and not the western half of the 1772 province, and that confusing the two will produce nonsense.

The 1846 rising is where the historiography is most divided and I have reported the division rather than resolving it. The physical figures — at least 470 manor houses destroyed, roughly 90 per cent of those in the Tarnów district — are the commonest in the literature. The death toll is given as a range because the estimators disagree: roughly 1,000–2,000 for landowners, their families and estate officials is the usual band, with wider counts to 3,000 in some accounts, and a figure of about 1,000 nobles killed and 500 manors destroyed circulating as a round summary. On Austrian instigation, Hahn reports it as generally accepted that the authorities deliberately exploited peasant dissatisfaction and points to the Tarnów district officer Breindl von Wallerstein's contacts with Szela; Bideleux and Jeffries, citing Alan Sked (1989), record the contrary view that the authorities knew nothing and were appalled; Hahn himself notes the bureaucracy's role has never been fully explained. Jan Lewicki's lithograph showing

officers paying salt and cash for noblemen's heads is treated here as evidence of Polish elite belief rather than of Austrian practice, which is how the specialist literature treats it. Szela's medal is reported as fact by Magocsi and others and I have not traced it to a document; his resettlement in Bukovina with a land grant is better attested and is what I have relied on.

The bombardment of Lviv is dated in the first week of November 1848; most accounts give 2 November, while the account drawing on Magocsi's *Galicia: A Multicultured Land* gives 6 November, and I have not been able to resolve the discrepancy — the substance (Hammerstein, roughly three hours, the town hall, academy, library and museum burnt, the surrender by a committee of residents, the state of siege, the disarming of the Academic Legion) is consistent across them. Stadion's decree abolishing the *corvée* is dated 22 April 1848 and is well attested.

The largest hole in this module is that I have no casualty figure of any kind for the Austrian occupation of 1772 itself, in either direction, and no return showing the size of the force that entered. I have therefore argued that Austria's cost was near-zero from the absence of recorded fighting and from the state of the Confederation's forces in April, which is an inference from silence. It is the sort of inference this project's own discipline warns against, and if a muster or a casualty return exists in the Vienna war archives it would either confirm the reading or embarrass it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 2 · THE SETTLEMENT

NEITHER SCHOOLS NOR THE SICK

Module 2, the settlement: who got what after 1772 — and how a definition of usefulness converted four centuries of accumulated church endowment into a current revenue without anyone having to announce a seizure.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Property that belonged to nobody who could sell it

Start with the largest concentration of wealth in the province that was not the nobility's, because it is the one the state actually took, and because taking it required an operation the framework has not yet had to name.

By 1770 the Habsburg lands held something on the order of two thousand one hundred and sixty-three religious houses with more than forty-five thousand monks and nuns in them. Galicia's share was substantial and old: Benedictines at Tyniec from the eleventh century, Dominicans and Franciscans from the thirteenth, Carmelites of both observances, Bernardines, Jesuit foundations inherited from the suppression of 1773, and beside them the Basilian monasteries of the Greek rite. Over five to seven hundred years these houses had accumulated villages, arable, forest, mills, fishponds, urban tenements, cash endowments and — the item that turns out to matter most — perpetual charges laid on other people's land for the saying of masses.

The point about all of it is not that it was large. It is that it could not be sold, and not because a law forbade the sale but because there was nobody in a position to be the seller. A monastic estate was held in mortmain, the dead hand: given by a founder, in perpetuity, for a stated spiritual purpose, and thereafter belonging in the only sense that mattered to the purpose rather than to the persons in the habit. The abbot was a steward with a term of years and a duty. A chantry endowment was land whose income was owed to the souls of people three centuries dead. You cannot buy that from

anybody, because nobody holds it; alienating it would not be a bad bargain but a category error, in the same way that selling your place in your clan is a category error.

The collection has met this shape before on the other side of the world and named it — the settlement's first act is a conversion of a relation into a thing, because relations cannot be granted and things can. Church land is not quite a relation between persons; it is a thing owned by an obligation. But the problem it poses to a treasury is identical, and so is the solution. Before any of it could be taken, something had to be done that made it takeable.

The test that made it sellable

On 12 January 1782 Joseph II decreed the dissolution of all houses of men and women that did not keep schools, care for the sick, or engage in learning. Different renderings of the criterion circulate — houses with no school, that did not nurse, did not preach or hear confessions, or did not distinguish themselves in scholarship — but the structure of the test is the same in all of them and it is the structure that matters. On 28 February 1782 the Religionsfonds, the religious fund, was constituted to receive what the dissolutions released.

Read the decree as an instrument and notice what it does not say. It does not say the property belongs to the state. It does not deny the church's title, question any founder's gift, or accuse a single monk of anything. It says what a religious house is *for*. Having said that, it abolishes the houses that are not for it — and an abolished corporation's endowment has no beneficiary, and property without a beneficiary devolves upon the sovereign as a matter of the most ordinary law. The taking is not in the decree. The taking is the consequence of a definition, and by the time it happens no further act of state is required.

This is the settlement's technology in an unusually pure form. Elsewhere in this collection the conversion runs from a relation into a thing — office-land into estate, clan right into parcel, occupation into vacancy. Here it runs from a *perpetuity into a term*: an endowment held forever for a purpose becomes an institution held conditionally for a function, and a conditional holding can fail its condition. Nobody has to lie. The founder's intention is not denied; it is simply no longer the thing that decides.

And it must be said plainly, because the framework's own guard rail requires it, that this was not a fraud dressed as a reform. Joseph believed the criterion, a great many

clergy believed it, and the reform genuinely delivered: something like eight hundred new parishes in Galicia and the neighbouring lands in 1782–83 on the Polish accounts, more than three thousand across the whole reorganisation on the Habsburg ones, schools in former cloisters, hospitals and poorhouses in others, and a rule that no parishioner should be more than an hour's walk from a church. Law cannot legitimate unless it genuinely delivers a great deal of the time. The delivery is the mechanism working, not an embarrassment to reading it.

The scale is reported on incompatible bases and should be given as a range with the bases named. Across the monarchy, seven hundred and thirty-eight houses of two thousand one hundred and sixty-three were suppressed by 1786, displacing something like thirty-eight to forty thousand religious. On the narrower count of the German-Austrian, Bohemian, Moravian and Galician lands together, three hundred and eighty-eight of nine hundred and fifteen houses were closed — two hundred and eighty of men, one hundred and eight of women. For Galicia specifically, the Polish scholarship gives seventy-five male and female houses suppressed under Joseph. From 1783 the emphasis shifted from the contemplative orders to the wealthy prelacies, and episcopal estates were secularised alongside them; and the fund's reach was extended until it swallowed not only the dissolved houses' land but endowments for masses and altars, for chapels of ease, confraternities, processions and pilgrimages — the whole apparatus of perpetual charge, absorbed into a ledger that undertook to go on saying the masses wherever the endowment could be proved.

Where it went, and what it bought

Out of the fund came two things: pensions for the religious who had been turned out, and salaries for parish clergy.

The second is the settlement's real content and it should be stated with precision, because nothing visible changed and everything changed. Before, a parish priest lived from his benefice — the glebe, the tithe portion, the stole fees — and from the goodwill of the patron who had presented him, who in Galicia was overwhelmingly the local Polish landowner, and who could make an inconvenient priest's life difficult without ever removing him. After, the priest drew a stipend from a state fund, on a schedule fixed in Vienna, administered by officials of the crown. Same man, same church, same village, same congregation. Different source. And the source is the tie.

Joseph was explicit about what he had bought. The parish priest was to be, in effect, an official with a congregation: he was to read imperial decrees from the pulpit and explain them, spread agricultural and medical knowledge, combat superstition, exhort his people to industry and morality, and teach the young. Attached to that were the details that show how far the supervision was meant to run — the emperor regulated the order of services, dissolved confraternities, restricted processions and pilgrimages, and, on grounds of economy, specified how many candles might burn on an altar.

Now follow the buildings, because that is where the settlement becomes visible on the ground and where the answer to *who got what* stops being abstract.

The army got a great many of them. Monastic houses in the district capitals were taken over for military use, and the province's garrisoning was accomplished without the treasury building barracks — which is worth setting beside the previous module's account of what actually held Galicia down, because the floor of force and the settlement here are the same masonry. Others became hospitals, poorhouses, schools, factories, and in one case a lunatic asylum. The Paulite church of Saints Peter and Paul in Lviv was handed to another confession.

And two of them became seminaries. In 1783 a General Seminary for all the dioceses of Galicia was established in Lviv in the buildings of the dissolved Calced Carmelite house; when the Latin-rite seminary separated from it in 1814 it moved into the buildings of the dissolved Discalced Carmelites; and in 1817 the Ossoliński National Institute, the Ossolineum, took over a former Carmelite convent and became the great Polish library of the province. Three Carmelite houses, three institutions, none of them Carmelite.

The line to follow to its end

In the same year, 1783, the Greek Catholic theological seminary was established in Lviv under Bishop Petro Bilianskyi, replacing the Barbareum that Maria Theresa had founded in Vienna in 1774; its seminarians took their theology at the university's theological faculty and drew their students from the Lviv and Przemyśl eparchies; by the 1880s it was enrolling around two hundred a year. Behind it stood the whole apparatus of parity: the renaming of the Uniates as Greek Catholics by Maria Theresa's decree of 1774, the repeated insistence by three sovereigns that the Greek rite stood equal to the Latin, the improvement of the clergy's legal and economic position, the

cathedral chapters at Lviv and Przemyśl, and in 1808 the restoration of the metropolitan see of Halych.

What that money bought is the largest single fact in this study. Before 1772 a Greek Catholic priest in Galicia was formed informally, very often by his own father, because the clergy was married and the vocation ran in families; he was poor; and under the terms his own bishops had subscribed in 1595 he was, if he held church land on a nobleman's estate, subject to that nobleman and expected not to take him to court. Within two generations of Austrian rule the same office was held by men with a seminary education, a state salary, a legal standing equal to the Latin clergy's, and sons who could go to a gymnasium. That is the first large educated class the Ruthenians of Galicia had possessed since their boyars became Polish four centuries earlier, and every subsequent development in this study — the Ruthenian Triad in the Lviv seminary in 1832, the Supreme Ruthenian Council under a bishop-coadjutor in 1848, the reading rooms, the co-operatives, the parties — comes out of it or out of its sons.

The arithmetic is worth stating without ornament. The fund from which the Habsburg state paid its clergy and built its seminaries was assembled out of the liquidated wealth of Catholic religious houses, most of them in Galicia Latin-rite and Polish-founded. The class that fund helped create became, within a century, the institutional core of a Ruthenian and then Ukrainian national movement whose principal antagonist was the Polish administration of the province. Nobody intended that. Joseph wanted useful clergy and a solvent church establishment; Maria Theresa and Kaunitz wanted a counterweight to the Polish nobility; the founders who had endowed the Carmelites in the fifteenth century wanted masses said for their souls. What the arrangement actually produced was none of these things, and it was produced by the ordinary operation of a fund.

The half that was taken back

The other half of the settlement — the land the nobility held — went very differently, and the difference is the module's sharpest finding.

Austria's first move on the szlachta was not confiscation but registration. The imperial patent of 1775 laid down the legal basis on which nobility would be confirmed, and a man's status now had to be established documentarily and entered in the register. This is a real change and its direction is easy to miss. In the Commonwealth nobility had been a matter of birth, arms, reputation and attendance

at the sejmik; it was a standing among neighbours who knew you. Under Austria it became an entry, and an entry requires parchment. The great families produced their parchment without difficulty. The *drobna szlachta*, the petty nobility — numerous in Galicia, often working their own strips with their own hands and indistinguishable in daily life from the peasants beside them — were exactly the people least able to produce it, and some part of them fell out of the estate. How large a part I cannot say; the Ukrainian archival scholarship notes that unregistered legitimations existed, that some records are lost, and that the scale of the loss cannot be calculated, and I will not invent a figure. But the mechanism is unambiguous, and it is the same one at work in the monasteries: a status that had been a relation among persons was converted into a fact in a register the state kept.

Then came the survey. By a patent of 12 April 1785 Joseph ordered a land cadastre, and between 1785 and 1788 a descriptive *operat* was compiled for every locality in Galicia: every productive parcel numbered, the holder named, the area and class of the holding recorded, its yield estimated, the soil assessed, the sowing system described, the whole thing valued as a basis for taxation. It was done at extraordinary speed, and it was done that way because the surveying method was deliberately simplified so that peasants could perform part of the work themselves — which meant, in practice, villagers measuring the fields whose assessment was the point at issue. The stated principle was *Gottgefällige Gleichheit*, an equality pleasing to God: the Estates' accumulated exemptions had pushed the tax burden onto the people least able to carry it, and a survey that recorded every parcel on the same basis would end that.

The cadastre fixed the distinction that governed rural Galicia for the next sixty years: *dominical* land, the lord's demesne, against *rustical* land, the holdings the peasants worked for themselves. That line decided what was taxed at which rate, what a peasant could later be confirmed in, and what a lord could later claim. It was drawn by a state that had been in the province for thirteen years, using information supplied by the parties whose interests it settled.

And then the reform it had been built for was abandoned. The urbarial patent of 1 November 1789 was to convert *corvée* and dues in kind into money rent, leaving the cultivator roughly seven-tenths of his gross yield, taking about twelve per cent for the state, and giving the remainder to the lord in cash. It would have ended the labour system at a stroke. Joseph died in February 1790; the Galician nobility, which had opposed the whole Josephine programme, pressed his successor Leopold II; and the urbarial reform was withdrawn.

Set the two halves of the settlement side by side and the shape is unmistakable. From the church — rich, unarmed, unrepresented in any diet, and already subject to a doctrine of state supervision — Vienna took the endowments outright, permanently, and never gave them back. From the nobility — landed, organised, able to make a frontier province ungovernable, and holding the *corvée* that produced the grain the province exported — Vienna took a survey, drafted a redistribution, and abandoned it within four months of the emperor's death. The instrument of measurement was kept. The substance was returned. Force never pays for what it does not need, and it never concedes what it need not concede either; what an apex gives back tells you as exactly as what it takes who it thought could hurt it.

The price of the labour, 1848

The labour system the *urbarial* patent had failed to end ran another fifty-nine years, and when it was ended the question of who got what was answered a final time.

What it had been is now partly quantifiable, and the figures fill a hole this study flagged in the preceding module. On the standard account, a Galician peasant household worked on average about two hectares of the lord's land and rendered something like seventy-eight days of *corvée* a year on state estates and one hundred and thirty-three days on private ones, with cases running as high as three hundred. Rather more than two-thirds of the total obligation — 68.2 per cent — was labour; 26.6 per cent was money; the remaining 5.2 per cent was other services and dues. Beside the statutory burden sat the unstatutory: fines imposed by the manor, and the requirement to take a set quantity of the lord's spirits, which is the propination monopoly of 1496 arriving in the household as a quota.

In April 1848, with Kraków already bombarded and the memory of the previous spring's massacres two years old, Governor Franz Stadion abolished the *corvée* and hereditary tenancy in Galicia by decree without waiting for Vienna — the accounts give 16 and 22 April — expressly in order to take the peasant question out of the hands of the Polish democrats who had meant to claim the credit for it. The empire-wide emancipation followed later that year.

The peasants got their persons and their plots. The lords got money. Compensation to the landowners for the loss of the labour was built into the settlement from the start, and the Ruthenian peasant deputy Ivan Kapushchak told the Reichstag on 17 August 1848 what he thought of it: let the lords keep *“the rods and whips with which they used*

to beat our weary bodies”, he said, and let that serve as their indemnity. The speech is reported to have made a strong impression on the chamber. The indemnity was paid anyway, and was still being serviced out of provincial taxation two generations later.

Three further items completed the division and all three ran the same way. The servitudes — the customary rights of villages to take wood from the forest and graze on the pasture, without which a holding of two hectares could not carry an animal — were referred to a state commission from 1855, and most of the contested cases were decided in favour of the manors, leaving the peasants without the use or with a token payment in land or cash; most were settled by the early 1880s and some ran to 1895. The propination monopoly survived emancipation by four decades and was not abolished in Galicia until 1889. And the estates themselves were not broken: at the end of the century something like forty per cent of the arable was still in holdings above fifty hectares, while the average peasant holding had fallen below two hectares and was scattered across, on some counts, twenty separate strips.

Reading the settlement against the framework

The framework carries three families of settlement fiction, and each is a way of handling land held by living people: **vacancy**, which declares occupied ground empty and does dispossession; **recognition**, which declares that a grantee already owned what he is being given and binds an elite; and **divisibility**, which declares a collective holding partible and manufactures a market where none existed. Galicia’s largest single transfer fits none of them, and the reason is that its object was not held by persons at all.

The refinement this module returns is a fourth fiction, which operates on wealth held by an institution rather than by people, and which should be added to the card: the purpose test. Its form is this. The state does not challenge the holder’s title, deny the founder’s gift, or accuse anyone. It legislates what the holding institution *exists to do* — and it chooses a criterion the institution was not built to satisfy, because the criterion is drawn from the state’s needs rather than the institution’s own. Bodies that fail the test are dissolved. Their endowments, having lost their beneficiary, fall to the sovereign by the most conventional operation of law, and the transfer that follows requires no further instrument and generates no seizure to be defended. Its job is neither dispossession nor the binding of an elite nor the making of a market. **Its job is to convert a perpetuity into a revenue** — to take wealth that had been immobilised by the dead and put it on a current account.

Four conditions predict when a conqueror reaches for it, and all four held in Galicia. The holder must be *rich* — otherwise the operation is not worth the trouble with Rome. It must be *unarmed*. It must be *unrepresented*, with no seat in a body that could obstruct. And there must already exist a body of doctrine asserting the state's right to supervise it, so that the redefinition arrives as the extension of an accepted principle rather than as an innovation; in the Habsburg case that doctrine had a name and a whole literature, and it long predated Joseph. Where all four hold, the purpose test is the cheapest expropriation available to a state that must answer to a metropolitan public which believes in law, because it never produces a victim with standing. Look for it wherever a state has met an old, wealthy, weaponless corporation — monastic, collegiate, charitable, guild, or endowed foundation — and check whether the taking was preceded by a redefinition of what the body was for.

One observation attaches, not claimed as a second contribution. The settlement in Galicia was not one division but two, made by the same government within seven years, running in opposite directions, and the difference between them tracks nothing except the capacity of the holder to resist. That is the revealed-preference test — normally applied to what an apex *spends* on legitimacy — run backwards, on what it *returns*. Joseph took the church's endowments and kept them; he drafted a redistribution of the nobility's labour income and it was withdrawn within four months of his death. An order's estimate of its own subjects is legible in the pattern of its retreats, and this one estimated correctly: the class it did not take from is the class that, fifty-six years later, would have to be disciplined by its own peasants rather than by the imperial army.

Two things this module has deliberately not done. It has said what the settlement gave the Greek Catholic clergy without asking what story was told to justify any of it — the partition, the dissolutions, the parity, the survey — and to whom. And it has said nothing about what those seminary-trained priests then did with the generation in front of them. Those are the next two questions, in that order.

A note on sources.

One primary phrase is quoted: Ivan Kapushchak's line to the Austrian Reichstag on 17 August 1848 about the rods and whips serving as indemnity. It reaches this page through a chain that should be visible — the speech was given in the chamber, is printed in the Polish document collection edited by M. Tyrowicz (*Galicja od Pierwszego Rozbioru do Wiosny Ludów*, 1956) and in Roman Rosdolsky's study of the

peasant deputies, and I have it from Ivan L. Rudnytsky's English rendering. I have not seen the stenographic protocol. The wording quoted is Rudnytsky's translation of a Polish transcription of a speech delivered in another language, and it should be treated as substance rather than as the deputy's ipsissima verba.

The decree of 12 January 1782 and the constitution of the Religionsfonds on 28 February 1782 are given by date from the Polish and Austrian reference literature; I have not seen the German text of either patent, and the criterion of dissolution is therefore paraphrased rather than quoted, with the variant renderings noted in the text because they differ in what they include (schooling and nursing in all versions; learning, preaching and hearing confessions in some). Anyone building on the exact scope of the test needs the *Handbuch der Josephinischen Gesetze* rather than this module.

Figures are given as ranges on incompatible bases and the bases are named where they are known: 2,163 religious houses with over 45,000 religious in the monarchy in 1770; 738 houses suppressed of 2,163 by 1786, with the displaced given as about 38,000 in one account and about 40,000 in another; 388 of 915 houses closed in the narrower German-Austrian, Bohemian, Moravian and Galician grouping, a count the 1913 *Catholic Encyclopedia* itself notes is often exaggerated in circulation; and 75 male and female houses suppressed in Galicia specifically, which is Jolanta M. Marszałska's figure and is the only Galicia-specific count I found. That single-source figure is load-bearing for the module's local claims and should be checked against the Galician *Kasaty klasztorów w Galicji* literature and against Władysław Chotkowski's *Historia polityczna Kościoła w Galicji za rządów Maryi Teresy* (1909), which is the standard old work on Habsburg church property in the province and which I have not consulted.

The parish figures — about 800 new parishes in 1782–83, more than 3,000 across the whole reorganisation — come from Polish and Austrian summaries respectively and are almost certainly counting different areas; they should not be added or compared. The account of the Religionsfonds' extension to mass endowments, altars, chapels of ease and confraternities is from the 1913 *Catholic Encyclopedia*, a source with an obvious position on the subject, and I have used it for the mechanism rather than for the tone.

On the buildings: the General Seminary of 1783 in the dissolved Calced Carmelite house, the Latin seminary's move to the Discalced Carmelite house in 1814, and the Ossolineum's occupation of a former Carmelite convent in 1817 are from the Polish and Ukrainian encyclopaedic literature. The Greek Catholic seminary of 1783 under Bishop Bilanskyi and its relation to the Barbareum are from the *Encyclopedia of*

Ukraine. I want to be exact about a limit here, because it bears on the module's strongest claim. I have established that the Religionsfonds paid clergy stipends and financed the seminary system, and that the Greek Catholic clergy were brought onto a footing of parity and their seminaries founded by the same emperors in the same years. I have *not* seen a Galician Religionsfonds account showing money from named dissolved Latin houses paid to named Greek Catholic parishes or to the Greek Catholic seminary. The connection I have drawn is structural and chronological, not documentary, and a reader should hold it at that strength until somebody has been into the *Geistliche Domänen Akten* in Vienna, which the archival literature notes remain substantially unworked.

The 1775 patent on the confirmation of nobility is from Smutok and Lyseyko's work on szlachta incorporation; the observation that unregistered legitimations existed and that the scale of loss cannot be calculated is theirs, and my refusal to give a figure for the declassified petty nobility follows it. Krzysztof Ślusarek's *Drobna szlachta w Galicji 1772–1848* (1994) is the standard work and I have not read it.

The Josephine cadastre — patent of 12 April 1785, survey 1785–88 (some accounts to 1789), an *operat* per locality, parcels numbered with holders named, the simplification permitting peasant participation — is from the Gesher Galicia cadastral documentation and the Polish archival descriptions. The urbarial patent of 1 November 1789 and its withdrawal under Leopold II are from the Polish economic-history literature; the split of gross yield (about seven-tenths to the cultivator, about twelve per cent to the state, the remainder to the lord) is a reported schedule I have not verified against the patent text and should be treated as approximate.

The corvée figures — an average of about two hectares of the lord's land worked, 78 days a year on state estates, 133 on private ones with cases to 300, and the 68.2 / 26.6 / 5.2 split between labour, money and other dues — are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and rest, at one remove, on Rosdolsky. They are a single-source set, they are averages across a province with enormous internal variation, and the extraction module will need to go behind them to Rosdolsky's *Stosunki poddańcze w dawnej Galicji* rather than repeat them.

Two dates I could not settle. Stadion's abolition of the corvée in Galicia is given as 16 April 1848 in one account and 22 April in another, and the empire-wide emancipation law of that autumn is dated variously to 7 September and 7 October; I have given the months rather than pretend to precision. And the seed for this study carried the indemnity as payable to 1898; I could not confirm that terminal date, and

note instead what I could establish — that the servitude commission's cases ran from 1855 into the 1880s with some to 1895, and that propination in Galicia was abolished in 1889, the 1898 date belonging to the Russian partition.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 3 · THE ROBE

OUR PEOPLE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN HIM

Module 3, the robe: the legitimating claim laid over the annexation — one text, three audiences, and what it cost Vienna to make it true enough that it could be quoted back.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The claim

Every conqueror has a story, and the Habsburg story about Galicia was not the usual one.

The usual colonial claim tells the metropole that the conquered people are backward and the conquest is their education. Vienna's claim said something structurally different: that the conquered *people* were victims, that the conquered *nobility* were their oppressors, and that the imperial administration stood between them. It was an anti-elite robe, and everything about the province's next hundred and forty-six years follows from that choice.

The content was Josephinism, and it can be stated without reference to any of its authors' hearts. The state is an instrument for the general welfare, to be organised by reason rather than by inheritance. Every institution in it must justify itself by utility. Burdens should fall on subjects in proportion to capacity, not by estate — the phrase used for the principle behind the land survey was *Gottgefällige Gleichheit*, an equality pleasing to God — and the Estates' accumulated exemptions were an abuse. Confession is a matter for conscience and a subject's faith should not determine his standing. And, decisively for this province, the cultivator is a subject of the sovereign and not the chattel of a lord.

The instruments were real and dated. The Patent of Toleration of 13 October 1781 recognised the Lutheran, Calvinist and Orthodox confessions; the Edict of Tolerance of 2 January 1782 extended a measure of the same to the Jews, on a stated rationale of making that population useful to the state. The Serfdom Patent of 1 November 1781

abolished personal servile status — and did *not* apply to Galicia, where personal serfdom was, unlike almost everywhere else in the monarchy, a real and common legal condition, and where it was ended by separate action the following year. Around it ran a body of measures reaching the Galician village directly: the *corvée* capped at three days a week and a hundred and fifty-six days a year from a full holding, with a sliding scale for the poorer categories; a flat prohibition on exactions beyond the statutory *corvée*; a cadastre recording the plots the peasants actually cultivated and securing them in possession; villages organised as communities with elected officers; the right to marry without the lord's permission; and the right to complain of the lord to the organs of the state and to be heard. In 1786 Polish law was replaced by the Austrian codes and the *sejmiks* by an assembly of estates with no real powers.

It is important to be exact about how far this went, because the temptation to inflate it is the whole of the Habsburg-nostalgic literature. The empire remained a society of estates and was not aiming at civic equality. The peasant, technically no longer a serf, remained a hereditary tenant of the manor, which kept substantial administrative, judicial and fiscal prerogatives over him. After Joseph's death in 1790 the reforms stopped, and post-Napoleonic administrative practice leaned back toward the landowners. Roman Rozdolsky's summary is the fair one and it is deliberately narrow: the Galician peasant had become an object of law, where before he had been outside any law. That is a small thing and it is not nothing, and the difference between those two judgements is what this module is about.

One text, three audiences

The framework's standing account of legitimation is that an apex facing several populations usually runs several robes at once, each cut to a currency its own audience already honours, and that the arrangement is stable precisely because the audiences never compare notes: Timur ruled as a Genghisid son-in-law toward his steppe cavalry and as Sword of Islam toward his Persian subjects, and neither claim was a lie covering the other because neither audience heard the other's version.

Galicia does not work that way, and the difference turns out to matter more than anything else in this module. Vienna ran **one text** in a province with at least three constituencies, and the text did not change from audience to audience. What changed was where each audience stood in relation to it.

To Vienna, and to the chanceries of Europe, the claim was that a barbarous province had been recovered and was being brought under lawful government. The revindication of a mediaeval Hungarian title did the legal half of that work. The moral half was done by a small literature that appeared very quickly and was startlingly aggressive in its target: not the Galician peasant but the Galician nobleman. Franz Kratter's *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand von Galizien*, published anonymously at Leipzig in 1786, was the most notorious of these, described by a contemporary in Lviv as a chronicle of scandal; it catalogued the misgovernment of the province and lodged the responsibility with the szlachta, and its circulated atrocities — the nobleman who sent a peasant up a tree after an owl's nest and then shot him out of it for entertainment — did exactly the work such stories do. Larry Wolff's reading of this material is that it served a political purpose: in the Josephine 1780s a modern claim to legitimacy could be made publicly, resting on the displacement of barbaric cruelty by enlightened government. Whether Kratter believed his own reports is unrecoverable and, on this framework's discipline, unnecessary.

To the Polish nobility, the same text arrived as an offer with a threat inside it. The offer was incorporation: confirmation as an imperial nobility, entry in the register, an assembly of estates, and — after 1867 — the province itself. The threat was that a state which justified itself by rescuing peasants from lords had committed itself in public to interfering between lord and peasant, and would go on doing so as long as it found that useful. The szlachta read the threat correctly and opposed the Josephine programme root and branch, and it was they who obtained the withdrawal of the urbarial reform within four months of Joseph's death.

To the Ruthenians, the text arrived as parity, and this is where it stopped being rhetoric and started costing money.

What it cost

The revealed-preference test is the sharpest instrument on this framework's card, and it is simple: force never pays for what it does not need. An apex that already holds uncontested violence and *still* pays a real, avoidable price for legitimacy has demonstrated, by the payment itself, that somebody's compliance was worth buying — whatever it said its reasons were.

Austria held Galicia absolutely. There was no armed Ruthenian anything, there had never been one, and the previous module established that the force which held the

province was in any case largely other people's. Vienna owed the Ruthenians nothing and could have run the province exactly as the Commonwealth had. Instead:

In 1774 Maria Theresa decreed that the Uniates should henceforth be called Greek Catholics, for the stated purpose of asserting that the Greek rite stood equal in dignity to the Roman — a change of name that was itself the claim, since the Polish Latin clergy had regarded the Eastern rite as inferior and the new word denied it. In the same year she founded the Barbareum in Vienna, a seminary at the church of St Barbara, to educate a clergy that was not hers, of a rite her court did not practise, in a capital a thousand kilometres from their parishes. In 1783 the Greek Catholic theological seminary was established at Lviv under Bishop Petro Bilianskyi and the Barbareum wound down. In 1784 Lviv University was refounded as a state institution. In 1787 a *Studium Ruthenum* was attached to it — a course of philosophical and theological study, running until 1809, conducted **in Ruthenian**, for candidates to the priesthood who did not know Latin. In 1808 the metropolitan see of Halych was restored with its seat in Lviv, a proposal first put to Vienna in 1773 by Bishop Lev Sheptytsky with the frank argument that a Greek metropolis in Galicia would extend Austrian influence among the Uniates still under Polish and Russian rule. And throughout, the clergy of that rite were placed on the state's payroll on a footing of parity with the Latin clergy — which for a married village priest who had previously been trained by his own father and who owed deference to the landowner on whose estate his church stood was a transformation of position, not an adjustment of income.

One incident measures the expenditure better than the institutional list does. In 1797 Mykhailo Harasevych, lecturing at the *Studium Ruthenum*, was reprimanded for teaching in Polish instead of Ruthenian. Consider what that means. An imperial university, in a province where the administration was conducted in German and the social prestige lay entirely with Polish, disciplined a Ruthenian lecturer for failing to teach Ruthenians in their own language when he would plainly have preferred not to. Nobody made Vienna do that. It is the kind of small enforcement that appears on no balance sheet and that reveals, more reliably than any decree, that a claim was being treated as a debt rather than as a form of words.

The purpose was not charity and this study will not pretend otherwise. Vienna wanted a counterweight to a Polish nobility it did not trust, in a frontier province facing Russia, and the only material available for one was a clergy attached to the majority of the eastern population. Sheptytsky's 1773 memorandum says so in as many words, and it was written by the Ruthenian side. But the counterweight had to be built

out of what the Ruthenians actually were, which meant seminaries, a language, a hierarchy and a rite — and once those exist they are not a policy, they are a class.

Where the inherited finding breaks

The previous study on this ground, under a different overlord, found something the seed for this one asked me to test. Its finding was that a legitimating claim addressed to the conquered and substantially *true* is more expensive than a false one addressed to the metropole, because a true claim can only be discharged by performance in the conquered's own institutions — and that the mechanism which keeps the bill payable is to **permit the function and forbid the ownership**: let them run the institution, do not let them own it.

The first half holds here and holds strongly. The list above is a bill, and it was paid in the conquered's own language, in their own rite, through their own hierarchy, for a century and a half.

The second half fails completely, and the failure is the finding. Vienna permitted the ownership. The Lviv seminary was the Greek Catholics'. The restored metropolitanate of Halych was occupied by a Ruthenian, and every metropolitan after him was one. The parishes were theirs, the cathedral chapters at Lviv and Przemyśl were theirs, and when the university chairs came — a Ruthenian chair in theology in 1848, the chair of Ruthenian language and literature in 1849 with Yakiv Holovatsky in it, two more in law in 1862 — they were held by Ruthenians, and Holovatsky went on to be dean of the philosophical faculty and then rector of the university. Vienna funded a set of institutions and did not keep the keys.

So the mechanism named by the previous study is not general. It is a specialisation, and the variable that selects it is not the truth of the claim but the *purpose of the funding*.

That is this module's contribution, and it is the point on which the rest of the study turns. An apex that funds an institution to carry its own message must own it, because an institution it does not own will carry someone else's. An apex that funds an institution to obstruct a third party must not own it, because a counterweight the apex owns weighs nothing. The Soviet state needed the church to say what the party said, so it had to hold the appointments; Vienna needed the Greek Catholic church to be something the Polish nobility could not absorb, and an appointment-controlled clergy would have been absorbable — or, worse, would have

been correctly read as a branch of the administration and carried no weight with the villages at all. The requirement of the counterweight function is genuine independence, and there is no way to buy genuine independence except by conceding it.

And conceding it is how a base gets created. Not by generosity, not by ideology, not by the age growing kinder: by an apex needing a lever against a rival and being unable to make the lever work unless it lets go of the handle.

The claim comes back

Which is the second half of the mechanism, and it is what the whole collection has been trying to observe.

A legitimating claim has to be general to work at all. An apex cannot legitimate itself by saying *we rule because we are stronger and we want this*; that is a description, not a claim, and it recruits nobody. So the claim is always made in terms that reach past the case at hand — reason, law, equality of burden, the dignity of the rites, the subject's standing before the sovereign — and those terms are then in public, in the state's own instruments, in a form anyone can read back.

But the reading back does nothing on its own. This study has already met the counter-example at its own beginning: the Ruthenian bishops asked for seats in the Senate in 1595, in writing, in a document the Crown had guaranteed, and they waited a hundred and ninety-five years, because no faction inside the Commonwealth's hierarchy had any use for granting it. Words without standing are an unexercised option. What changed under Austria was not that the words got better. It was that the people holding them acquired a base.

Watch it fire in 1848, in the space of six weeks. On 18 March the Poles of Galicia petitioned the emperor for extensive autonomy for what they described as a Polish land. On 19 April the Ruthenians submitted their own petition, asking for recognition of their nationality and for equal rights for the two peoples inhabiting the province — which is Josephine parity, quoted back to the government that installed it, by the class that government had educated. On 22 April Governor Franz Stadion abolished the *corvée* and hereditary tenancy in Galicia by decree, ahead of Vienna, expressly to take the peasant question away from the Polish democrats who had intended to claim credit for it. On 2 May the Supreme Ruthenian Council was constituted under the presidency of the Greek Catholic bishop-coadjutor of Lviv, and on 10 May it issued a

manifesto declaring the Galician Ruthenians part of a single people of fifteen millions, of whom two and a half lived in Galicia. Within months there was a Ruthenian newspaper, thirty-four local branches, a delegation to the Slav Congress in Prague, an assembly of Ruthenian scholars, deputies in the Reichstag, and a petition for the partition of the province that eventually carried two hundred thousand signatures.

The Polish response was the quip that Stadion had invented the Ruthenians. It is a good line and it is wrong in the way such lines usually are: what the governor did was find a constituency the imperial state had been paying to educate for seventy years, and put it to use against another constituency, at a moment when that was worth his while. Rudnytsky's answer is the correct one — there was no need to invent them; he found them there.

And then the counter-case, which has to be stated at full strength because it is the module's honest limit. In 1867 the same dynasty handed the province to the Polish upper classes and dropped the Ruthenians who had been loyal to it in 1848 and had fought for it against the Hungarians. The robe did not protect them. The parity decrees were still on the books, the words were unchanged, and they were worth nothing that year, because what had changed was the price to Vienna of the Hungarian and Polish settlements and not one syllable of the doctrine. That is the framework's own claim about words and it should not be softened: **the claim is the form in which a demand can be made; it is never the reason the demand succeeds.** What made the difference over the following fifty years was that the Ruthenians came back — decade after decade, losing repeatedly — and could come back because they still had a church, a seminary, a hierarchy, parishes, and shortly reading rooms, co-operatives, a press and seats. A faction that survives its defeat can present the bill again. That is the ninth module's whole subject and it is not settled here.

Whether anyone believed it

Sincerity at the apex is unrecoverable and the framework uses only the deviation test, held as a probability and never as a verdict. On that test Joseph reads unusually well: he pressed measures that struck directly at the material interest of the class that funded his treasury and officered his army, was warned repeatedly that he was doing so, and pressed on; and the surest evidence that the cost was real is that the most expensive of the measures was withdrawn by his successor within four months of his death, at the demand of exactly the party it had cost. A man breaking toward something valued

above both doctrine and personal advantage, at a price, reads sincere. It reads that way. It is not a finding, and nothing in this study depends on it.

At the base the framework forbids mind-reading and asks instead what the population actually *did* when the order's authority was tested. Galicia supplies three tests and they run one way.

In 1809, when Polish forces of the Duchy of Warsaw took Lviv and demanded that the head of the Greek Catholic church substitute Napoleon's name for the emperor's in the liturgy, Metropolitan Antin Anhelovych refused and was imprisoned for it; when the Austrians returned he was decorated. In 1846, when the Polish gentry rose, the peasants of western Galicia came for the manors and fought beside imperial regulars at Gdów. In 1848, when half the empire was in revolt and the Poles of Lviv were on the barricades, the Ruthenians petitioned, formed a council, raised a national guard, and sent it against insurgent Hungary. Three occasions on which it cost nothing to stay home or to change sides, and on all three the population moved toward the throne and against the class immediately above it.

Ivan Franko wrote the epitaph on the eve of the Great War, in a study of the *corvée* and its abolition — and Franko was a socialist, an anticlerical, a man tried by that same state in 1878 and denied a university career by it. Of Joseph II, dead a hundred and twenty-three years, he wrote that *“our people have not forgotten him”*, and still spoke of the wisdom and humanity of his treatment of his subjects.

Set against that the fact that must be held in the same hand: the peasantry that remembered Joseph so warmly had been left under the *corvée* for another fifty-eight years after he died, was emancipated only when a governor needed to outbid a revolution, was then charged for its own emancipation through the indemnity, lost its wood and pasture rights to a state commission that mostly found for the manors, and went on emigrating by the hundred thousand. The robe was not a lie. It was substantially true, expensively performed, sincerely believed by a great many of the people it was addressed to — and it delivered, to the man at the bottom, an object of law rather than a man outside it, and very little else for two generations. Both of those are the same document.

Reading the robe against the framework

The framework holds that legitimacy is always borrowed from a currency the audience already honours, and that an apex facing several audiences usually runs several robes,

protected by the fact that the audiences never compare versions. Galicia adds a second configuration, and it should go on the card beside the first because its properties are opposite in every respect that matters.

One text, several audiences. Where an apex's audiences occupy one province, read one another's newspapers, sit in one Diet and are governed by one body of law, the several-robcs arrangement is unavailable: there is no seam to hide behind. The apex must then run a single claim whose *incidence* differs by position — the same sentence heard as rescue by the peasant, as parity by the priest, as interference by the lord, and as civilisation by the metropolitan public. This is more expensive than the several-robcs form, because performance toward any one audience is visible to all of them and a default toward one is a default they can all see. And it has a consequence the several-robcs form does not have: **every audience holds the same instrument.** Timur's Persians could not embarrass him with his steppe cavalry's currency. The Ruthenians of 1848 could and did quote Josephine parity back to Josephine officials, because there was only ever one version and the officials had written it.

Attached to that, and following from the previous module rather than replacing it, is the condition under which the instrument turns out to be worth holding. This module's evidence says the deciding variable is not whether the claim was true, and not whether the apex was sincere, but **what the funding was for.** An apex that endows an institution to carry its own message must keep the appointments, and the finding this study inherited — permit the function, forbid the ownership — holds for that case. An apex that endows an institution to *check a rival faction* cannot keep the appointments, because a counterweight in the apex's own hand weighs nothing and is seen by everyone to weigh nothing. It must concede real ownership. And in conceding it, it manufactures precisely what a faction needs in order to survive its defeats and present its bill again in a better year.

Which is to say that the residue this collection has been looking for is not produced by generosity, by the spirit of an age, or by the persuasiveness of a well-drafted principle. It is produced by an apex that needed a lever against a rival, could not make the lever work while holding the handle, and let go.

Two things this module has not done. It has established what the imperial state paid for and to whom the claim was addressed, without asking what those seminary-trained priests, those elected village officers and those German-language schools actually did to the generation of children in front of them — whether Vienna attempted to form one kind of subject out of Poles, Ruthenians and Jews alike, and what happened when it

did not. And it has asserted that the Ruthenians could return after defeat because they had a base, without yet dating the growth of that base against the concessions it supposedly won. The first is the next module. The second is the test the whole study exists to run, and it must not be anticipated.

A note on sources.

One primary phrase is quoted: Ivan Franko on Joseph II, from his study of the *corvée* and its abolition in Galicia (*Panshchyna i ii skasuvannia v 1848 r. v Halychyni*, Lviv 1913), which I have from Ivan L. Rudnytsky's English translation and have not seen in Ukrainian. The rendering is Rudnytsky's. Roman Rozdolsky's judgement that the Galician peasant became an object of law rather than a man outside it is paraphrased from the same intermediary, from *Stosunki poddańcze w dawnej Galicji* (Warsaw 1962), which I have not consulted; that book is the standard work on Galician seigneurial relations and both this module and the extraction module ought to rest on it directly rather than on summaries.

Dates and instruments are given from the reference literature and I have not seen the German text of any of the patents. The Patent of Toleration of 13 October 1781, the Edict of Tolerance of 2 January 1782, and the Serfdom Patent of 1 November 1781 are standard; the last is quoted here only for the fact that it did **not** extend to Galicia, which is stated explicitly in the German History in Documents and Images editorial apparatus and which matters, since a good deal of loose writing treats 1781 as the end of Galician serfdom. Galician personal subjection was ended by separate action, dated 1782 in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*'s account. The stated aim of the 1782 Edict of Tolerance regarding the Jewish population — making it useful to the state — is a rendering I have seen only in English summary and should be checked against the German preamble before anyone leans on the wording.

The Josephine peasant measures for Galicia — the three-day and 156-day ceilings with a sliding scale, the prohibition of exactions beyond the statutory *corvée*, the securing of cultivated plots, the elected village officers, the right to marry without permission, the right of complaint to state organs — are Rudnytsky's summary of the Franko, Mises, Herasymenko and Rozdolsky literature, and are given here as a list rather than as datable instruments because I could not attach each to its patent. That is a real gap: a study of a robe should be able to name the document each promise was made in, and this one cannot yet.

Franz Kratter's *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand von Galizien* (Leipzig: Wucherer, 1786, published anonymously, two volumes) is described here but **not quoted**. I have not read it; the digitised copies at the Bavarian State Library and the Internet Archive are in Fraktur and I have not verified any wording from them. The characterisation of its argument and target, the contemporary description of it as a chronicle of scandal, and the owl's-nest anecdote all come at second hand from Larry Wolff's *The Idea of Galicia* and its citation in the general literature. Anyone wanting to quote Kratter must go to the original; anyone wanting to weigh how representative he was must go further, since he was one voice in a genre and the genre's relation to official policy is exactly the sort of thing that gets asserted more confidently than the evidence supports.

The institutional sequence — the 1774 renaming and the Barbareum, the Lviv seminary of 1783, the refoundation of Lviv University in 1784, the *Studium Ruthenum* of 1787–1809 teaching in a literary Ruthenian, the restoration of the Halych metropolitanate in 1808, and the university chairs of 1848, 1849 and 1862 — is from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and the Lviv university documentation. Sources differ on whether the *Studium Ruthenum* course ran two or three years and I have not resolved it. Bishop Lev Sheptytsky's 1773 memorandum proposing a Galician Greek metropolis as an extension of Austrian influence is reported by Rudnytsky, who cites its text as reprinted in Chotkowski's *Historia polityczna kościoła w Galicyi za rządów Maryi Teresy* (Cracow 1909); I have not seen it, and since it is the single clearest statement in this module of the counterweight motive stated by the beneficiary rather than the benefactor, it deserves to be read in full by whoever takes this further.

The 1797 reprimand of Mykhailo Harasevych for lecturing in Polish rather than Ruthenian at the *Studium Ruthenum* is from Amvrozii Androkhovych's study of that institution (*Zapysky NTSsh*, 1927), cited in a recent *Austrian History Yearbook* article; I have it at two removes and it carries more weight in my argument than a twice-removed detail comfortably should. If it is wrong, the expenditure argument survives on the institutional record but loses its sharpest single illustration.

The 1848 sequence — the Polish petition of 18 March, the Ruthenian petition of 19 April, Stadion's decree of 22 April, the constitution of the Supreme Ruthenian Council on 2 May and its manifesto of 10 May — is Rudnytsky's, resting on Kost Levytsky's *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainsiv* (Lviv 1926), where the texts are printed. The manifesto's claim of fifteen million Ruthenians of whom two and a half were in Galicia is paraphrased rather than quoted for that reason. Anhelovych's refusal in 1809 and his subsequent decoration are from the same literature. Note that

Levytsky was himself a leader of the movement he was writing about, which does not make him unreliable but does make him a participant, and that the Polish historiography of 1848 in Galicia reads the same events very differently.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 4 · FORMATION

AZBUKA AND ABECADŁO

Module 4, formation: what Vienna tried to install in the children of Galicia, what it merely paid for, and why the difference between those two decided which of the province's peoples became a nation.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Nobody arrives unformed

A conqueror never meets a blank population. He meets one that is already running a framework it did not choose and cannot easily inspect, absorbed in childhood from parents and neighbours and the calendar of the year, laid down before the child had any faculty capable of screening it, and by adulthood buried under a whole life built on top of it. This is not a defect in the people concerned. It is how any mind in a society larger than a village must work: nobody can check more than a sliver of what he has to believe, so everyone takes the overwhelming mass of it on trust from sources his upbringing taught him to trust. What formation actually installs, underneath all the doctrinal content, is an answer to two questions — *whose word do I take?* and *who is my people?* — and the answers are held not as opinions but as the ground the person stands on.

Which is why the question that governed Galicia for a hundred and forty-six years was, at bottom, a question about collars. Does a Ruthenian villager's deference run to the Pope, to the Patriarch of Constantinople, to a Tsar who claimed to be the protector of all the Orthodox — or to an emperor in Vienna standing above all three? The Union of Brest in 1596 had been a decision about exactly that, taken by a hierarchy for its own reasons. Vienna's programme, from 1774 onward, was to insert the emperor above whatever answer the village had, and it half-succeeded in a way nobody planned: it produced a clergy that was Roman in obedience, Byzantine in rite, Habsburg in salary and Ruthenian in blood, and then discovered that four marks on one collar is not a single authority but a standing argument.

This module runs two experiments the province happens to supply as a matched pair. On one population the imperial state attempted, with compulsion and money and at the right age, to **install** a new formation. On another it merely **endowed** the formation already there. One failed completely. The other succeeded past anything intended, and manufactured a nation.

Three peoples, three years

Start with the calendar, because the framework asks for the ritual year and because Galicia's answer is the plainest imaginable demonstration that formation is not decoration laid over real life.

The province ran on three calendars and never stopped. The Latin-rite Poles kept the Gregorian. The Greek Catholic Ruthenians kept the Julian, which by the nineteenth century stood twelve days behind it and by the twentieth thirteen. The Jews kept a lunisolar year of their own with its own new year, its own months and its own Sabbath cycle. There was no week in which all three populations were doing the same thing, and no date on which a governor could summon the whole province without excluding somebody's holy day. Christmas in Lviv fell twice. A Ruthenian peasant working a Polish estate was expected at work on his own feasts and idle on his lord's.

Behind each calendar sat a complete apparatus. The Ruthenian child was baptised, married and buried by a priest of his own rite, in a church whose liturgy was in Church Slavonic and whose books were in Cyrillic; his priest was married, lived in the village, farmed a glebe, and his son would very likely be the next priest. That parish was the entire institutional life of the Ruthenian people — there was nothing else, no nobility, no burgher class of consequence, no court, no school above the parish — and everything in this study that later happens to the Ruthenians happens through it.

The Polish child was formed in the Latin rite and the Latin alphabet, and above that in a gentry culture with an unusually explicit historical self-understanding: the Commonwealth's constitution as a lost inheritance, the *szlachta* as a nation in itself, the insurrection as a recurring duty. That formation had its own carriers — the manor, the parish, later the private tutor and after 1867 the whole provincial school system — and its own literature, of which Sienkiewicz's historical romances were the most widely absorbed and, in this province, the most consequential, since they installed in Polish minds a picture of Ruthenians as rebellious barbarians drawn from the seventeenth-century Cossack wars.

The Jewish child entered the *heder* at three or four, learned letters before he learned much else, and went on, if he had aptitude, to the study house. His community had its own courts of a kind, its own charities, its own language, and — through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, decisively — its own new form of authority. Galicia became one of the heartlands of Hasidism, and a Hasidic court is a formation institution of a very particular sort: the *rebbe's* authority is personal, charismatic, hereditary within a dynasty, and completely invisible to any imperial table of ranks. There was no seat for him in the Diet, no salary line in the Religionsfonds, no office through which a governor could reach him. His followers' deference was fully engaged and it went nowhere the state could see.

Three peoples on one soil, sharing no year, no script, no rite and no answer to the question of whose word to take. That is the material Vienna had to work with.

The one wholesale attempt, and its failure

On 7 May 1789 the *Judenordnung* for Galicia was issued. Its preamble is a fair sample of the claim examined in the previous module — that it accorded both with the principles of toleration and with the general good to abolish the distinctions the law had made between Jewish and Christian subjects and to grant the Jewish inhabitants of Galicia “*all the rights and privileges which the Christian subjects enjoy*”. Among its clauses was the requirement that every community erect a German-language school on the model of the state elementary schools, and that attendance be compulsory for boys and girls alike.

The man appointed to run it was Naphtali Herz Homberg, a Bohemian-born Maskil, tutor to Moses Mendelssohn's son, recommended by Mendelssohn himself, and a wholehearted believer in the assimilation of Jews into German culture. He became superintendent of the German-Jewish schools of Galicia — the sources give 1784 and 1787 for the appointment and I have not resolved it — and simultaneously assistant censor of Jewish books. He built, on the fullest counts, something over a hundred schools and classes and a teachers' seminary at Lemberg, staffed largely by teachers imported from Bohemia and Germany. Instruction was in German rather than Yiddish or Hebrew. The curriculum followed the Austrian normal schools: reading, writing, arithmetic, singing, penmanship, practical skills. Religious instruction was initially left out altogether, on the ground that the object was civic usefulness.

Two features of the programme deserve to be looked at directly, because they show a state reaching into precisely the places the framework says formation lives.

The first is the censorship. Homberg, as assistant censor, worked on which Jewish books might be printed, and the categories he moved against included kabbalistic works, most Hasidic writing, and works of moral instruction — in one account the prayer book itself. He prepared his own adapted version of a standard Yiddish women's devotional for publication. He wrote to the rabbis in 1788 proposing that Jewish education be reshaped on European lines, and told them that if they did not adapt themselves the government would compel them.

The second is the marriage gate, and it is the sharpest exhibit in this module. Homberg wrote a catechism, *Bne Zion*, published in 1812 — a religious and moral reader for the young, commissioned within the state's programme. The district offices then examined every Jewish bride and groom on it before issuing the certificate without which they could not marry. A Galician Jew could not form a household until an imperial official had tested him on a book written by a state-appointed superintendent to install the state's preferred version of his own religion. There is no more exact instance in this collection of an order attempting to seize the life cycle: birth, marriage and death are the three points at which every human being must present himself to somebody, and a state that controls the middle one has a lever on everyone who intends to have children.

It failed completely.

Parents kept their children away, understanding the schools — not unreasonably, given the censorship, the imported teachers and the omitted religion — as instruments of conversion. Homberg denounced non-compliers to the authorities, which did not improve matters. In 1797 a tax on Sabbath candles was imposed in Galicia; Homberg supported it and was accused of taking a share of the revenue, and that charge together with an accusation of embezzlement drove him out of the province in 1802. Four of his sons became Christians, a fact he later cited in support of his own applications to reside in Vienna. On 26 June 1806 the Emperor Francis abolished the entire Galician Jewish school network, the teachers' seminary with it; something on the order of three and a half thousand pupils were attending at the end. The school fund — 259,088 florins, raised out of the taxation of the Jewish population — was folded into the general Galician school fund.

Read that against what is known about how minds actually take belief and the failure is not surprising, it is predictable. The state did not attack a doctrine; it attacked

a set of cues. It replaced the authority the child's community recognised with one it did not, put the instruction in a language the household did not speak, removed the sacred content that would have made the enterprise legible as anything other than an attack, and imported strangers to deliver it. Every filter a vigilant person runs — is this source competent, does it wish me well, do the people I depend on trust it, does the speaker pay any price for what he professes — returned the same answer, and returned it correctly. And the child went home each evening to the household the school was meant to displace. What actually grew in Galicia across the same century was Hasidism, which asks for exactly the costly, visible, personally staked devotion that the mind reads as sincerity, and which the state could neither fund, appoint, nor find on a map.

The arithmetic of the episode is worth setting down without comment. A population was taxed to build schools it did not want, refused to attend them, had them abolished after nineteen years, and did not get the money back.

What was endowed instead

Now the other case, which the previous module examined from the paying end and which must be looked at here from the receiving end.

Vienna did not attempt to install a new formation in the Ruthenians. It took the one that was already running and paid for it: the Barbareum in Vienna from 1774, the Lviv seminary from 1783, the *Studium Ruthenum* at the university from 1787 teaching in Ruthenian to candidates who had no Latin, the restored metropolitanate of Halych in 1808, parity of the Greek clergy with the Latin, and salaries from the religious fund. It kept the rite. It kept the calendar. It kept the script. It kept the language. It ordained Ruthenians and sent them back to Ruthenian villages.

And it kept, without particularly noticing, the clause from 1595 that made the whole thing compound: the married clergy. This is the difference between a payroll and a lineage, and it is the mechanism by which a fiscal decision of the 1770s turned into a social class by the 1830s. A celibate order absorbs whatever a state spends on it and returns priests. A married clergy absorbs the same money and returns priests *and their sons* — boys raised in a house with books in it, with a father who had been to a seminary, in a family with an income and a standing, and with a plausible route to the gymnasium. Within two generations the Ruthenian educated stratum was substantially a clerical caste reproducing itself, and when a lay intelligentsia finally appeared in the 1860s and 1870s it was made of the same families: as Rudnytsky puts it, every educated

Ukrainian of that period stood one or two generations from either a parsonage or a peasant hut.

The state also, in the same period, made the parish priest its registrar. Births, marriages and deaths were recorded in the parish books, and the state's knowledge of who existed in Galicia ran through the institution the villagers already trusted. That is an administrative convenience and it is also a fusion: the mark the peasant deferred to and the machine that governed him were now the same object in the same building.

The Ruthenian Triad forms in the Lviv seminary in 1832 — Shashkevych, Holovatsky, Vahylevych, three seminarians — and publishes *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* at Buda in 1837 because the Galician censorship would not pass it. The Supreme Ruthenian Council of 1848 is presided over by the Greek Catholic bishop-coadjutor of Lviv. The Old Ruthenian party of the 1850s and 1860s is nicknamed the St George circle after the cathedral several of its leaders were canons of. Every institution the Ruthenians built in the nineteenth century came out of a seminary the Habsburg treasury had paid for.

Which is when the state found it could not steer what it had funded

Three times the administration tried to alter the carriers of the formation it was financing, and three times it lost.

The script. In 1834 Josyp Łoziński, a Ruthenian priest and scholar, published a proposal to write Ruthenian in a Polish-based Latin alphabet, on the practical arguments that presses and administration already ran on Latin type and that it would open Western literature. The reply came from Markiian Shashkevych in 1836, in a pamphlet whose title is the whole quarrel in two words — *Azbuka i abecadło*, the Cyrillic word for alphabet set against the Polish one. The proposal died. In 1859 it returned with the state behind it: the viceroy Agenor Gołuchowski persuaded Leopold von Thun, the minister of education, to impose a Latin orthography drawn up by the Czech scholar Josef Jireček on Czech principles, and put it to a commission. It was defeated by a coalition that included Russophiles and Ukrainophiles, the Greek Catholic metropolitan Spyrydon Lytvynovych, and Łoziński himself, who had proposed the thing in 1834 and voted against it in 1859. The Galicians called it the alphabet war.

The calendar. Gołuchowski also pressed the Greek Catholic church to adopt the Gregorian calendar. It refused, and the two calendars ran on to the end of the monarchy and beyond.

The chair. He pressed for the abolition of the chair of Ruthenian language at Lviv University, and did not get it.

The pattern is exact and it is the module's finding in miniature. What a state can buy is institutions, buildings and salaries. What a formation runs on is *marks* — the script a person's sacred books are printed in, the year his mother kept, the rite in which his dead were buried — and the marks are held by the community, not by the paymaster. Change the script and every text the person has ever trusted becomes foreign at a stroke; change the calendar and the year he lives in stops matching the year in his parents' mouths. This is why populations that will absorb enormous substantive change without complaint will fight to a standstill over an alphabet. Nothing about the doctrine was at issue in 1859. What was at issue was whether the collar would still be recognisable.

And note who did the defeating. Vienna's own creation — the seminary-trained, state-salaried, parity-holding Greek Catholic clergy — was the institution that stopped the imperial minister of education. That is what the previous module meant by saying an apex funding a counterweight cannot own it. Here is what it costs.

The counter-formation, 1867 onward

After the Austro-Polish settlement the provincial formation apparatus passed to the Polish administration and was used exactly as a formation apparatus is used.

Lviv University was Polonised — Polish became the internal administrative language in 1871 and the primary language of instruction in 1879; the secondary system went the same way. The arithmetic at the end tells the story better than any characterisation: in 1911–12 Galicia had seventy Polish and eight Ukrainian boys' gymnasia, twenty Polish and one Ukrainian girls' gymnasium, and fourteen Polish *Realschulen* and none at all in Ukrainian — in a province whose population was some 43 per cent Ruthenian, and whose eastern half was nearly two-thirds Ruthenian. It had been a consistent policy of the Polish-controlled Diet to restrict the creation of Ruthenian secondary schools, and after 1867 the Diet held the power to do it.

So the Ruthenians built their own, and what they built is the answer to the question this whole study is running. Prosvita, founded in 1868 as an adult-education

association, had by 1914 seventy-seven branches and close to three thousand village reading rooms. Private Ukrainian secondary and trade schools filled in behind the public ones. The Shevchenko Scientific Society, founded in 1873 on money raised in Russian-ruled Ukraine, became an academy of sciences in everything but name. By 1910 there were something over two thousand four hundred Ruthenian-language primary schools. And in the last pre-war decade the gymnastic societies Sokil and Sich — the first on the Czech model, the second named for the Cossack stronghold — spread across the villages and, from 1912, began military training.

These are formation institutions and they were chosen because of what they were not: not state schools, not the Diet's, not fundable and therefore not defundable. A reading room in a village is a building, a shelf and a man who can read. A co-operative dairy is a formation institution that pays for itself. This is what a base looks like from the inside, and it is why the ninth module has something to count.

Whose word, and who your people are

The bitterest fight in nineteenth-century Ruthenian Galicia was not with the Poles. It was among Ruthenians, and it was a formation quarrel in the purest sense: not about policy but about which channel to trust and which people to belong to.

The Old Ruthenians of the St George circle, clerical and conservative, wanted a dignified written language to set against Polish and reached first for Church Slavonic and then, some of them, for literary Russian, on the argument that Kyivan scholars and Gogol had helped make it. Their newspaper was *Slovo*; their macaronic idiom was mocked by their opponents as *iazychiie*, jargon. They held to the Julian calendar, the Cyrillic script and the Byzantine liturgy as the marks of identity, and the ritualist movement of the 1850s and 1860s to purge Latin accretions from the Greek rite was their programme in its purest form. The *narodovtsi*, the populists, formed around 1860 under the impact of Shevchenko's poems, wanted the vernacular and the peasant, and their paper was *Dilo* — the Deed, named against the Word.

Both sides took foreign money and foreign encouragement. Russian subsidies reached the Russophiles through the chaplain of the Russian embassy in Vienna; the Ukrainophiles were mentored from exile by Drahomanov in Geneva and supplied with books and funds from Kyiv. And both the Austrian administration and the Polish viceroys played on the split — Gołuchowski denounced the Ruthenians to Vienna as

Russophiles, and later viceroys funded the Russophiles precisely because the Ukrainophile tide was rising.

One episode is worth holding, because it is the clearest instance in this study of a formation actually being revised, and of the only mechanism by which that reliably happens. Kornylo Ustianovych, painter and poet, had belonged as a student to the Russophile circle in Vienna and was an ardent pan-Russian. He visited Russia in 1867 and again in 1872 to see the country of his convictions, and found that Galician Ruthenians, for all their subordination, held constitutional liberties that subjects of the Tsar did not; that the autocracy he had admired from a distance was despised by the best people he met there; and that Russians and Ukrainians were, whatever the official position, not the same. He came home a Ukrainian nationalist. Nobody argued him out of anything. His field of the visible was widened by travel, and he did the weighing himself.

Reading formation in Galicia against the framework

The framework holds that no child goes unformed, that installing a new formation is generational work, and that most conquerors never seriously attempt it on a subject population because forming people in the metropole's own creed and law would be to admit them. Galicia complicates that in a useful way, because Vienna did both things at once, in the same decades, on two different populations — and the outcomes were opposite.

The refinement this module returns is the distinction between installing a formation and endowing one, and the finding that the variable deciding which is possible is whether the state works through the existing carriers or against them.

Homburg's schools were an *installation*. They replaced the teacher with a stranger, the language with German, the sacred content with civics, and gated marriage on a state catechism. Every one of those moves attacked a cue — the recognised authority, the community's language, the sacred value, the life-cycle rite — and the population's ordinary vigilance, functioning exactly as it should, read the whole apparatus as hostile and refused it. Nineteen years, over a hundred schools, a seminary, compulsion, a marriage gate: abolished, with nothing left behind but a grievance and a confiscated fund.

The seminaries were an *endowment*. They kept the rite, the calendar, the script, the language and the married priesthood, and changed only who paid. The population

accepted them completely, because from inside the village nothing had been attacked; the priest was still the priest, and now he could read. And what the state got for its money was not a more governable population but **a stronger version of what was already there** — which within two generations meant an educated class, a press, a national movement, and, in 1859, an institution capable of defeating an imperial minister of education over an alphabet.

Two corollaries follow and both matter for the rest of this study. The first is that endowment is the *only* method available to a state that is not prepared to spend generations and coercion, and that it works — but that its product is never a client. You cannot fund a formation without strengthening whoever the formation already told people to trust. The second is that this is not the safer option for the state, merely the cheaper one. Vienna paid for a counter-elite because it wanted a lever against the Polish nobility, got exactly that, and then found the lever had a will, a calendar and an alphabet of its own, and would in due course present bills the treasury had not anticipated.

Which returns the study to the question it exists to answer, and which the next modules must approach from the other side. This one has established that the Ruthenians of Galicia possessed, by the 1860s, a formation the state had strengthened and could not steer, and the institutional means to reproduce it without further state help. It has not asked what any of that was worth to the man in the village, who could not read, held under two hectares, and was weighing whether to stay.

A note on sources.

One primary phrase is quoted, from the preamble to the Galician *Judenordnung* of 7 May 1789, in the English rendering given in the 1906 *Jewish Encyclopedia*'s article on Galicia, which cites the Piller collection of Galician patents and Koeffl's digest of Galician laws. I have not seen the German text. The rendering is a public-domain translation of 1906 and should be treated as substance rather than as the draftsman's wording, and anyone quoting the patent should go to the Piller *Sammlung*.

Markiiian Shashkevych's *Azbuka i abecadło* (1836) is cited by title only. Ivan Franko's three-part study of the 1859 alphabet war in the *Zapysky* of the Shevchenko Society (1913) is the standard contemporary account and I have not read it.

The Homberg material is drawn from the 1906 *Jewish Encyclopedia*, the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* tradition via Encyclopedia.com, and the Lviv *yizkor* volume, and

the accounts differ on points that matter. The date of his appointment as superintendent is given as 1784 in one and 1787 in another; the number of schools as “more than 104,” “107 classes and schools,” and “over 100”; the date of his departure from Galicia as 1799 in one account and 1802 in another, and the reason variously as scandal, the candle-tax accusation, and embezzlement. The abolition of the network is dated 26 June 1806 by the *yizkor* volume, with about 3,550 pupils attending on the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* figure and 389 in Lviv alone on the *yizkor* one. The school fund of 259,088 florins folded into the *Galizischer Normalschulfond* is from the *yizkor* volume alone and is a single-source figure carrying real weight in my argument. **The examination of brides and grooms on Bne Zion before the issue of a marriage certificate is likewise from the *yizkor* volume alone**, and since it is the module’s sharpest single exhibit it needs confirming from the administrative record before anyone repeats it. These are all Jewish communal and reference sources with their own view of Homberg, who is a genuinely contested figure — a sincere reformer to the Haskalah historiography and an informer to the traditionalist one — and I have tried to report the acts rather than adjudicate the man.

The alphabet wars of 1834 and 1859, Gołuchowski’s parallel pressure for the Gregorian calendar and for the abolition of the Ruthenian chair, and the composition of the 1859 commission are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and the recent literature on the Ruthenian alphabet question; the detail that Łoziński, who proposed Latinisation in 1834, voted against it in 1859 comes from the same body of work and is the kind of neat reversal that should be checked before it is leaned on.

The Greek Catholic institutional sequence, the Ruthenian Triad and *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, Prosvita’s seventy-seven branches and nearly three thousand reading rooms in 1914, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Sokil and Sich, the Polonisation of Lviv University in 1871 and 1879, and the 1911–12 school counts are from Ivan L. Rudnytsky’s essay on the Ukrainians in Galicia and the sources he cites, chiefly Hugelmann’s *Nationalitätenrecht des alten Oesterreichs* and Ann Sirka’s study of the nationality question in Austrian education. The figure of some 2,457 Ruthenian-language primary schools by 1910 comes from a separate study of Greek Catholic clerical education and I have not cross-checked it against the school statistics. Kornlyo Ustianovych’s journeys to Russia and his change of view are from his own reminiscences of 1884, reported by Rudnytsky; a memoirist recounting his own conversion is exactly the kind of source that improves a story in the telling, and I have used it as an illustration of a mechanism rather than as evidence of a fact.

Three real gaps. I have **no Galicia-specific illiteracy series**, and have therefore not given one; the empire-level observation that the highest illiteracy rates were found among the Ruthenians and comparable groups, and that a basic elementary infrastructure only reached the periphery around 1900 despite compulsory schooling from 1869, is from the Habsburg centenary literature and is not a substitute. Without that series the claim that a formation was or was not reaching the village rests on institutional counts rather than on outcomes, which is weaker than it should be. Second, I have described the Jewish, Polish and Ruthenian formations at very unequal depth, and the Polish one — the manor, the tutor, the insurrectionary tradition, the reception of Sienkiewicz — is the thinnest here and deserves better, since after 1867 it was the one with a provincial state behind it. Third, I have not established what the Hasidic courts actually did in this period beyond growing, which leaves the counter-formation that defeated Homberg described by its outcome rather than by its working.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 5 · THE COST COLUMN

YOU CANNOT SOLVE SOCIAL PROBLEMS WITH PRISON SENTENCES

Module 5, the cost column: why the Galician peasant stayed for a century after he was legally free to go, what changed when a steerage ticket came within reach, and what a state does about a door its own constitution will not let it shut.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The ledger from below

Take a Ruthenian smallholder in an eastern Galician village in, say, 1885, and run the arithmetic he was actually running. Not the arithmetic of revolt, which is a different and easier question, but the daily one: why get up and go to work in this arrangement rather than some other.

The benefit column was not empty, and the previous modules have shown why. He was legally free, which his grandfather had not been. He held his plot in his own name and could leave it to his sons. He could marry without asking anybody. He had a court that was not his lord's, and a right of complaint against the manor that was worth something even when it failed. He had a parish priest with a seminary education who was, increasingly, the son of another such priest and a man of his own people. He had an emperor whom he had been taught — accurately, as far as it went — to regard as the party that had taken the whip out of the steward's hand. That is a real benefit column and it is why the peasantry of this province behaved in 1846, 1848 and 1809 the way the third module described. The compliance was not purchased with fear.

Now the other side. Half the peasantry held under two hectares; the provincial average was somewhere around two and a third and falling. The inheritance law adopted in 1868 required a peasant's land to be divided equally among his sons, and Galician families were large, so a viable holding became two unviable ones in a

generation and four in two. The plots were not contiguous: the standard figure given for the average peasant is something like twenty separate strips, which means a man walked between his fields all day and could not consolidate, drain or improve any of them. Rural density was the highest in Europe. Yields were the lowest in the monarchy. Something like forty per cent of the arable remained in estates above fifty hectares, and the customary rights to wood and pasture that had made a small holding workable had been referred to a state commission in 1855 which mostly found for the manors. The lord's monopoly on spirits survived until 1889. Ninety-four per cent of Ukrainians in Galicia were still on the land in the early twentieth century; industrial employment in the whole province had not reached a hundred thousand at the turn of the century, and by 1914 Galicia held some nine per cent of Austria-Hungary's industry while carrying a much larger share of its people. A worker in Lviv earned a fraction of a Lower Austrian's wage.

And behind all of it, the credit. A man on two hectares with a bad harvest borrowed, because there was nothing else to do, and until the co-operative credit unions appeared he borrowed at whatever rate was asked, and the security was the land. Forced sales to cover debts became one of the standard mechanisms by which Galician peasant holdings changed hands. It is worth noting, because the pattern runs through this whole study, that the visible creditor was very often a Jewish moneylender occupying the same structural position the *arendator* had occupied in the Landscape — the interface at which an extraction he did not design was collected, absorbing a resentment whose beneficiaries were elsewhere. The official statistics for auctioned farms show the proportion of forced sales of Jewish debtors' property rising alongside the peasants', which is the plainest evidence that the interface was being crushed with the rest.

What that produced is contested and must be reported as contested. The phrase that fixed it in the European mind — *nędza galicyjska*, Galician misery, and the Polish pun *Golicja i Głodomieria*, Broke-land and Hunger-land — comes with an author and a purpose: Stanisław Szczepanowski's *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* of 1888 was an argument for an industrial policy, and its most-quoted figure, fifty thousand deaths a year from hunger, is a polemical estimate that has been reproduced ever since as though it were a return from a registrar. The count of seven major famines between 1847 and 1889 circulates in the same loose way. What is not in dispute is the direction: this was the poorest crownland in the monarchy, it was getting more crowded rather than less, and the men living in it knew it.

The cost side, and its strange emptiness

Here is where Galicia departs from almost everything else in this collection, and the departure is the module's subject.

The framework's standing expectation is that where the benefit column is thin the cost column must be held high by visible force — garrisons, police, laws against flight, the credible expectation that the man who defects will be caught and made an example of. Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took.

Galicia after 1848 has almost none of that, and not because the record is missing. There was no *corvée* after 1848 and no manorial court. There was no law binding a peasant to a village. Passports ceased to be required for travel within the monarchy in 1857. Passport control at the monarchy's own frontiers was abandoned in 1865. And the constitutional revisions of December 1867 — the same settlement that handed the province to the Polish upper classes — guaranteed Austrian subjects the right to emigrate. There was a *gendarmerie*, there were courts, and the agrarian strikes of 1902 produced arrests; there was a state of siege in 1864–65 during the Russian-Polish rising next door, and there was the memory of 1846, which cut in the state's favour rather than against it. But nothing in that adds up to a floor pressing a population into place. By the standards of this collection the Galician peasant was, on paper, one of the freest subjects in the corpus.

So what held him?

Not force. The plain answer is that he was held by the fact that there was nowhere he could afford to reach. His only asset was two hectares he could not sell for enough to move a family, in a province whose towns had no work, at the edge of an empire whose industrial regions were a thousand kilometres away and whose language he did not speak. A door that a man cannot pay to walk through is shut, whatever the statute book says. He stayed because staying was the only option in his field of vision that did not begin with a sum of money he did not have.

This is a case the framework's account of the exit dial has not properly had. Everywhere else in the corpus the door is shut by the extractor: laws against flight, collusion among lords to return runaways, sealed borders, a pass at the throat. In Galicia the extractor had no power to shut the door and the door was shut anyway, for four decades after emancipation, by price.

The door opens

What opened it was not a change of law. The law had permitted departure since 1867. What opened it was that going became affordable, and it became affordable in a specific and traceable way.

It began small and near. From the 1880s Galician peasants went seasonally — to Prussian Germany, newly unified and hungry for agricultural hands, and to Bosnia. That is a journey a man can make on foot and by third-class rail with money he can borrow against a harvest. On the estimates for the years 1907 to 1912 something like seventy-five thousand seasonal workers a year were going to Germany alone, under recruitment arrangements the Ukrainian organisations eventually negotiated themselves.

Then it went transatlantic, and it went in the pattern that always signals a threshold has been crossed rather than a policy changed. It started in the Polish-speaking west and moved east into the Ruthenian districts. The first men went; they sent money home; that money paid the fare of the next. A village that had sent nobody in 1885 was sending its young men in a stream by 1900, because the passage now cost a letter from a cousin rather than a decision to sell the only thing the family owned. The literature calls it chain migration; in the framework's terms it is the exit dial turning, and the hand on it belongs to the emigrants themselves.

The figures are large and the estimators disagree, so they are given here as a range with the bases named. Something on the order of seven hundred and fifty thousand people crossed the Atlantic from Galicia between 1880 and 1914 on the commonest overall count. For the Ukrainians specifically, the estimate is that between seven hundred and eight hundred thousand Austro-Hungarian Ukrainians — Galicians and Transcarpathians together — left between 1890 and 1913, which the same source puts at between a third and a half of the total natural increase for the period. Poles went principally to New England and the American Midwest and to Brazil; Ukrainians to Brazil, Canada and the United States, with a heavy flow from southern Podolia to the Canadian prairies; Jews to the New World directly and by way of other Habsburg lands. The Brazilian episode of the 1890s was intense enough to acquire a name — Brazilian fever — and a literature: Konopnicka wrote about it in Polish and Franko in Ukrainian, and Osyp Oleskiv's intervention redirected much of the Ukrainian flow from Brazil to Canada.

And the money came back. This is the part that matters for the ledger, because a remittance does two things at once: it pays the next man's passage, and it puts cash in a

household that had never handled any. Galician peasants began buying land with it. The parcelling of indebted great estates accelerated; the share of eastern Galician land in holdings above the estate threshold fell from just over forty per cent in 1889 to just under thirty-eight in 1912; and in 1908 the Ukrainians founded a Land Bank to organise the buying, because the Polish leadership was using the same parcelling process to plant settlers from western Galicia in the eastern districts. Even the land purchase was a contested field.

The strike and the ticket are the same fact

In July and August of 1902 the agrarian strikes broke out — over four hundred village communities across some twenty districts of eastern Galicia, with participation put at around two hundred thousand. The peasants refused their labour to the manorial estates and demanded better wages and better treatment. The movement began spontaneously and was then taken up and organised by the Ukrainian parties.

It is worth being exact about why this was possible in 1902 and had not been possible in 1862. A strike is a threat to withhold something the other party needs and cannot easily get elsewhere. For four decades after emancipation the estates of eastern Galicia had faced a labour market in which the supply was effectively infinite: the villages were overfull, the men had nowhere to go, and a labourer who refused a wage was replaced within the hour by one of the twenty other men standing at the gate. Marginal productivity of labour in eastern Galicia has been described as effectively zero — labour so cheap that it discouraged even the building of factories. Under those conditions withholding labour is not a threat; it is a resignation.

What changed the arithmetic was the boat. Once a substantial fraction of the able-bodied men aged fifteen to forty-nine were leaving, and once the ones who stayed knew they could leave, the estate could no longer assume the hands would be there in the spring. The strike became credible because the departure had become credible. **Exit and voice are the same asset seen twice:** a man who can go is a man who can also refuse, and the manor has to bid for both.

The third mechanism arrived alongside and is easy to underrate. The Ukrainian co-operative movement, beginning modestly in the 1880s and gathering pace through the 1890s, had by 1914 covered the province with credit unions, co-operative stores, dairies and purchasing associations, with Silskyi Hospodar spreading agricultural instruction. A credit union does one thing above all: it breaks the lender's monopoly. A peasant

with somewhere else to borrow cannot be made to sign at any rate offered, and a peasant who is not signing at any rate offered does not lose his land at auction. A Polish observer of the period noted the political consequence with some accuracy — that militant Ukrainianism had acquired in these institutions a set of entrenched strongholds, and that practical peasant minds attach most readily to a movement that visibly serves their everyday interests.

So all three of the mechanisms by which the floor beneath the man at the bottom can rise were operating in Galicia in the same two decades: a door opened, the subject acquired the power to make his own extraction costly, and — after 1907 — the force above him became answerable to a franchise he was part of. That combination is what this study exists to observe.

What the state did about it

It did not like it, and what it did instead of closing the door is the sharpest single exhibit in this module.

In November 1889 a criminal trial opened at Wadowice, fifty kilometres from Kraków. Sixty-five defendants stood accused, among them Jewish travel agents from Oświęcim — where the Prussian, Russian and Austrian railways met and a large emigration business had grown up — together with a number of mid-level Austrian civil servants, railway employees and police officers charged with corruption. The formal charges were fraud, smuggling, bribery, assault and swindling emigrants of their last coins. The substantive charge, as the prosecution developed it, was that the agents had seduced peasants into abandoning their homeland with false promises of American wealth, and delivered them instead to hard labour in American factories and mines and to brothels. The prosecutor told the court the case was a referendum on emigration itself, one of the burning questions of the day, and that emigration threatened the basic ideal of freedom in the Habsburg Empire. Reporters came from across the monarchy and from England, France and America. The proceedings ran until March 1890.

The defence answered on two grounds and both are worth holding. The first was constitutional: Austrians had a legal right to travel abroad to earn a living, and a licensed agency that sold a worker a passage to America had done nothing that a railway booking office does not do. The second was the arithmetic. In his closing, the defence advocate Lazarski told the court that *“you cannot solve social problems with prison sentences”* — that to stop the emigration one would have to forbid returning emigrants

from bringing home the money they had saved, or else put an end to the exploitation of agricultural workers in Galicia, and that if either were done the emigration would stop at once.

That is the cost column stated in open court by a working lawyer in 1890, and it is more precise than most of the scholarship. He named the two terms: the remittance, which is what turns the exit dial, and the extraction, which is what makes turning it worth the journey. He also named, without meaning to, the reason the state was prosecuting agents rather than legislating: it could not lawfully close the border, and it could not politically address the extraction, so what remained was the infrastructure in between.

This is a mechanism the framework should carry. **Where a state cannot lawfully foreclose exit, it attacks the doorkeepers** — the agent, the shipping line's tout, the man who advances the fare, the recruiter — and it does so in the language of protecting the very people who are leaving. The prosecution is framed as a rescue. And there is a further tell in who gets prosecuted: the intermediaries in Galicia were disproportionately Jewish, which meant that a case about labour supply could be run, and was run, in a register the province's antisemitic politics supplied ready-made. The framework's ordinary observation that an interface population absorbs the resentment generated by an extraction it does not own applies here to the exit as well as to the extraction — and in the spring of 1898, when thousands of peasants and townspeople in western Galicia rioted against their Jewish neighbours, the pressure that could not go upward went sideways again.

Three ledgers, not one

The colonial bend requires this module to note that the cost column read differently by caste, and in Galicia it read differently three ways.

The Ruthenian was overwhelmingly on the land — some ninety-four per cent of Ukrainians were still agricultural in the early twentieth century — with the fewest alternatives inside the province, the least urban presence, and a national movement that was, from the 1890s, deliberately building him institutions. His exit was the boat, and his voice was the strike and the co-operative.

The Pole of the western districts was also mostly a peasant, and emigrated first and in comparable numbers; but a Polish speaker of any social position had routes inside the province that a Ruthenian did not — the administration, the schools, the

professions, the Diet — because after 1867 those were Polish. Only about two-thirds of Galician Poles were in agriculture. The same emigration was, for that population, one option among several.

The Jew had no land to be held by and no province to rise in. His exit was earlier, more various, and more permanent: to Hungary and the Romanian principalities in the earlier period, then to Vienna and to the New World. His cost column carried items the other two did not — the end of the propination trade in 1889, which removed a whole occupational stratum at a stroke; the boycotts; the riots of 1898; and, pressing from the other side of the Russian frontier, refugees from pogroms arriving faster than Galician Jews were leaving, so that the population more than doubled between 1849 and 1910 even as it emigrated.

Three populations, one province, three completely different readings of the same arrangement. Any account that gives Galicia a single cost column has averaged away the thing it should be measuring.

Reading the cost column against the framework

The framework holds that the extractor drives the subject's share downward until it meets the revolt threshold, that the threshold is set by two dials the extractor turns — the credibility of force and the availability of exit — and that the floor rises only when a dial turns: when the force weakens, when a door opens, or when the subject acquires the power to make his own extraction costly.

Galicia confirms the mechanism and corrects the account of the second dial, and the correction is this module's contribution.

Exit has two components and the framework has been tracking only one. A door is shut by permission or by price, and where the extractor cannot control the permission he does not need to, so long as the price holds. The Galician peasant had a constitutional right to emigrate from 1867 and did not exercise it in any numbers for two decades — not because he was content, not because he was watched, and not because anybody forbade him, but because the fare was more money than his family had ever held at one time. The Habsburg state closed no door in Galicia and needed to close none. The price did the work that a pass law does elsewhere, and it did it without a single administrative act, without a policeman, and without appearing in any record as coercion at all.

That yields two things to look for in every other case. The first is that **the exit dial is turned by whoever can pay for the journey**, which in a poor province means it is turned not by a government but by the first men through the door sending money back — so a chain migration is not a symptom of the dial having turned, it *is* the dial turning, and its dating is the dating of the change. The second is the tell. Where a state cannot lawfully shut a door it will attack the doorkeepers instead, prosecute the intermediaries rather than the travellers, and describe the prosecution as protection of the people it is trying to keep. Wadowice is the specimen: sixty-five defendants, four months, world press, and no charge that anyone had a duty to stay, because no such duty existed and everyone in the courtroom knew it.

The corollary is that exit and voice are not alternatives but the same asset. The agrarian strikes of 1902 were possible because the estates could no longer treat Galician labour as inexhaustible, and they could not treat it as inexhaustible because it was on boats. A man who can leave can refuse; a man who cannot leave is not making a threat when he refuses, he is announcing a resignation. Where a study finds a subject population acquiring bargaining power, it should look first for the door that opened, and expect the two to be dated to the same decade.

And the limit, which must be stated at full strength because it is where the cheerful version of this module would go wrong. The floor rose for the man who left and for the household that got his remittance. It did not rise for the province. Galicia's population grew by some forty-five per cent between 1869 and 1910 *despite* three-quarters of a million people crossing the Atlantic — which means the emigration was not relieving the pressure, it was running behind it. Where the underlying condition is demographic and the land is finite, opening the exit dial improves individual ledgers and leaves the aggregate roughly where it was. Nobody in this province was saved by the boat. Some individuals were, one at a time, and they paid for the next ones.

The next module has to establish what was actually being taken, and from whom, and by which instrument — because this one has argued that the extraction was heavy enough to make a transatlantic crossing look like the better bet, and has not yet put a number on it.

A note on sources.

One primary phrase is quoted: the defence advocate Lazarski's closing statement at the Wadowice trial in March 1890, in Tara Zahra's English rendering in "Travel Agents on

Trial: Policing Mobility in East Central Europe, 1889–1989,” *Past & Present* 223 (2014). The underlying text is a contemporary newspaper report; Zahra notes that the complete trial records appear to be missing and that the case must be reconstructed from the press coverage, which was extensive and came from across the political spectrum. The translation is hers, the trial reporting is a nineteenth-century newspaper’s, and the module leans on the line heavily enough that a reader should know it stands on that chain. The prosecutor’s characterisation of the trial as a referendum on emigration and as a threat to the ideal of freedom in the empire is paraphrased from the same article. The composition of the defendants — sixty-five in all, including civil servants, railway employees and police officers — and the dates of 19 November 1889 to 12 March 1890 are Zahra’s.

The legal position on exit is from the standard genealogical and administrative literature on Habsburg travel documents: passports no longer required for internal travel from 1857, border passport control abandoned in 1865, and the right to emigrate guaranteed in the constitutional revisions of December 1867. I have not seen the text of the relevant Basic Law article and the claim would be better for it, since it is the module’s structural premise.

Emigration figures are given as ranges because the estimators disagree and count different populations over different periods. The figure of roughly 750,000 transatlantic emigrants from Galicia between 1880 and 1914 is the commonest overall total in the reference literature. The figure of 700,000–800,000 Austro-Hungarian Ukrainians between 1890 and 1913, amounting to between a third and a half of the natural increase, is Ivan L. Rudnytsky’s, resting on Kubijovyč and on Bachynsky’s *Ukrainska emigratsiia* (Lviv 1914); the seasonal figure of about 75,000 a year to Germany from 1907 to 1912 is from the same source. A widely circulated figure of 400,000 leaving in 1913 alone, and of “almost a million” to the United States from the late 1880s to 1914, comes from popular writing rather than from a demographic study and I have not used it in the argument.

Landholding and welfare figures are the weakest part of this module and should be treated accordingly. The average holding of about 2.3 hectares, the twenty scattered plots, the seven famines between 1847 and 1889, the forty per cent of arable in large estates, and the Lviv wage at three-fifths of a Lower Austrian’s are drawn from reference and popular sources rather than from the agricultural statistics, and several trace back ultimately to Szczepanowski. **Szczepanowski’s** *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* (1888) is a polemic written to argue for a policy, its fifty-thousand-hunger-deaths

figure is an estimate and not a return, and it has been quoted for a century and a third as though it were a census. I have named it as what it is and have not built on it. The decline of large-estate land in eastern Galicia from 40.3 per cent in 1889 to 37.8 per cent in 1912, the Ukrainian Land Bank of 1908, and the parcelling process are Rudnytsky's, and are the most reliable quantities in the module.

The 1902 agrarian strikes are given as over 400 village communities in some twenty districts (Rudnytsky) and around 200,000 participants (*Encyclopedia of Ukraine*); these are probably measuring different things and I have reported both rather than reconciling them. Franko's contemporary German-language analysis of the strikes (1902) is the primary account and I have not read it.

On usury, forced sales and the position of Jewish creditors I have relied on the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter's survey, which is careful and which notes explicitly that the official statistics do not distinguish peasant from middle-class holdings among the auctioned farms — so the common claim that most auctioned farms were peasant farms is a supposition and is flagged as one there. The western Galician riots of the spring of 1898 are noted in Larry Wolff's work and elsewhere; I have not examined them and they deserve their own treatment in the accounting module rather than a clause here.

Two gaps I could not fill. I have **no wage or price series for rural Galicia** and therefore no way to say what the extraction actually amounted to per household per year, which is the number this module most needed and which the extraction module must supply. And I have not established what the gendarmerie in Galicia actually did — its size, its distribution, its arrest figures — which means my claim that the cost column was held by price rather than by force rests on the absence of evidence of coercion rather than on evidence of its absence. That is exactly the inference this project's discipline warns about, and it is stated here so that it can be checked.

MODULE 6 · EXTRACTION

TWO KREUZER FOR EVERY SABBATH CANDLE

Module 6, extraction: by what instruments the wealth of Galicia was taken, from whom, at what rate — and why the cheapest tax a state ever found was one levied on an act its subjects had already been formed to be unable to refuse.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The shape to look for first

Before any question of rates or revenues, look for the shape: compulsory labour that produces for somebody else, and then labour on your own days for your own subsistence. *Corvée*, *robot*, *pańszczyzna*, *Gutsherrschaft* — the name varies and the arrangement does not. It is the oldest and simplest way of taking from a man who has nothing but himself, and Galicia ran it for three hundred and fifty years.

The numbers, as far as the record permits, are these. A Galician peasant household before 1848 worked on average about two hectares of the lord's land and rendered something in the region of seventy-eight days a year on state estates and one hundred and thirty-three on private ones, with documented cases running as high as three hundred. Of the total obligation, 68.2 per cent was labour, 26.6 per cent money, and the remaining 5.2 per cent other services and dues. The Commonwealth's statutes had fixed a *minimum* of one day a week from a full holding in 1520 and named no maximum at all; Austria imposed the first ceiling, of three days a week and a hundred and fifty-six days a year, in the Josephine period.

Sit with what that means as an instrument. The thing taken is *time*, and time has properties no other tax base has. It cannot be stored, so it cannot be saved against a bad year. It cannot be hidden, because the steward can see whether a man is in the field. It cannot be under-declared, because there is no declaration — a cadastre can be evaded and a harvest can be buried, but a Monday cannot be concealed from the person who is standing in it. And it is taken first: the days owed to the manor came off the top, and

the household's own subsistence was produced in whatever remained. That is the arrangement's whole cruelty and its whole efficiency. The peasant did not hand over a share of what he grew. He grew what was left after he had finished growing somebody else's.

The second instrument: compulsory consumption

The *corvée* had a companion that the framework has not previously met and that deserves a name, because it is a different mechanism working on the same household.

The *propinacja* — the noble monopoly on the production and sale of spirits, granted to the *szlachta* in 1496 and running in Galicia until 1889 — was not merely a monopoly. In its Commonwealth and Galician form it carried a compulsory purchase: a peasant household was obliged to take a quantity of the lord's alcohol, calculated by the number of its members, and the alternative to taking it was additional *corvée*. A household that refused had the drink delivered and dumped at its door and was charged for it regardless.

Read that as an instrument and it is the inverse of the test this framework normally applies to a tax. The usual question is *what will be accepted in satisfaction of the obligation* — because a levy payable only in a currency a subsistence household does not hold is a labour draft wearing a fiscal costume. Here the obligation is not discharged by paying at all. It is discharged by **consuming**, and the extractor's own product is the unit of account. That does three things at once. It guarantees a market with no selling and no competition. It converts a levy into a sale, so that on any ledger it appears as commerce rather than as tribute. And — the part that should not be passed over — the product is one whose consumption reduces the consumer's capacity to work, to save, and to organise. This ran for three hundred and ninety-three years in the territory that became Galicia, and the standard account of Galician alcoholism traces it directly here.

When Vienna finally abolished the monopoly in 1889 it compensated the owners, and the compensation is reported to have run at five or six times the annual income the pubs had been yielding. The peasant who had been compelled to drink got nothing; the lord who had compelled him was paid out at a multiple.

The third: an extraction that survived its own abolition

In April 1848 — the patent is dated 17 April in some accounts and 22 April in others, and the empire-wide law followed that autumn — Governor Stadion ended the *corvée* and hereditary tenancy in Galicia by decree. The peasants got their persons and their plots.

They also got a bill. The principle written into the Austrian emancipation was manumission with compensation: somebody had to pay the landlords for the loss of the labour and the dues. The Ruthenian peasant deputy Ivan Kapushchak told the Reichstag on 17 August 1848 that serfdom was a cruel abuse and therefore not a thing that ought to be compensated at all, and that the lords might keep the rods and whips with which they had beaten the peasants and let those serve as their indemnity. The speech is reported to have struck the chamber. The indemnity was paid.

The mechanism is the one this study was told to look for and it is confirmed exactly. **The labour obligation was not abolished; it was converted into a debt.** A hundred and thirty-three days a year became a charge on the provincial finances, and the provincial finances rested on the taxation of the province, and the province was overwhelmingly the households that had rendered the days. The instrument changed from a labour-book to a bond schedule. The direction of the flow did not change at all.

Two further transfers completed the settlement and both ran the same way. The servitudes — the customary rights to take wood from the manor's forest and graze on its pasture, without which a two-hectare holding could not carry an animal or heat a house — were referred to a state commission from 1855, which decided most of the contested cases in favour of the manors, leaving the villages either without the right or with a token payment; most were settled by the early 1880s and some ran to 1895. Thereafter a peasant who wanted firewood bought it from the man who had just been given the forest. And the propination survived to 1889, so that for four decades after emancipation the free peasant was still buying his lord's vodka.

One honest complication belongs here, because the module would be false without it. Emancipation ruined a great many of the nobility too. The manorial farms lost their free labour in May 1848 and became, overnight, enterprises that had to pay wages; the indemnity was promised for the future and the wage bill was immediate; the estates went looking for cash, borrowed from banks and usurers against their land, and a substantial number of them lost the land to their creditors. A settlement can transfer misery downward and bankrupt its beneficiaries at the same time, and this one did.

The fourth: extraction sorted by caste, collected through the ritual

Now the instrument that makes this module worth writing, and it was aimed at the population that had no land at all.

From the first years of Austrian rule the Jews of Galicia paid taxes nobody else paid. There was a protection or tolerance charge — a *Schutzsteuer* of four florins per family, with a further florin added for the benefit of the landlord — inherited and adjusted from Maria Theresa's arrangements. There were marriage-permit fees. And in 1784 Joseph II added a tax on kosher meat, which began at one and three-quarter kreuzer on the pound and was raised to three, while the charge on a goose went from five kreuzer to seventeen. The effect, by statute, was that meat slaughtered according to Jewish law cost more than meat that was not.

The tolerance tax failed. It was abolished in 1797 on the government's own reasoning: it did not yield what had been expected, and it generated an unmanageable number of delinquents. A charge of four florins on a family is a charge a family can simply not pay, and a great many did not; the Galician communities fell into arrears so deep that Vienna was ordering foreclosures on Jewish earnings and then deferring them.

What replaced it is one of the most precisely designed extractions in this collection. On the proposal of a Jewish tax farmer named Solomon Kofler and the recommendation of Naphtali Herz Homberg — the same man who was at that moment superintendent of the German-Jewish schools and assistant censor of Jewish books — the government imposed, in 1797, a tax on the lighting of candles for Jewish ritual.

The schedule is worth setting down as it stands. Two kreuzer for each candle lit for the Sabbath and the festivals. Six kreuzer for a *Yahrzeit* candle, lit for the dead. Half a kreuzer for a Hanukkah light. Ten kreuzer for the candles of the Day of Atonement. The rates were raised repeatedly and are reported to have nearly tripled in 1816. A married woman paid for every pair of Sabbath candles, and one account of the arrangement notes that she paid whether or not she had the money to buy the candles themselves. Collection was farmed: a company was constituted for the purpose, and in 1800 the farmers paid three hundred and fifty thousand gulden for the right to collect. The charge fell hardest on the poor and the farmers were detested. It was abolished in 1848, when the Reichstag struck down the whole class of special Jewish imposts.

And there is a final clause that turns the thing from an exaction into an architecture. **The right to vote in the community's own elections was determined by the**

amount of candle tax a man had paid. The state's levy on the performance of a religious duty became the property qualification for representation inside the community it was levied on. A poor man's non-payment did not merely leave him in arrears; it left him without a voice among his own.

Why the candle tax worked and the tolerance tax did not

Set the two side by side and the government's own learning is legible.

The tolerance tax was a charge on *being* — a flat sum on a household, of the same family as the poll taxes this framework has met on four continents. Its defect is the defect of every poll tax: it bears no relation to capacity, so the poorest simply cannot pay it, and the state is left with a register of defaulters, a choice between forgiveness and cruelty, and an administrative apparatus that costs more than the yield. Vienna said as much when it abolished the thing.

The candle tax was a charge on *doing* — and on doing something that the person taxed could not decline to do without ceasing to be who she was.

This is the module's finding and it should be stated carefully, because it is the point at which the extraction module and the formation module turn out to be describing one object. A sacred obligation is, by definition, a commitment that has been placed beyond calculation: the whole work of formation is to install certain acts as not-optional, not weighable, not tradeable against advantage. A woman who has been formed to light the Sabbath candles does not, on a bad week, run a cost-benefit calculation and decide to skip it. That is what it means for the value to be sacred. Which makes the act the closest thing to a perfectly inelastic demand curve that a pre-industrial state will ever locate.

The extractor's ideal tax base is an act the subject cannot decline, and formation manufactures that inelasticity far more cheaply than law can. Compare the two Galician instruments directly. Propination also attached itself to a compulsory consumption — but the compulsion was *legal*, and legal compulsion has to be enforced: the quota calculated by household size, the refusal, the barrels dumped at the door, the charge levied anyway, the litigation, the resentment discharging onto the tavern-keeper. A tax on the Sabbath light needs none of that. It requires no census, because the observance declares itself; no assessment, because devotion is its own return; no bailiff, because nobody is refusing. It rises with piety rather than with

income, which is why it fell hardest on exactly the households least able to bear it, and it is uncollectable only from a person willing to stop being a Jew.

And the corollary is the one that matters for the shape of this study. **This instrument is available only against a population whose formation the state did not build.** A state cannot tax its own subjects' patriotism this way; there is no discrete purchasable act, and the whole point of a formation you installed yourself is that it returns compliance rather than revenue. The devotional levy is therefore structurally a *caste* tax — it requires an inside and an outside, and it works on the outside. Vienna spent a great deal of money in Galicia endowing one formation it had not built, and taxed another one it had not built, in the same decades, and the two policies are the same recognition applied in opposite directions: the formation you did not install is the one thing in the province you can neither steer nor be given for free, so you either fund it or farm it.

It should be said plainly, because the previous module has already been through this ground, that the man who recommended the candle tax was the man running the schools. Homberg's schools failed to install a new formation in the Galician Jews. The tax he recommended succeeded completely, because it required nothing of them except that they go on being what they already were.

The fifth: what the state took in its own name

Beside the seigneurial and confessional instruments ran the ordinary fiscal ones, and they should be listed even where I cannot quantify them.

The land tax, resting on the Josephine cadastre of 1785–88 and its Franciscan successor — the survey built for the urbarial reform that was withdrawn, and then kept for two centuries as an assessment roll. The salt monopoly, on the ancient workings at Wieliczka and Bochnia, which taxed a necessity nobody can do without and which the state ran directly. The tobacco monopoly. And, as the first module established, conscription: a draft of bodies, twenty-five years before 1802 and three years after 1868, falling by an exemption schedule that excused nobles, priests, townsmen and free peasants' eldest sons, and therefore landing on the younger sons of the poorest villages. That is extraction in the most literal available sense — the province exported men to the army as it exported grain and, later, oil.

The sixth: the oil, and the thing that did not happen

From the 1850s petroleum was worked at Boryslav and Drohobych in the Carpathian foothills. Stanisław Szczepanowski — the same man who wrote *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* — introduced steam drilling in 1880; the Briton John Simon Bergheim and the Canadian William Henry McGarvey arrived in 1882 and were boring to seven hundred and a thousand metres by 1883. Boryslav went from perhaps five hundred inhabitants in the 1860s to twelve thousand by 1898. In 1909 the Austrian Empire, on the strength of Galicia, stood third among the world's oil producers with about two million barrels — behind the United States at a hundred and eighty-five million and Russia at sixty-five, which is the correct way to read a proud statistic. At its peak it was some five per cent of world output. In the Great War it was the Central Powers' only substantial domestic source, and it was not enough.

Now the fact that matters for this framework, because it inverts the expectation. In almost every case in this collection, a conquering power that finds a mineral vests it in the crown: Lugard took the minerals of Northern Nigeria along with the land and the currency, and the pattern repeats. In Galicia the central government did monopolise the province's *other* mineral rights — and repeatedly failed to do it with oil. Over a protracted struggle between provincial landowners and imperial engineers, petroleum was designated private property, attaching to the surface owner. After 1867 the provincial autonomy made that position defensible, and the coalition that defended it was the three-sided province acting for once as one: Polish noble landowners who wanted no imperial interference on their estates, Jewish wildcatters who did not want to lose their niche, and Ruthenian peasants who were making modest but real money leasing their oil rights to the wildcatters.

The consequences were exactly what the arrangement implies. With rights fragmented across thousands of tiny plots, often without clear title, the field filled with miniature operations competing for the same oil; the Imperial Petroleum Law of 1884 was required before large companies could assemble workable leases; the industry stayed decentralised and largely unprofitable, overproduced, crashed its own price, depleted the fields within a few decades, and worked its men in conditions that were ruinous to health, with open-air storage and fires that sometimes burned for months.

The framework reading is not that autonomy prevented extraction. It is that **autonomy relocated the beneficiary**, and did so in the one commodity the province's own elite could plausibly claim. Galicia's oil was extracted, and it made a small number of Galicians and a larger number of Viennese, French, German and British investors

rich; what the province retained was the wildcat structure and the depleted field. But the Ruthenian smallholder with a lease on his two hectares of Boryslav mud is, so far as this collection has found, the only man at the bottom anywhere in it who received a royalty — and the reason he did is that his province had acquired a Diet in 1867 and used it against Vienna.

What must be conceded

Taxation as such is not theft and this framework does not argue that it is. The Habsburg state in Galicia built roads and railways, ran a salt industry, put down a sanitary administration, funded the seminaries examined in the third module, established a university, and by the last decades was producing measurable gains in mortality and schooling that the accounting module will have to count at full weight. Revenue was genuinely needed and genuinely spent. The objection this framework makes is narrower and it survives the concession: it is to a levy imposed by an authority the payer had no part in constituting, at a rate he could not contest, sorted by a caste he did not choose, and — in the sharpest instance — attached to an act his upbringing had already made impossible for him to decline.

And the honest formulation about the candle tax is probably not that anyone in Vienna set out to design a perfect instrument of confessional extraction. It is the ordinary way institutions acquire their real purposes: a tolerance tax was tried and did not work, a Jewish tax farmer and a Maskil schoolman proposed something that would work better, the treasury adopted it because it yielded, and only afterwards did the arrangement's properties — the self-declaring base, the zero enforcement cost, the franchise clause — become the reasons it was kept for half a century.

Reading extraction in Galicia against the framework

The card requires the fork to be read first: is the thing taken a flow, tunable to a rate and stopping short of the revolt threshold, or a stock taken whole? Galicia is unambiguously the first. Nobody wanted the Galician peasant gone; everybody wanted him working. There was no settler frontier, no clearance, no logic of elimination. The equilibrium is the ordinary tributary one and it sat where the framework says it sits — at the edge of what the household would endure, held there for a century by the fact,

established in the previous module, that the household had nowhere it could afford to go.

The medium-of-payment test returns something the card does not yet carry, and it is this module's contribution.

The operative question about a levy is not only what will be accepted in satisfaction of it, but what act it attaches to — and the extractor's ideal base is an act the subject cannot decline. Legal compulsion can manufacture that inelasticity and does so expensively; formation manufactures it for nothing. Galicia ran both instruments side by side and the comparison is clean. Propination compelled consumption by statute and required a whole apparatus of quotas, bailiffs, dumped barrels and forced charges to make it stick, and generated resentment that discharged, generation after generation, onto the population staffing the tavern. The candle tax compelled nothing, because the Sabbath light was already not a choice, and it therefore needed no register, no assessment and no enforcement: a sacred value is a commitment placed beyond calculation, and a demand that cannot be calculated cannot be reduced when the price rises.

Two things follow, and both should be looked for in every other case. The first is a diagnostic: **where a state abandons a poll tax and replaces it with a levy on a ritual object or observance, it has just learned this lesson**, and the replacement is the tell. Vienna's own stated reason for dropping the *Schutzsteuer* in 1797 — that it did not yield and produced too many delinquents — is the working shown. The second is structural: the devotional levy is only available against a formation the state did not install, because the point of a formation you built yourself is that it returns obedience rather than revenue. It is therefore always a caste instrument, and its presence in a fiscal system is direct evidence that some population inside the order is being governed as an outside.

That connects this module to the two before it in a way worth stating once. Vienna endowed the Greek Catholic formation because it needed a counterweight and could not have one it owned; it taxed the Jewish formation because it could not install a replacement and would not leave the yield on the table; and it did both in the same decades, through some of the same officials, for the same underlying reason. **A formation the state does not control is either a lever to be funded or a base to be farmed, and the choice between the two is made on whether the state wants that population's strength or its money.**

The last thing to note is what none of this produced. Three hundred and fifty years of corvée, four centuries of monopoly spirits, a converted indemnity, a confiscated commons, a caste tax on ritual, and an oil boom, and Galicia at the end held nine per cent of the monarchy's industry, the lowest yields in the monarchy, and the highest rural density in Europe. The extraction was real and it was heavy and it did not build anything here. Whether that is a fact about Vienna, about the province's own elite after 1867, or about the arithmetic of a population growing forty-five per cent in forty years on a fixed quantity of land, is the question the accounting module has to answer and this one cannot.

A note on sources.

No primary text is quoted in this module. Ivan Kapushchak's Reichstag speech of 17 August 1848 is paraphrased here; it was quoted in the settlement module, where its chain of transmission — a Polish document collection, Rosdolsky's study of the peasant deputies, Rudnytsky's English rendering — is set out, and the same caveats apply.

The corvée figures (about two hectares of the lord's land, 78 days on state and 133 on private estates with cases to 300, and the 68.2 / 26.6 / 5.2 split) are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* resting on Rosdolsky, are averages across a province of enormous internal variation, and are the same single-source set flagged in the settlement module. **They remain the weakest load-bearing numbers in this study** and the correct remedy is Roman Rozdolsky's *Stosunki poddańcze w dawnej Galicji* (Warsaw 1962), which I have not consulted.

The propination material — the compulsory quota calculated by household size, the alternative of additional corvée, the dumping of undrunk spirits at the door with the charge levied anyway, and the compensation to owners at five to six times annual pub income at the 1889 abolition — comes from a single popular-history account of the Galician propination laws. It is the most vivid material in the module and it is the least well sourced; the compulsory-purchase mechanism is attested in the general literature on the Commonwealth, but the specific figures and the dumping practice need confirmation from the Polish agrarian historiography before anyone repeats them.

On the Jewish taxes the sources are the 1906 *Jewish Encyclopedia*, the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* tradition via Encyclopedia.com, and two *yizkor* volumes (Zhovkva and Oświęcim). The kosher meat tax of 1784 at 1¾ kreuzer rising to 3 per pound, and 5

kreuzer rising to 17 on a goose, and the *Schutzsteuer* of four florins plus one florin *Domesticalsteuer* abolished in 1797 for want of yield and excess of delinquents, are from the *Jewish Encyclopedia* and are the best-attested figures here. The candle-tax schedule — two kreuzer for Sabbath and festival candles, six for *Yahrzeit*, half for Hanukkah, ten for Yom Kippur — is from the Zhovkva volume; the Oświęcim volume gives ten kreuzer for a pair of Sabbath candles and reports the near-tripling of 1816, which does not obviously reconcile with the Zhovkva figures, and I have reported both rather than choosing. The proposal by Solomon Kofler, Homberg's recommendation, the *Pachtungsgesellschaft*, the 350,000 gulden paid by the farmers in 1800, and the abolition in 1848 are from the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* line. **The clause making communal suffrage depend on candle tax paid is the module's sharpest single fact and rests on that same source**; it is exactly the sort of detail that would repay verification in the Galician administrative record, and its failure would not break the argument but would remove its keystone illustration. *Yizkor* volumes are memorial books written by survivors and descendants, often decades after the events and drawing on communal memory as well as documents; they are indispensable and they are not archives.

The oil material is from the reviews and the introductory apparatus of Alison Fleig Frank's *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* (Harvard, 2005), which is the standard work and which I have not read in full. The load-bearing claims taken from it — that petroleum was repeatedly designated private property attaching to the surface owner while the central government monopolised the province's other minerals; that the 1884 Imperial Petroleum Law was needed before large firms could assemble leases; and that the coalition defending the arrangement comprised Polish noble landowners, Jewish wildcatters and Ruthenian peasants leasing their rights — are her findings, reported at second hand from reviewers. The production comparison (about 2 million barrels for Austria in 1909 against 185 million American and 65 million Russian) is from a review; the peak share of world output is usually given as around five per cent. My inference that the Ruthenian smallholder's royalty is unique in this collection is mine and is only as good as my memory of the other studies.

Three gaps, and the first is serious. **I have no Galician fiscal accounts** — no figure for what the province paid Vienna in direct and indirect taxes, what Vienna spent in the province, or what the balance was in either direction. That is the central quantity of an extraction module and its absence means every claim here about the direction of the flow between province and metropole is qualitative. Bujak's *Rozwój gospodarczy Galicyi*

1772–1914 (Lviv 1917) is where to start. Second, I have not established the terms of the *Grundentlastung* in Galicia specifically — the total sum, the split between peasant and provincial contribution, the interest, or the terminal date — and have therefore described the mechanism without pricing it; the seed for this study carried 1898 as the terminal date and I have not been able to confirm it. Third, I have no wage series, so the statement that extraction sat at the edge of subsistence is an inference from the demographic and emigration evidence rather than a measurement.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 7 · INFORMATION AND SUPPRESSION

RUS' DOES NOT EXIST

Module 7, information and suppression: who controlled what could be known in Galicia, what happened when the censor was taken away in 1867 — and why the schedule of answers permitted on a census form turned out to be a more powerful instrument than any censorship office.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The direction the suppression faced

This collection's sharpest instrument on this question is a rule about asymmetry: **what a regime bothers to hide is a map of what its audience would actually punish.** Concealment is expensive — it needs offices, statutes, prosecutions and the standing embarrassment of visible gagging in a state that professes free speech — so no administration buys it where inattention is free. The corpus of European colonies produced a strange, consistent result when that rule was applied: censorship existed, sometimes heavily, but it faced inward at the conquered, and toward the metropole there was mostly nothing, because nothing was needed. The facts travelled and were inert.

Galicia is not a colony across an ocean and the first thing to establish is that the metropolitan half of that mechanism simply does not apply here. There was no distance to hide behind: Lviv is six hundred kilometres from Vienna, and from 1848 Galician deputies sat in the imperial parliament and could say whatever they liked from the tribune. There was no untranslation: the administration ran in German, the province's grievances were argued in German by people who wrote it well, and Ivan Franko published his analyses of Galician conditions in German journals for German readers in 1846 and again in 1902. There was no concealment of the province's poverty: Szczepanowski's *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* of 1888 was published in order to be read in Vienna, and its numbers have been quoted ever since. When the Wadowice emigration trial opened in 1889, reporters came from across the monarchy and from England, France and America, and the thing ran for four months in the world's press.

So the seam in Galicia does not run between a colony and a metropole. It runs *inside the province*, between three populations and the two administrations that governed them — and every instrument of suppression in this module points inward and downward, at the peoples of Galicia, and specifically at their capacity to become **publics**. That is the same target the colonial censorships had, stripped of the oceanic alibi. What the order feared was never exposure. It was a body of people capable of holding a common grievance and acting on it.

The censor and the other censor, to 1848

Before 1848 the apparatus was the ordinary Metternichian one: prior censorship, an office that read manuscripts before they became books, and a police administration that read what got through.

What it did in Galicia had two distinctive faces, and the more interesting is the one aimed at religious interpretation rather than at politics.

Naphtali Herz Homberg, whom the fourth module met running the German-Jewish school system and the sixth met recommending the tax on Sabbath candles, held simultaneously the post of assistant censor of Jewish books. The categories he moved against were not seditious pamphlets. They were kabbalistic works, most of the Hasidic literature, and works of moral instruction — in one account, the prayer book itself. He also prepared his own adapted edition of a standard Yiddish devotional for women, altered to conform to his opinions, which passed the government censorship and was never printed.

Read that as an instrument and it is not censorship in the ordinary sense at all. Nobody was arguing about the government. A state-appointed official of a subject confession was deciding which strand of that confession its adherents would be permitted to read, and simultaneously writing the replacement. This is the seam being worked directly: the position of trusted interpretation between a people and what they cannot check for themselves is being contested, not by suppressing a rival account of the state, but by suppressing a rival account of God. And the state's stake in it was legible — the strands Homberg struck at were the ones whose authority was personal, charismatic and hereditary, seated in a *rebbe* whom no imperial table of ranks could reach, and the strand he promoted was the one that produced graduates of state schools.

It failed, as the fourth module recorded. The Hasidic courts grew through exactly the decades in which their literature was being censored, which is worth setting beside the general finding that mass persuasion mostly fails against adult vigilance: a censorship that removes books does not remove the authority the books came from, and where the authority is a living man in a nearby town, the removal of his printed word costs him nothing.

The Ruthenian channel was policed with the same instrument and the episode is exact. In 1837 the seminarians of the Ruthenian Triad — Shashkevych, Holovatsky and Vahylevych — published *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, an almanac of folk poetry and original verse in the vernacular. They printed it at Buda in Hungary because the Galician censorship was tighter. The edition was confiscated, and further vernacular publication was blocked.

Now note who did it. The state censorship was hostile, and the police director of Lviv gave the reason with unusual candour: the administration already had trouble enough with one nationality, meaning the Poles, and these young men wanted to resurrect a Ruthenian nationality he considered dead and buried. But the confiscation of the *Rusalka* was carried out by the **ecclesiastical** censorship, and the objection came from the Greek Catholic hierarchy itself. Metropolitan Mykhailo Levytsky and his collaborators regarded the printing of the peasant language as undignified, indecent, and possibly subversive.

That is the module's first structural finding and it is one the framework should hold. **Where an interpreter class exists, it polices its own channel more cheaply and more legitimately than any state bureau can.** A police confiscation is a visible act of an alien power and it makes martyrs; a metropolitan's refusal of an imprimatur is an internal disciplinary matter conducted in the community's own language by its own recognised authority, and it produces not a martyr but a young man in disgrace with his own bishop. Shashkevych was broken by it and died young; Vahylevych eventually went over to the Polish camp. The state got a result it could not have bought, from an institution it was paying for, without spending anything or appearing anywhere in the transaction.

The censor removed, and what replaced him

In 1848 the censorship went. What followed within months is the standard demonstration of what suppression had been holding down: a Ruthenian petition in

April, a Supreme Ruthenian Council in May, *Zoria halytska* — the first Ukrainian-language newspaper published anywhere — a network of local branches, an assembly of Ruthenian scholars, a delegation to Prague, deputies in the Reichstag, and a partition petition that eventually carried two hundred thousand signatures. In November the same year Hammerstein's artillery burned the university library and a state of siege was proclaimed, and the neoabsolutist decade restored the censorship for another ten years.

The settlement that mattered came in December 1867. The Fundamental Laws granted equality before the law and freedom of the press, speech and assembly, on top of the Press Act of 1862. The caution money that publishers had been required to deposit was abolished in 1894 and the newspaper stamp in 1899. By the standards of the century this was a real constitutional press regime and it should not be diminished.

But the censor was not abolished. He was **moved downstream**. Under the Austrian arrangement the police retained the power, on their own initiative or on the public prosecutor's instruction, provisionally to confiscate a publication after it appeared, subject to subsequent judicial confirmation. Prior restraint became post-publication seizure, and the two are different machines with different properties. Prior restraint is silent, cheap and complete: nothing appears and nobody knows what did not. Seizure is loud, expensive and partial: the type has been set, the run has been printed, the editor knows exactly which passage did it, the confiscation itself is a news event, and the second edition can be run with the passage removed and the gap showing.

This is the thing the seed for this study wanted tested — what happens when the censor is taken away — and the answer for Galicia is that the volume of print rose enormously and the state's ability to prevent a specific sentence being read fell nearly to nothing, while its ability to punish the man who printed it remained.

What the freed press was used for

The Ruthenians used it, and the use has one feature that belongs in this module rather than in any other.

The domestic list is long: *Slovo* for the Old Ruthenians from 1861, *Pravda* from 1867, *Dilo* from 1880 and daily from 1888, *Zoria*, *Batkiushchyna*, the Radicals' journals, and from 1898 the *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, the monthly Franko and Hrushevsky edited together, which united the best literary talent of both empires' Ukrainians. Prosvita, founded 1868, had by 1914 seventy-seven branches and close to

three thousand village reading rooms — which is the real infrastructure, since a newspaper needs somewhere to be read aloud in a village where most people cannot read.

And then the feature. In 1876 the Russian government issued the Ems decree prohibiting Ukrainian cultural publication in the Russian Empire. For the following thirty years Galicia was where eastern Ukrainian writers published: journals in Lviv carried both local and Dnieper contributors, the Shevchenko Scientific Society was founded in 1873 on money raised in Russian-ruled Ukraine, and the standard literary language that emerged was built on a Poltava base with a large Galician contribution to its scientific, political and commercial vocabulary. A Habsburg constitutional order's press freedom was, for three decades, the printing house of a public that a neighbouring absolutism had forbidden to exist.

That inverts the colonial pattern usefully. In the colonial cases the suppression was calibrated to the reach of the audience — the dangerous fact tolerated in the language of the few and the far, forbidden in the language of the many and the near. Galicia shows what happens when a state does not or cannot make that calibration: the freedom granted to a small provincial minority for reasons of internal imperial management became, by way of the border, an instrument in a much larger contest that Vienna had not intended to enter and that St Petersburg noticed. The tsarist government's later subsidies to the Galician Russophiles are the response, and they are the clearest possible statement that an information channel in a neighbouring jurisdiction is a strategic object.

Prosecution after the censor

The state kept prosecuting, and the results are instructive because they mostly failed as prosecutions and sometimes succeeded as something else.

In 1878 Ivan Franko and his circle were tried in the first anti-socialist trial in Galicia; their informal reading group was construed as a revolutionary conspiracy. The prosecution did not silence him. It denied him a university career, which meant he spent thirty years as a writer, editor, folklorist and mentor instead of as a professor, and became the most consequential Ukrainian intellectual of his generation. That is the ordinary arithmetic of prosecution in a constitutional order: it converts a young man with opinions into a public figure with a record.

In 1882 came the treason trial of the Russophile leadership — Adolf Dobriansky, the priest Ivan Naumovych, and others — arising out of a village's conversion to Orthodoxy. It ended in acquittal. And yet the government got, from a trial it lost, three things it wanted: the proceedings exposed the duplicity of leaders who had publicly professed loyalty to the empire and the Catholic church while privately favouring Russia and Orthodoxy; the most compromised defendants, Naumovych among them, emigrated to Russia, which gutted the movement's leadership in Galicia; and Vienna asked for, and obtained, the resignation of the Greek Catholic Metropolitan Iosyf Sembratovych for having tolerated Russophile propaganda.

Set that beside the acquittal and the mechanism is plain. **Where a constitutional order cannot convict, the trial itself remains available as an instrument — not to punish the defendants but to reach the institutional heads that the ordinary law cannot touch.** No court removed Sembratovych. The trial created the circumstances in which a government could ask a metropolitan to go, and the metropolitan went. The Old Ruthenian party never recovered, and by 1890 the leadership of Ruthenian Galicia had passed to the Ukrainophiles.

The instrument that beat all of them

None of that — not the censor before 1848, not the confiscations after 1867, not the trials — was the most consequential act of information control in Habsburg Galicia. The most consequential was a printed form with nine boxes on it.

From 1880 every inhabitant of the Austrian half of the monarchy had to declare, on the census schedule, his *Umgangssprache* — his language of daily use — and had to choose exactly one, from a closed list established by the regulation of 6 August 1880: German, Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Serbo-Croat, Italian-Ladino, Romanian, Hungarian. There was no Yiddish on the list, and no Hebrew.

Galicia at the end of the period held something over eight hundred thousand Jews. The mass of them spoke Yiddish. Lviv was the home of the world's first Yiddish-language daily newspaper. And in the state's own count of its own people, they had nowhere to say so, and were therefore recorded under whichever of the permitted categories the local bureaucracy favoured.

Watch the series. In 1869 Galician Jews were still generally recorded as German-speaking. Then, as the provincial administration was Polonised after 1867, the

“German” population of Galicia declined and the Polish rose: by 1880, 60.4 per cent of Galician Jews were returned as Polish; by 1890, 74.6 per cent; by 1900, 76.5 per cent; and by 1910, over ninety-two per cent were registered as Poles. Nothing whatever had happened to what these people spoke at home. What had happened was that the administration collecting the returns had changed hands.

Two controls establish that this was an artefact of the instrument and not a description of the world. First, the Jewish national press in Galicia ran a campaign in 1890 urging Jews to enter Yiddish as their *Umgangssprache*; Orthodox leaders opposed the campaign, and by one account more than half the Jews of Galicia, Vienna and Bukovina wrote it in anyway. It was not counted, because there was no column for it. Second, as late as 1931 — after a further generation of Polonisation under a Polish state — just twelve per cent of all Polish Jews declared Polish their mother tongue when a census permitted them to answer otherwise.

This is annulment, and it is a purer specimen than any this collection has yet found. The framework has previously looked for annulment as the ruling that a fact never was a fact — the census retaken, the famine unwritten, the year removed from the record. Here nothing was ruled and nothing was struck out. **A fact was simply given no available form in which to be recorded**, by an administrative schedule drawn up for other reasons in 1880 and never revised, and the state’s own knowledge of its own population was thereby made incapable of registering the third-largest people in its most populous crownland.

And it was not academic. Those returns were the numbers on which the province’s representation was argued. The curial franchise, the allocation of seats, the whole Polish case that Galicia was a Polish land with minorities in it, rested on a language count in which some eight hundred thousand people who spoke neither Polish nor German had been distributed between Polish and German — and, after 1880, overwhelmingly to Polish.

The nation that could be denied, and the one that could not

Against that, set what happened when the same denial was attempted on the Ruthenians.

It was attempted, repeatedly, and at the highest volume. In the Reichstag’s constitutional committee in January 1849 the Polish deputy Florian Ziemiałkowski told the chamber that the Ruthenians were an artificial nation invented the previous

year, and that what divided Pole from Ruthenian in Galicia was religion, not nationality. In the Galician Diet in 1868 Count Leszek Borkowski put it in five words: “*Rus’ does not exist. There is only Poland and Moscow.*” The eminent historian Walerian Kalinka wrote in 1858 that history had placed the Ruthenian nationality far to the east and that the near bank of the Dnieper, conquered and defended by Polish arms, was and would remain a Polish province. As late as the eve of the war a moderate and self-declaredly conciliatory Polish scholar could write that to put Polish and Ukrainian on a footing of equality was to create a pretended justice between two totally unequal things.

That is a sustained, forty-year, articulate campaign of annulment conducted by a provincial administration with the schools, the university, the Diet and the electoral machinery in its hands. And it failed.

One reason it failed is the subject of the fourth and third modules — the Ruthenians had a church, a seminary, a clergy and, after 1868, three thousand reading rooms. But there is a reason belonging to this module and it is worth isolating, because it is small, administrative, and decisive.

Ruthenian was on the list. It had been one of the nine permitted answers since the classification of 1849, and every census from 1880 returned a Ruthenian figure for Galicia — some forty per cent of the province, some two-thirds of its eastern half. A deputy in the Diet could say that Rus’ did not exist; the imperial statistical office said otherwise every ten years, in print, in a government publication, with a number attached. When the franchise reform of 1907 was argued, and when the provincial statute was renegotiated between 1907 and 1914, that number was the ground of the argument, and its existence is why the argument could be about *how many seats* rather than about whether there was anyone to give them to.

Reading information control in Galicia against the framework

The corpus’s standing instrument is that what a regime bothers to hide maps what its audience would punish, and that the suppression map is therefore a map of thresholds rather than of crimes. Galicia confirms it in the negative — nothing was hidden from Vienna because Vienna’s threshold was high and everybody knew it — and adds a second instrument that operates before any of that.

The refinement is that a census category is a form of standing, and that a state's schedule of permitted answers is a more powerful and far cheaper instrument of information control than its censorship office.

Compare the two machines directly, because Galicia ran both. A censor acts on a statement after somebody has made it. He is expensive, he leaves a record, he must be defended in a state that professes free speech, and — this is the part administrators consistently underestimate — his work advertises itself, because a confiscated edition tells the whole province exactly which paragraph the government could not bear. A classification schedule acts before anyone has spoken. It costs one printing. It leaves no record of what it excluded, because an unavailable answer generates no file. It produces an official number that every subsequent argument must be conducted against, including by the excluded population's own advocates. And it cannot be appealed, because nothing has been refused: nobody was forbidden to speak Yiddish, and nobody was told he was a Pole. He was simply asked a question to which his true answer was not among the options, by a clerk who had no discretion, on a form that had been designed in Vienna in 1880 for reasons that had nothing to do with him.

Two things follow, and they are the module's contribution.

The first is a diagnostic to run in every case: **look at the enumeration schedule before looking at the censorship records.** Ask what categories the order's own instruments of knowing permit, who fits none of them, and what happens in the arithmetic to the people who do not fit. Where a population appears in the count as itself it possesses a number, and a number is the minimum unit of a claim — it is what a deputy can cite, what a franchise commission must allocate against, and what a hostile chamber cannot simply deny. Where a population does not appear, it must establish its own existence before it can make any claim at all, and it must do so against the state's own published figures.

The second is a corollary to the instrument this collection already holds. What a regime bothers to hide maps what its audience would punish. **What a regime declines to count maps what it intends never to have to answer.** Concealment is a response to a public with a threshold; non-enumeration is a response to a claimant with a case. The first anticipates scandal, the second forecloses standing — and the second is the cheaper of the two by an enormous margin, because a scandal has to be managed every time it recurs and a missing box only has to be printed once.

Galicia ran both denials in the same decades, by the same administration, against two of its three peoples. The one that was denied in the chamber but counted in the

returns took forty years of defeats and arrived in 1914 with sixty-two seats promised in a reformed Diet. The one that was counted as something else disappeared, statistically, into the population that was denying it — and did so during the exact decades in which its own daily newspaper was being printed, in its own language, in the provincial capital.

A note on sources.

One primary phrase is quoted: Count Leszek Borkowski in the Galician Diet in 1868. It reaches this page through Ivan L. Rudnytsky's essay, which cites Stefan Kaczala's *Polityka Polaków względem Rusi* (Lviv 1879) at page 306. I have not seen Kaczala, and Kaczala was himself a Ruthenian polemicist reporting the words of a political opponent; the line is famous, it is quoted consistently, and it should nonetheless be held as a well-attested report rather than as a stenographic record. Florian Ziemiałkowski's remark of January 1849 about an artificial nation invented the previous year, Walerian Kalinka's 1858 judgement, and the police director of Lviv's remark about resurrecting a dead-and-buried nationality are paraphrased from the same essay and rest on Springer's published protocols of the Reichstag's constitutional committee, on Kalinka's collected works, and on Terletsky's serialised study of Galician-Ruthenian literary aspirations respectively. Rudnytsky is a Ukrainian historian writing about a Polish-Ruthenian quarrel and every one of these citations is a hostile witness quoting an opponent; the Polish historiography of the same events selects differently.

The Josephine and Metternichian censorship material on Homberg — his post as assistant censor, the categories of Jewish literature he moved against, and his own adapted devotional — is from the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* tradition and carries the caveats set out in the formation module, including that Homberg is a contested figure in the Jewish historiography.

The confiscation of *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* in 1837 by ecclesiastical rather than state censorship, and Metropolitan Levytsky's objection to the printed vernacular, are Rudnytsky's account. This is the module's first structural claim and it rests on one intermediary; the Ukrainian literature on the Ruthenian Triad is extensive and would settle it.

On the press regime: the Austrian Press Act of 1862, the December 1867 Fundamental Laws, the abolition of caution money by the press law of 9 July 1894 and

of the newspaper stamp by that of 27 December 1899, and the retention by the police of a power of provisional confiscation, are from the 1911 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*'s article on press laws, a public-domain source contemporary with the regime it describes and therefore useful, but also a source with its own liberal view of what a good press law looks like. I have not examined the Galician confiscation statistics and cannot say how often the power was used in this province, which is a real gap: a claim that seizure replaced censorship ought to be supported by a count of seizures.

The 1878 trial of Franko and his circle and the 1882 treason trial of Dobriansky, Naumovych and others — the acquittal, the emigrations, and the government's obtaining of Metropolitan Sembratovych's resignation — are Rudnytsky's, citing Drahomanov's contemporary account of the 1882 proceedings. Drahomanov was a partisan of the opposing Ukrainophile camp writing about the humiliation of the Russophiles, and his characterisation of their duplicity should be read in that light even where the facts are not in dispute.

The census material is the module's centrepiece and is the best-sourced part of it. The requirement to declare a single *Umgangssprache* from the nine categories fixed by the regulation of 6 August 1880 is documented in the scholarly literature on Habsburg bureaucratic classification, which cites the *Reichsgesetzblatt* directly. The series for Galician Jews returned as Polish speakers — 60.4 per cent in 1880, 74.6 in 1890, 76.5 in 1900 and over 92 in 1910 — is from Joshua Shanes's work in the *Austrian History Yearbook*, citing Rosenfeld; the 1931 control figure of twelve per cent of Polish Jews declaring Polish as mother tongue is from Ezra Mendelsohn, cited in the same article. The 1890 campaign to write Yiddish into the returns and the report that more than half the Jews of Galicia, Vienna and Bukovina did so is from Piotr Wróbel's survey and I have not traced it further; it is a striking figure resting on a single secondary statement and I have flagged it in the text as a report rather than a count. Emil Brix's *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation* (Vienna 1982) is the standard study of Habsburg census-language politics and would be the place to settle all of this; I have not read it.

Two limitations. First, I have treated the census schedule as an instrument of information control without establishing anybody's intention in drafting it, and I do not believe the 1880 categories were drawn up in order to erase Galician Jewry — the classification descends from an 1849 scheme built for other purposes, and the same schedule caused comparable trouble to bilingual populations across the monarchy who were not Jewish. The finding is about the effect of a classification, not about a

conspiracy to classify, and a reader should not let the sharpness of the outcome import a design that I have not shown. Second, the module's whole treatment of the Polish population's own information environment after 1867 — the provincial press, the schools, the Diet's control of what could be taught — is thin, and given that the Poles held the province's information apparatus for half a century, that is the largest hole here.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 8 · ELITE COORDINATION AND THE DEFAULT

LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE GALICIAN DIET

Module 8, elite coordination and the default: how a province was paid for with itself, why two factions that despised each other governed it together for half a century, and where — precisely — the fracture was loaded.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What the default is, and how to test for it

A hierarchy that lasts has generally arranged matters so that every man inside it, defending nothing more than his own position, defends the whole arrangement as a by-product. He need not approve of it. He need not like the people beside him in it. He need only find that his own interest points the same way the arrangement does — and if enough positions are built that way, the order reproduces itself with no cabal, no shared conviction, and no coordination anyone has to organise. Some arrangements manage this better than others, and the ones that manage it best are the ones that survive long enough to be studied.

The test is an audit. Go down the chain from the apex and ask at every link: *does this man, in defending his own position, thereby defend the whole?* Where the answer is yes all the way down, the order runs itself. Where the answer turns to no at some link, that link is the fault line — and it will be a link where somebody has standing and means and has stopped receiving anything.

Galicia after 1867 is an unusually clean specimen, because the arrangement was made explicitly, in a single settlement, and its terms are legible.

The bargain

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 had a Galician corollary. The more ambitious Polish demand — a special constitutional status for the province on the

Hungarian model — was refused, and Galicia remained legally on the same footing as the other crownlands of the Austrian half. For all practical purposes, however, the province was handed to the Polish upper classes.

The instruments are concrete. From the 1860s it became the settled custom that the viceroy of Galicia would be appointed from the Polish aristocracy, and it remained so to the end. In 1869 Polish became the official language of the province. By 1871 the universities of Kraków and Lviv were Polonised, and the secondary system followed. Both the state administration under the viceroy and the autonomous provincial administration under the Diet were staffed almost exclusively by Poles and transacted their business in Polish. And in Vienna a permanent post was created — a Minister for Galician Affairs, sitting in the imperial cabinet, whose function was to guard Polish interests at the centre.

What Vienna received in exchange was votes. The Polish Club in the Reichsrat became one of the most reliable governmental blocs in a chamber that the German liberals, the Czechs and eventually the mass parties were making progressively harder to govern. That is the whole transaction, and it should be stated in the plainest available terms: **Vienna paid for the province's loyalty with the province itself.**

The cost was borne by a party that was not at the table. The Ruthenians had been loyal in 1846 when the Polish gentry rose, loyal in 1848 when the Poles were on the barricades, and had sent a national guard against insurgent Hungary in 1849. In 1867 they were handed to the people they had been used against. The dynasty and the central government sacrificed, in Galicia as in Hungary, precisely the nationalities that had supported them in 1848. Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, one of the chief authors of the dualist system, is credited with the summary — that whether and to what extent the Ruthenians might exist was “*left to the discretion of the Galician Diet*”. The attribution is reported rather than documented, and it is quoted here because it states the settlement's operative content more exactly than any of the instruments do.

The audit, link by link

The apex. Franz Joseph and his ministries needed a Reichsrat that could pass a budget. Galicia's hundred-odd deputies, voting as a disciplined bloc, were worth more to a government than the province's revenues ever were. Defending the imperial position meant keeping the Polish Club satisfied, and keeping the Polish Club satisfied meant not interfering in Galicia. Yes.

The Polish Club. Its members held their positions because the arrangement existed, and it delivered accordingly — including on occasions when its own province's interests pointed the other way. In 1888 Franz Joseph used his personal authority to secure the Club's compliance with a new tax on spirits that ran against Galician economic interests, and got it. In 1907 the Club accepted a franchise reform that materially reduced Polish preponderance in Galicia's imperial representation, which is a considerably deeper capitulation and which it made because the alternative was to lose the relationship that the whole provincial arrangement rested on. Yes, and demonstrably so, because the test of a default is what a man swallows rather than what he applauds.

The imperial offices. Here the chain does something this collection has not seen before. Galicia — the poorest crownland in the monarchy, the one whose peasants were emigrating by the hundred thousand — supplied the empire's senior officers. Alfred Józef Potocki was Minister-President of Austria in 1870–71; Kazimierz Badeni was Minister-President in 1895–97. Agenor Gołuchowski the younger was foreign minister of Austria-Hungary from 1895 to 1906. Julian Dunajewski and Leon Biliński held the finance ministry. Franciszek Smolka and later Dawid Abrahamowicz presided over the lower house. In 1897 the Minister-President, the foreign minister and the finance minister of the monarchy were all Galician Poles at the same time. Yes — and this link will turn out to be the module's whole finding.

The viceroy. A Polish magnate, appointed from Vienna, governing a province in which he was a landowner. His position existed because of the settlement and depended on both ends of it: he had to be acceptable to the emperor and effective for the Polish interest. Yes.

The Diet and the Provincial Board. Elected on a curial franchise — representation by economic estate rather than by head — which guaranteed a Polish preponderance in the provincial chamber and in Galicia's Reichsrat delegation. Ruthenians could realistically be elected only from the peasant curia, and even there the share was cut further by administrative pressure and electoral corruption. Yes, for everyone in it.

The two Polish factions, who could not stand each other. This is the part the author's formulation points at directly and it is worth taking slowly.

The Stańczyks were the Kraków conservatives — landowners, professors and senior officials, formed by the 1869 pamphlet *Teka Stańczyka*, which ridiculed armed insurrection, blamed the Polish nation itself for the loss of its state, and argued for loyalty to Franz Joseph and organic economic work instead. They dominated the Polish

Club, they wrote the historiography of the Kraków school, and Vienna liked them: they were regarded at court as the liberal and manageable wing.

The Podolians were the landowners of eastern Galicia — the men whose estates sat in the Ruthenian districts. They wanted Galician autonomy too, but an autonomy in which the Ruthenians got as little as possible and the Jews not much more. In Viennese salons they were compared, sometimes derisively, to Prussian Junkers, and Vienna knew perfectly well that they were less pliable than the Kraków men and far more stubborn on the national question.

The two groups did not agree and did not have to. What bound them was arithmetic: the Stańczyks could not assemble a Diet majority without Podolian votes. So the Podolians held a standing veto over the Stańczyk programme, and they used it, specifically on its two reformist elements — the liquidation of what remained of the seigneurial order, and concessions to the Ruthenians. The result is the thing to hold: **the most reactionary content of Galician government for forty years was not anybody's programme. It was the output of a coalition arithmetic**, produced by two factions each defending its own position, neither of which would have written that programme alone.

A contemporary Polish observer, Władysław Studnicki, put the upper half of the same mechanism in a sentence: a relationship had formed in which the Stańczyk party supported the government and the government supported the Stańczyks' influence in the country. That is the default written out by a man watching it work.

The district administration. The *starosta*, the gendarme, the tax officer, the school inspector — Polish, appointed through the provincial machinery, and running the elections. The elections of September 1895 under Badeni became notorious enough to acquire a name, the bloody elections, with results manipulated and police beating voters at the polling stations. A district officer who ran a clean election in an eastern district would have returned Ruthenian deputies and damaged the arrangement that employed him. Yes, and the yes is what produced the beatings.

Below that. Nothing, until 1907. The audit stops because the chain stops: the peasantry of both nations and the urban working class of both were outside the arrangement entirely, and had no position in it to defend.

The two levers Vienna kept

A default is not self-winding and this one was maintained. Vienna held two instruments over its Polish partners and used both.

The first was the Ruthenians. The central government's willingness to press the Polish administration for concessions varied almost exactly with the temperature of relations with Russia, because Galicia was the province a Russian war would be fought in and a disaffected Ruthenian population sitting on the frontier was a military problem. The New Era of 1890 is the clean instance: it was made in Vienna, not Lviv, when the foreign minister Count Kálnoky advised the viceroy Badeni to placate the Ruthenians. The same calculation drove the central government's prodding for a Polish-Ukrainian compromise between 1907 and 1914, and its motive is stated frankly in the scholarship — fear of an impending war with Russia and of the Ruthenians defecting to it. Vienna's leverage over the Poles was not a threat to remove them. It was a standing capacity to be nice to somebody else.

The second lever was cruder and it reached further down. When Gołuchowski's faction was arguing the case for submission to Vienna against the more autonomist nobility, its case was made with a carrot and a stick. The carrot was a pro-Polish orientation at the centre and a programme of Polonising reforms — which was delivered. The stick was the threat to dissolve the Galician Diet and **incite the peasantry against the recalcitrant nobility**.

Everybody in that conversation knew what the threat referred to. In 1846 the Galician peasantry had come for the manors, burned four hundred and seventy of them, and killed somewhere between one and two thousand landowners and estate officials, and the question of what the Austrian administration's role in it had been was contested at the time and remains contested now. Whatever the truth of 1846, its political function afterwards was permanent: the Polish landed elite of Galicia governed for the next seventy years in the knowledge that the imperial state could, if sufficiently provoked, go around them to the people underneath them, and that it had at minimum stood by while exactly that happened once.

That is the sharpest thing this module has to say about how the coordination was actually held. **The intermediate elite's compliance was purchased with the province and secured with the two populations it stood on** — the Ruthenians as the standing alternative partner, the peasantry as the standing threat.

Classifying the case

Against the framework's menu this is **Co-opt**, in the specifically modern form: a grant purchasing political compliance rather than armed service. The consideration is stated and it was votes in the Reichsrat. The grantees kept no armed capacity whatever — Polish military capacity in Galicia had been broken in 1846 and again in 1848, and the nearest thing to a retinue that the Polish elite possessed by 1900 was a gymnastic society, unarmed until the last two years before the war.

What is unusual is the *object* of the grant. Elsewhere in this collection the co-opting power grants land, office and salary to individuals. Vienna's grant to the Galician Polish elite was not land — they already had the land — but **the administration of the province**: the schools, the courts, the university, the language of business, the patronage, and the right to draw the electoral boundaries. That is a larger grant than any this corpus has recorded, and it was made to a nation rather than to a list of men.

Blended into it, at the imperial level, is **Divide and balance** — the family the field manual names with real instances but has not yet run as a full case. Galicia supplies one. The central government did not manufacture the Polish-Ruthenian antagonism; it inherited it. But it managed the province by holding the balance between two nationalities, each of which needed Vienna against the other, and it adjusted the balance according to its own external needs. The Poles could not have the province without imperial appointment; the Ruthenians could not obtain anything except through imperial pressure on the Poles. Neither could dispense with the centre, which is precisely what divide-and-balance is for. The refinement Galicia adds to that family is that the balance need not be *created* — an inherited antagonism, correctly managed, is cheaper than a manufactured one and carries none of the risk of being detected as policy.

Where the fracture was loaded

The author's formulation names the place to look: a group with standing and means that has stopped benefiting.

Galicia had three candidates and they were not equal.

The Ruthenian counter-elite is the principal one. By the 1890s it possessed standing — a metropolitan with a seat in the House of Lords, a clergy with seminary training, an academy in fact if not in name, lawyers, teachers, deputies — and it possessed means: a church the state had endowed, parishes, land, three thousand

reading rooms, a co-operative network, a press, a Land Bank from 1908, and after 1907 twenty-seven seats in the Reichsrat. And it received, from the settlement of 1867, essentially nothing. Its share of the administration was negligible; the university was Polonised in 1871 and 1879; the province ran seventy Polish and eight Ukrainian boys' gymnasia and one Ukrainian girls' gymnasium in 1911–12. This is exactly the configuration the audit is designed to find: capability without a rung.

The Polish democratic and peasant movements are the second. Father Stanisław Stojalowski's peasant organisation from 1892, the peasant party that followed, and Ignacy Daszyński's social democrats represented Poles who had standing and rising means and no share in the arrangement, and after 1907 they had seats.

The Jewish population is the third and the most divided, split from the 1880s between an assimilationist leadership that sat inside the Polish arrangement — there were Jewish deputies in the Diet from the 1860s — and a Jewish national and Zionist current that placed itself outside it and was, as the previous module showed, not even permitted to appear in the census as itself.

And now the finding that matters most about all three: **none of them fractured the order.**

For fifty-one years the excluded contested *inside* the arrangement rather than against it. The Ruthenians lost, and came back, and lost, and came back: 1848, 1861, 1867, the New Era of 1890 and its collapse by 1894, the Badeni elections of 1895, mass rallies from 1900, the franchise reform of 1907, six years of deadlock over the provincial statute, and the compromise of 14 February 1914 that gave them sixty-two seats out of two hundred and twenty-eight and two places on the Provincial Board. Their most extreme parliamentary tactic was the “musical obstruction” of 1910–12, in which Ukrainian deputies brought whistles, trumpets and drums into the Diet and made its business impossible. The single lethal political act of the entire constitutional era was the assassination of Viceroy Andrzej Potocki by a Ukrainian student, Myroslav Sichynsky, in 1908 — an individual act, not a plot, and it changed nothing.

That is what an order looks like when the fracture is loaded and does not fire: the excluded have capability, they have grievance, and they have an institutional route which is blocked but not closed. The whole of Module 9 is about whether that route was worth using. What Module 8 establishes is that the men with standing and means judged, year after year, that it was — and that the arrangement therefore held right up to the moment an external war destroyed the state that housed it.

Reading the default in Galicia against the framework

The framework's standing account of what holds an appointed elite is that its holdings are **non-portable**: a man whose position, income and standing cannot be carried anywhere else defends the order because the order is the only place his assets are worth anything. The seed for this study predicted that this account would fail in Galicia, and it does, comprehensively.

The Galician Polish elite's holdings were about as portable as holdings get. It held land, but also capital, education, professional credentials, an aristocratic network reaching across the monarchy, and — decisively — **careers**. Its members did not merely stay put and collect rents. They moved to Vienna and ran the empire: two Minister-Presidents, a foreign minister who held the post for eleven years, two finance ministers, two presidents of the lower house, a permanent seat in the cabinet, and thirty Polish nobles in the House of Lords. Nothing anchored these men. Everything they possessed would have travelled.

And the order held them for fifty-one years, until it was destroyed from outside.

The refinement is that portability is not the variable. The destination is. What binds an elite is not that its holdings cannot be moved, but that its best available career runs through the order.

Look at what a Galician Pole's assets were actually worth outside the Habsburg arrangement in 1890. There was no Polish state to serve. The Russian partition offered a Pole surveillance, Russification and, after 1863, systematic exclusion; the Prussian partition offered the Colonisation Commission buying his land out from under him. His talents were portable *within* the monarchy and close to worthless beyond it. Which means the arrangement did not have to trap him. It had only to promote him — and promotion is a far stronger tie than entrapment, because a trapped man stays and resents it while a promoted man stays and wants to. The Habsburg settlement made the most capable and most ambitious Poles in Europe into imperial statesmen, and an imperial statesman does not fracture the empire.

The same proposition tested from the other side gives the same answer with the sign reversed. The Ruthenian elite's holdings were *also* portable — a seminary education, a clerical office, later a law degree or a teaching certificate — and it was not bound at all. What it lacked was not an anchor but a ladder. The viceroyalty was closed to it by custom, the administration by language and appointment, the university by the Polonisation of 1871 and 1879, and the secondary schools by a Diet that had made

restricting Ruthenian gymnasias a settled policy. A Ruthenian priest's son of unusual ability in 1885 could become a village priest, a lawyer in a provincial town, a teacher in one of eight gymnasias, or a leader of the national movement. He could not become anything in the state. And it is precisely that group, and not the landless or the hungry, that supplied every leader of the counter-elite this study has named.

So the rule to carry forward: **an elite is bound by the ladder above it, not by the anchor beneath it. Where the ladder is open, portable holdings do not loosen the tie; where the ladder is closed, non-portable holdings will not tighten it.** The audit should therefore ask, at every link, not only whether the man's position pays him but whether the next position up is one he could conceivably occupy — because a man defending his own position defends the whole arrangement most reliably when the arrangement is also the thing that might promote him.

A corollary follows for the standing question of elite overproduction, which this framework treats as a pressure rather than a verdict. The Galician Poles overproduced claimants heavily — a province of that poverty educating that many gentry sons — and it did not fracture them, because the surplus had the whole monarchy to spend itself in: the imperial administration, the army, the professions, Vienna. The Ruthenians overproduced more modestly and it was politically explosive, because their surplus had one province, one closed administration, and a formation that had taught it exactly what it was being excluded from. **Overproduction is dangerous not in proportion to its size but in proportion to how visible the closed rung is,** and a formation system that educates a class for positions it will not be given is the most efficient counter-elite factory in this collection.

Two things this module has established that the next one must now test. The first is that the Ruthenian counter-elite, having capability and no rung, chose for half a century to contest inside the arrangement rather than against it — which is only rational if contesting paid. The second is that the concessions it obtained arrived at dated moments and mostly under external pressure: 1890 when Kálnoky feared a Russian war, 1907 when Vienna needed a franchise reform for reasons of its own, 1914 when the same war was two years off. Whether those gains track the growth of the Ruthenian base or merely the imperial weather is the question the entire study was built to answer, and it belongs to Module 9.

A note on sources.

One phrase is quoted, and it is the weakest-provenance quotation in this study so far: Beust's remark that the existence and extent of the Ruthenians were left to the discretion of the Galician Diet. It reaches this page from Ivan L. Rudnytsky's essay, which cites Kost Levytsky's *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainsiv* (Lviv 1926) at page 104, where it is given as *attributed* to Beust. Levytsky was a leader of the Ukrainian national movement writing its history; the line is exactly the sort of summary that becomes canonical in a nationality's account of its own betrayal, and it may never have been said. I have used it because it states the settlement's content accurately and have flagged it in the text as attributed. Nothing in the argument depends on it.

The institutional architecture of Galician autonomy — the viceroy always drawn from the Polish aristocracy, the Minister for Galician Affairs in Vienna, the curial franchise, the Polonisation of both administrations and of the two universities, and the restriction of Ruthenian secondary schooling — is Rudnytsky's, resting on Grzybowski's *Galicja 1848–1914*, on Hugelmann's *Nationalitätenrecht des alten Oesterreichs*, and on Ann Sirka's study of Austrian educational policy. The 1911–12 school counts and the composition of Galicia's post-1907 Reichsrat delegation come from the same apparatus.

The list of Galician Poles in imperial office — Alfred Potocki and Kazimierz Badeni as Minister-Presidents, Agenor Gołuchowski the younger as foreign minister 1895–1906, Dunajewski and Biliński at finance, Smolka and Abrahamowicz presiding over the lower house — is from the Habsburg centenary literature and from the *Austrian History Yearbook* article on Austria and its Polish subjects, which is also the source for the 1888 spirits-tax episode and for the reading of the 1907 franchise reform as a Polish capitulation. That article, by its own account, rests substantially on Josef Redlich's political diary, which is a participant's record of Viennese conversation; the 1888 story reaches it at third hand, through a minister recounting it in 1911. The simultaneity of the three Galician ministers in 1897 is from Britannica's account of the Badeni ministry.

The Stańczyk-Podolian relationship — the Stańczyks holding office and Vienna's confidence, the Podolians holding the Diet votes that made a majority and using them to veto the reformist half of the programme, and Studnicki's formulation of the mutual support between party and government — is from John-Paul Himka's

Socialism in Galicia, which characterises the outcome as a pashaluk of the Polish nobility. Himka is a historian of the Ukrainian left writing about the Polish right and his framing is not neutral; the factual structure he describes, however, is confirmed by the Polish conservative historiography, which argues among itself about whether the Stańczyks or the Podolians actually ruled and thereby concedes that both were necessary. The Viennese preference for the Stańczyks and the Junker comparison come from that Polish literature.

The Gołuchowski faction's carrot-and-stick argument to the autonomist nobility, including the threat to dissolve the Diet and incite the peasantry, is from Himka. **It is the module's single most consequential claim about how the coordination was maintained and it rests on one source**, and it needs corroboration from the Polish conservative papers before it is relied on further. Its plausibility rests on 1846, which is independently established, but plausibility is not evidence.

The New Era of 1890, Kálnoky's advice to Badeni, and the war-driven motive for the 1907–14 compromise negotiations are Rudnytsky's; he notes explicitly that the extent of the Austrian government's involvement in the New Era has never been fully explored, which is a warning I am passing on rather than resolving. The Badeni elections of September 1895 and Sichynsky's assassination of Potocki in 1908 are from the general literature and from Rudnytsky respectively.

Two gaps. I have **no membership figures or voting records for the Polish Club** and have therefore described its reliability qualitatively; a study that could show its division rates on government business would settle the default claim quantitatively rather than by anecdote. And I have not established what proportion of the Galician civil service was actually Polish at any date — “almost exclusively” is Rudnytsky's characterisation and I have repeated it without a number behind it, which for a module about who holds which position is a real weakness.

MODULE 9 · PLURALITY OR FORECLOSURE

AN INVIOABLE RIGHT

Module 9, plurality or foreclosure: what protections actually existed against the Galician state apparatus, which factional fight produced each one, and why a people that lost every contest for fifty years nevertheless finished holding more than it started with.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question, asked properly

There is a state apparatus. It can tax you, conscript you, arrest you, search your house, open your letters, close your newspaper, refuse your school and count you as somebody you are not. The question this module asks is not whether the order talked about liberty — every order does — but whether, against that apparatus, you had anything. Could you speak? Publish? Petition? Assemble? Was there a body obliged to hear you if you complained? And when a protection did exist, the second question is the one that matters more, because the answer is never the flattering one: **who made it, and what were they trying to get for themselves?**

The peasant did not make it. He is present in every opening as a number, a voter, a body and a grievance, and he is never the author. Protections are made by factions inside the hierarchy, bargaining from strength, at moments when neither they nor the apex wants to break the arrangement — and what they extract for themselves is drafted in language general enough that other people can later pick it up. That residue, accumulated across many such fights, is the whole of what a subject population ever actually has. This module dates the fights.

What was on the books

Galicia's constitutional position is unusually easy to state, because it arrived in a single week. On 21 December 1867 the Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals came into force across the Austrian half of the monarchy, and with it a Basic Law establishing an independent judiciary and another establishing an Imperial Court.

Take the author's checklist against the text.

Protection from the apparatus. Article 2: all citizens equal before the law. Article 3: public offices equally open to all citizens. Article 8: personal liberty guaranteed, with the law of 27 October 1862 on the protection of individual liberty declared an integral part of the constitution, and — a clause worth pausing on — an obligation on the state to indemnify anyone arrested or detained in violation of law. Article 9: the home inviolable. Article 10: the secrecy of correspondence, with seizure permitted only on a judicial warrant or in time of war.

Speech. Article 13: everyone has the right to express his opinion freely within the limits of the law by speech, writing, print or image; and the press may not be subjected to censorship nor restricted by a system of concessions.

Petition. Article 11, in one line: "*The right of petition is free to everyone.*"

Assembly. Article 12: Austrian citizens have the right to assemble and to form associations.

Exit. Article 4: freedom of movement inside the state, and freedom of emigration restricted only by the obligation of military service — the clause the fifth module found the Wadowice defence invoking in 1890.

And then Article 19, which is the one this province lived and died by. All the peoples of the state are equal in their rights, and each has "*an inviolable right to the preservation and fostering of its*" nationality and language; the equality of all customary languages in school, office and public life is recognised by the state; and in provinces inhabited by more than one people, public educational institutions are to be arranged so that each receives the means of education in its own language without being compelled to learn a second.

Against all of that, Article 20 permitted a special law to suspend certain of these rights temporarily and locally — and it was used, in Galicia, during the state of siege of 1864–65 and again in the emergency regime of 1914.

The forum

A text of that kind is worth exactly as much as the body obliged to receive somebody repeating it back. This collection has already found two cases where the text existed and the body did not — the Ruthenian bishops' request for Senate seats in 1595, which waited a hundred and ninety-five years because no institution had to hear it and no faction had a use for it; and, in the study on this same ground under a different

overlord, a written constitutional right of secession that no forum was ever obliged to entertain.

Galicia had the body. The December settlement created a Reichsgericht — an Imperial Court whose jurisdiction, alongside conflicts of competence and certain pecuniary claims against public authorities, expressly included **complaints by citizens of violations of their political rights**. Beside it stood the Administrative Court. And the record shows the thing being used exactly as designed: the contending nationalities of Cisleithania recurrently invoked the three clauses of Article 19 and alleged infringements of their rights before both courts, so that the struggle over national rights was conducted as a legal matter inside the Austrian legal system and not only as a political one.

So the forum test is passed, and it should be stated plainly because this collection has not been able to say it before. In Habsburg Galicia a man could publish a newspaper without a licence, form an association, hold a meeting, petition the emperor, stand for election, sue the administration, and lose a case in a court that was capable of finding against the government.

And now the discipline. Passing the forum test is necessary and it is nowhere near sufficient. Article 19 was law from December 1867. In 1911–12, forty-four years later, Galicia had seventy Polish and eight Ukrainian gymnasia for boys, twenty Polish and **one** Ukrainian gymnasium for girls, and fourteen Polish and no Ukrainian *Realschulen*, in a province two-fifths Ruthenian whose eastern half was two-thirds Ruthenian. The clause about the means of education in one's own language was on the books throughout. A forum you can enter is not a decision you can win.

Whose fight produced the text

Nobody in Galicia wrote the December Constitution and it was not written with Galicia in mind.

It was the price the crown paid to the German liberals. The monarchy had lost the war of 1866 and been expelled from Germany; it needed to reconstruct the state, settle with Hungary, and obtain a parliament that would vote a budget. The German liberals of the Reichsrat supplied the parliamentary cooperation and were paid in a bill of rights. That is a factional bargain among the already-in, struck in Vienna between a defeated dynasty and a bourgeoisie whose votes it needed, and no peasant, Pole, Ruthenian or Jew was consulted about any clause of it.

Article 19 in particular was drafted to manage the monarchy's great national problems, which were Czech, German, Polish and Hungarian. The Ruthenians of Galicia were not the parties whose accommodation the clause was written to buy. They were beneficiaries of language drafted for somebody else — and that is the residue mechanism in its exact form, and the reason it is a mechanism rather than an act of generosity. **A faction bargaining for its own protection cannot draft narrowly, because a protection stated as a personal exemption is not a principle and does not bind a future government.** It has to be stated generally to be worth having. And a general statement, once in force and once attached to a court, is available to be picked up by parties nobody was thinking about.

The dating test

The seed for this study set the question and I undertook in my first message to answer it as a dating exercise rather than a presence one. Here it is. For every gain the Ruthenians of Galicia made, two questions: what fight at the apex opened the door, and what did they possess at the time that determined how much they carried through it.

1848. The opening is Franz Stadion's, and it is factional in the plainest way. He abolished the corvée by decree in April to take the peasant question away from the Polish democrats who had intended to claim it, and he blessed the Supreme Ruthenian Council in May to set a second nationality against Polish irredentism. What the Ruthenians held at that moment was a clergy and nothing else. What they carried through: a council with thirty-four branches, the first Ukrainian-language newspaper published anywhere, a national guard, deputies in the Reichstag, and — in 1848 and 1849 — a chair of Ruthenian theology and the first chair of Ruthenian language and literature at Lviv.

1861. The Diet met for the first time and the Ruthenian membership was forty-nine, about a third of the chamber. The opening is Schmerling's German centralist ministry, which needed Slav counterweights against Polish autonomism. The Ruthenians held, still, a clergy and a conservative leadership that leaned on Vienna. The gain was large and it rested entirely on somebody else's alignment.

1867. The alignment reversed and the gain was taken back. The crown needed the Hungarian settlement and its Polish corollary, and paid with the province. Ruthenian representation in the Diet fell to fourteen out of a hundred and forty-four. At the

Reichsrat elections of 1879 the Ruthenians returned three deputies against fifty-seven Poles. Everything obtained in 1861 was gone within a decade.

1868. Prosvita was founded.

Hold that date against the one above it, because it is the most important fact in this study. One year after the most complete political defeat the Galician Ruthenians ever suffered — the loss of the Diet, the loss of Vienna's patronage, the handing of the province to their opponents — the men who had just been beaten founded an adult-education association that would end with seventy-seven branches and close to three thousand village reading rooms. They did not disperse. They could not be dispersed, because the thing they were was not in the state's gift.

1873. The Shevchenko Scientific Society, founded on money raised in Russian-ruled Ukraine. **1880.** *Dilo*, daily from 1888. **1880s–90s.** The credit unions and co-operatives. **1890.** The Radical Party; **1899,** the National Democrats.

1890, the New Era. The opening is external and its author is named: the foreign minister Kálnoky, fearing that Galicia would shortly be a theatre of operations against Russia, advised the viceroy Badeni to placate the Ruthenians. Antonovych intervened from Kyiv on the other side, wanting the Galician sanctuary strengthened. What the Ruthenians now held was a press, an intelligentsia, Prosvita, and a moderate populist leadership willing to deal. What they carried through was small — some educational and linguistic concessions and a newly created chair of East European history at Lviv, to which Antonovych sent his best pupil, Hrushevsky, in 1894. The compromise itself collapsed by 1894 because the Poles had offered concessions and the *narodovtsi* had expected a change of system.

But note what survived the collapse. The chair did. Hrushevsky held it for two decades, presided over the Shevchenko Society, turned it into an academy in all but name, published eight volumes of a history of Ukraine by 1913 and trained a generation of scholars. **A concession that lands on an existing institution compounds; a concession that lands on an agreement evaporates when the agreement does.**

1895–97. The Badeni elections, conducted with administrative abuse shocking even by Galician standards. The intended effect was to break the Ukrainian movement. The actual effect was that the indignation became the signal for a general Ukrainian offensive against the provincial regime. A rigged election intimidates an unorganised population and mobilises an organised one, and by 1895 this one was organised.

1907. Universal, equal and direct male suffrage for the Reichsrat, enacted in January. The opening is entirely imperial: many groups wanted franchise reform, and the government took it up under the impact of the Russian revolution of 1905 and in connection with its difficulties with Hungary. What the Ruthenians held by then was parties, a daily press, co-operatives, reading rooms and an electorate that could be turned out. What they carried through was the largest gain of the period — their parliamentary representation more than trebled, at the Poles' expense, returning twenty-seven deputies in Galicia and five in Bukovina; and in the towns an electoral alliance with the Zionists put two Jewish nationalist deputies into the Vienna parliament for the first time. The reform was gerrymandered against them, at roughly one Polish seat per fifty-two thousand inhabitants against one Ukrainian seat per hundred and two thousand. It was still the thing that could not be taken back, because unlike 1861 it rested on a franchise and an electorate rather than on a ministry's alignment.

14 February 1914. The reform of the provincial statute. The opening is again the coming war: the central government regarded a Polish-Ukrainian compromise as highly desirable because of the threat from Russia, offered its good offices, and prodded. Both sides had exhausted themselves; the viceroy Bobrzyński, the compromise's architect, was forced out by Polish opponents and the negotiations continued anyway; and Metropolitan Sheptytsky played the decisive part in removing the last obstacles. What the Ruthenians held: three thousand reading rooms, seventy-seven Prosvita branches, a Land Bank, a co-operative network, thirty-one Diet seats after the elections of 1913, and gymnastic societies that had been drilling since 1912. What they carried through: sixty-two of two hundred and twenty-eight seats in the Diet — twenty-seven per cent — two of the eight places on the Provincial Board, separate election of each nationality's members to the Board and the committees, the removal of Ukrainian elementary and secondary education from Polish control, ten new Ukrainian secondary schools planned for the autumn of 1914, and a Polish undertaking to stop obstructing a Ukrainian university.

What the dating shows

Read the list and the first finding is unambiguous and it is not the comfortable one.

Every single opening was made by somebody else, for reasons of their own. Stadion against the Polish democrats in 1848. Schmerling against Polish autonomism

in 1861. The crown settling with Hungary and Poland in 1867, which reversed the whole thing. Kálnoky against Russia in 1890. Vienna against Hungarian obstruction, with 1905 in the background, in 1907. The general staff against the coming war in 1914. Not one Ruthenian gain in seventy years is dated to a Ruthenian victory in argument, and not one is dated to the age growing kinder. The Ruthenians of Galicia were, throughout, a lever that other parties reached for when they needed one.

Which is the framework's claim and it is worth stating without softening: the sword gives nothing it can get by the sword. Every protection in this module was conceded by somebody who wanted something and calculated that conceding was cheaper than fighting.

And now the second finding, which is why this case was chosen, and which the first does not contradict.

The base did not open the doors. It determined what could be carried through them, and whether the load survived the next reversal.

Lay the two series against each other and the pattern is regular. In 1861 the Ruthenians had a clergy and got forty-nine seats, and the seats were gone by 1867 because they rested on nothing the Ruthenians themselves held. In 1890 they had a press and an intelligentsia and got a chair and an agreement; the agreement evaporated and the chair became an academy. In 1907 they had mass organisation and got a parliamentary delegation that could not be withdrawn. In 1914 they had everything above plus a paramilitary drill and got a share of the provincial executive.

The 1867 catastrophe is the experiment that settles it. A base did **not** protect the gains: everything won in 1861 was taken away, and the base at that date — a church, a seminary, a hierarchy — did not prevent it for a day. What the base did was something narrower and far more consequential. It guaranteed that the losers were **still there**. The Greek Catholic church was not dissolved. The seminary went on ordaining. The parishes went on baptising. The men who had been beaten in 1867 were, in 1868, in a position to found Prosvita — and their sons were in a position to take the 1890 opening, and their grandsons the 1907 one.

This is the refinement, and it is more precise than the hypothesis this study inherited. **Liberty's residue accretes not because gains are permanent — they are not, and 1867 proves it — but because the claimant is permanent.** A faction whose position *is* its concession is liquidated when the concession is withdrawn, and there is nobody left standing at the next opening to present the bill. A faction with a base outside the state's gift survives the withdrawal with its capabilities intact and is on the

doorstep within the year. Over seventy years and five or six openings, that difference compounds into everything.

Which is exactly why the comparison this study was built on works. Under an order in which every position was on a list and a man who lost was a pensioner, nothing accumulated in half a century, because each defeat removed the claimant along with the claim. Under an order in which the losing party owned its own church, its own reading rooms, its own credit unions and its own printing presses, seventy years of defeats produced sixty-two seats and two places on a provincial executive. Same people. Same ground. The variable is not the generosity of the ruler and not the justice of the cause. It is whether losing costs you your standing or merely your seat.

Who was let in, and by whose quarrel

The author's rule holds without exception here: every enlargement of the "in" tracks a fight among the already-in.

The peasant of both nations got personal freedom and his plot in April 1848 because a governor needed to beat the Polish democrats to the announcement. The Jews got full civil equality in the December Constitution of 1867 because German liberals were extracting a bill of rights from a crown that had just lost a war. The common man of both nations got the vote in 1907 because Vienna needed a franchise reform to manage the Hungarians and had just watched a revolution next door. In each case the beneficiary was outside the room.

The control case: a category, or not

And here Galicia supplies something better than an argument, because it ran the experiment itself, on two populations, under the same constitution, in the same decades.

Article 19 protects *Völkstämme* — peoples. The Ruthenians were one, and were listed as such in the census schedule of 1880. **The Austrian constitution of 1867 did not recognise the Jews as a nationality. It recognised them as a religious confession,** and, as the previous module established, the census offered them no box for their language either.

The consequence is exact and it should be set out coldly, because it cuts against the intuitive ranking.

Individually, the Jews of Galicia did better than the Ruthenians under the December settlement, and by a wide margin. They obtained full civil equality in 1867, the right to be elected to the Diet, deputies in Vienna, entry to the professions on equal terms, and by the end of the period they supplied some two-thirds of the province's physicians and far more of its lawyers than the Ruthenians did. Every individual right in the checklist at the head of this module was theirs.

Collectively, they had nothing to accumulate with. There was no Article 19 claim to be made for a Jewish school in the Jewish language, because there was no recognised Jewish *Volksstamm* and no recognised Jewish *landesübliche Sprache*. There was no number in the returns to cite, because the returns recorded them as Poles — 60 per cent in 1880, over 92 per cent by 1910. When the Jewish national press campaigned in 1890 to have Yiddish written into the census, the entries were not counted. The single collective political gain of the period came in 1907 and came sideways: two Jewish nationalist deputies elected to Vienna on Ukrainian votes, in an electoral alliance made by a party that did have a category, in seats the Ruthenians could not win alone.

So: individual rights and collective standing are different currencies, and residue accretes only in the second. A Jewish advocate in Lviv in 1900 had more usable liberty in his own life than any Ruthenian peasant in the province. The Ruthenians as a people finished with sixty-two seats, two places on the provincial executive and control of their own schools. The Jews as a people finished with a failed campaign to be permitted to write their own language on a government form. The difference is not effort, organisation or intelligence, all of which the Jewish national movement had in abundance. The difference is that one people was a category the apparatus recognised and the other was not — and a claim can only be made in a currency the forum accepts.

The three legs, at the scale of the realm

The framework's master question at this scale is whether violence, wealth and trusted information sat in one hand or in hands that could check one another.

Violence: captured, entirely and throughout. The imperial army was never contested, never divided, and never subject to any Galician authority. Nothing in this module changes what the first module established.

Wealth: genuinely split. Polish latifundia held some forty per cent of the arable; Jewish commerce, credit and the oil trade held a large share of the province's liquid

capital; foreign syndicates held Boryslav; and by 1914 the Ruthenians held a co-operative network, a Land Bank and a slowly growing share of the land. No single coalition owned the wealth of Galicia.

Trusted information: genuinely crowded. Three national presses, three formations, two rival churches and a third confession, an academy the state did not control, a university the province did, and after 1867 no censorship of prior restraint. This is the leg on which Galicia differs most sharply from every foreclosed case in this collection, and it is not a coincidence that it is also the leg the Ruthenians built first and held longest.

Two of three legs contested. That is the contestability signature, and it is the answer to the question the module asks: liberty in Galicia was not rhetoric, and it was not a gift, and it accrued because the three monopolies were not in one hand.

What the peasant actually had

The discipline of this project requires the arithmetic and not the sum, so here is the arithmetic for the man at the bottom, who is the only person whose answer settles anything.

By 1914 a Ruthenian peasant in eastern Galicia possessed: the vote, since 1907; a village reading room, probably, since there were three thousand of them; a credit union that had broken the moneylender's monopoly; a co-operative that bought his crop; a legal right to assemble, petition and print; a court that would hear a complaint against the administration; deputies of his own nation in Vienna and in Lviv; schooling in his own language at the elementary level and, from the autumn of 1914, the prospect of ten more secondary schools. He also possessed under two hectares of land in twenty scattered strips, a memory of famine that ran through the lifetimes of everyone he knew, and a brother in Winnipeg.

It reached him. It reached him thinly, forty years late, mostly through institutions his own counter-elite had built rather than through the state — and it reached him. That is more than this collection has been able to say anywhere else, and it is a great deal less than the word liberty ordinarily implies.

Reading plurality in Galicia against the framework

Three things to carry forward.

First, the refinement. A base does not open a door and does not hold one open. Every opening in this seventy-year record was made by a faction at the apex for reasons of its own, and one of them — 1867 — closed the doors that had been opened six years earlier and took back everything behind them. What a base does is guarantee that the claimant survives the reversal. **The gains are not the ratchet. The claimant is the ratchet.** Residue accumulates for a faction that cannot be liquidated between openings, and for no other kind, which is why the operative question in any case is not *what protections exist* but *what happens to the losing party after it loses*.

Second, the currency. Individual rights and collective standing are separate holdings and they do not convert. Galicia granted both to the Ruthenians and only the first to the Jews, under the same constitution, in the same province, at the same time, and the two peoples' trajectories diverged accordingly. Where a case shows a population with full personal rights and no recognised collective category, expect its members to prosper individually and its people to accumulate nothing — and look for the category, in the constitutional text and in the census schedule, before looking at anything else.

Third, the drafting. The protections a faction wins for itself must be stated generally or they are not protections at all, and generality is what makes them portable to strangers. The German liberals who extracted Article 19 from a defeated crown in 1867 were thinking about Bohemia. A Ruthenian peasant's grandson went to a Ukrainian gymnasium because of it. That is not irony and it is not providence. It is the structural reason liberty spreads at all: **a privilege can be written for one party, but a right cannot, and a faction strong enough to demand a right has to accept the wording that makes it available to everyone the wording covers.**

What none of this settles is why the arrangement ended. It did not end because the Ruthenians won, and it did not end because the Poles lost, and it did not end because anything in this module reached its conclusion. On 14 February 1914 the province agreed a compromise that everyone present regarded as the turning point of its modern history, and within six months the compromise was irrelevant. The next module has to begin in Vienna.

A note on sources.

Two short phrases are quoted from the Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals of 21 December 1867 (RGrBl. 142/1867): the petition clause of Article 11 in the Cornell/Habsburg-list English translation, and a fragment of Article 19 in the

translation published by the Austrian legal information system. Both are renderings of a public-domain German original, and the translations differ in their handling of *Volksstamm* — rendered variously as “race,” “ethnic entity,” “nationality” and “people” — which is not a trivial variation given that the whole of the module’s final argument turns on who counted as one. The German is *Volksstämme*, and readers should hold that word rather than any of its English clothes. The remaining articles are paraphrased from the same translations.

The Reichsgericht’s jurisdiction over citizens’ complaints of violations of their political rights is from the Austrian Constitutional Court’s own historical account of its predecessor. That the nationalities recurrently invoked Article 19’s three clauses before the Reichsgericht and the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, so that the national struggle was conducted as a legal as well as a political matter, is from the *Ethnopolitics* literature on Habsburg nationality law, which is also the source for the statement that the 1867 constitution recognised Jews as a religious group and not as a nationality. **I have not read a single Galician case before either court**, which is a real gap in a module that rests part of its argument on the existence of a working forum: I have established that the forum existed and was used by somebody, not that Galician Ruthenians used it or with what result. Gerald Stourzh’s work on the equality of nationalities and the December constitution is the standard treatment and would settle it.

The dated sequence of Ruthenian gains and losses — the 1848 measures and the two chairs, the forty-nine Diet seats of 1861, the fall to fourteen of a hundred and forty-four by 1867 and to three deputies against fifty-seven in the Reichsrat elections of 1879, the New Era of 1890 and Hrushevsky’s chair in 1894, the Badeni elections of 1895, the 1907 franchise reform with its trebled representation and its 52,000-against-102,000 gerrymander, the thirty-one Ukrainian Diet seats of 1913, and the compromise of 14 February 1914 with its sixty-two seats of two hundred and twenty-eight, two places of eight on the Provincial Board, transfer of educational control, ten planned secondary schools and the undertaking on the university — is Ivan L. Rudnytsky’s throughout, resting on Kost Levytsky’s *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainsiv* (Lviv 1926), on Buszko’s study of the Diet franchise reform, on Hugelmann, and on Bobrzyński’s memoirs. Levytsky and Bobrzyński were both participants, on opposite sides; Rudnytsky is a Ukrainian historian; and the Polish historiography narrates the same fifty years as a story about Polish state-building under an alien crown. The dates and the numbers are not in dispute between them. The

causal weighting is, and this module has put its weight on the imperial triggers rather than on either national narrative, which is a choice a reader should see me making.

Kálnoky's advice to Badeni in 1890, and the war-driven motive for Vienna's prodding between 1907 and 1914, are Rudnytsky's; he notes explicitly that the extent of the Austrian government's involvement in the New Era has never been fully explored, and my dating argument would be stronger or weaker depending on what that exploration found. The characterisation of the 1907 reform's imperial drivers — the 1905 Russian revolution and the Hungarian difficulties — is his, resting on Kann.

On the Jewish side, the census series (60.4 per cent of Galician Jews returned as Polish in 1880, over 92 per cent by 1910) and the failed 1890 Yiddish campaign are as sourced in the previous module; the 1907 Ukrainian-Zionist electoral alliance and the two Jewish nationalist deputies it returned are Rudnytsky's. My claim that the Jews of Galicia did better individually and worse collectively than the Ruthenians is an inference from these materials and from the professional figures cited earlier in this study, not a finding I have taken from anyone; it should be tested against the substantial literature on Galician Jewish politics, which I have sampled rather than read.

Two limitations beyond those. I have described the base's growth by institutional counts — branches, reading rooms, seats, co-operatives — because I have no membership series for Prosvita or the co-operatives, no circulation figures for *Dilo*, and no way to say how deep any of it went into the villages. A dating argument that lays a series of concessions against a series of institutions is only as good as the second series, and mine is coarser than the first. And I have said almost nothing about Polish liberty in this module, though the Poles were the party that actually held the province's autonomy and whose own internal politics — the Stańczyk-Podolian veto, the neoconservative turn of the 1890s, Bobrzyński's fall in 1913 — determined what was on offer at every stage. A module about plurality that treats the dominant nationality only as an obstacle has not fully done its job.

MODULE 10 · CHANGE AND COLLAPSE

A CROWNLAND FOR A MILLION TONS OF GRAIN

Module 10, change and collapse: how an order that had survived seventy years of internal contest was destroyed in four by a war it did not start — and why what mattered at the end was not who had been pushing but who was assembled.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Where the ending has to begin

On 14 February 1914 the Galician Diet passed the reform of the provincial statute. The Ruthenians were to have sixty-two of two hundred and twenty-eight seats, two of the eight places on the Provincial Board, separate national election to the Board and its committees, control of their own elementary and secondary schooling taken out of Polish hands, ten new Ukrainian secondary schools opening in the autumn, and a Polish undertaking to stop obstructing a Ukrainian university. Contemporaries on both sides regarded it as the turning point in the modern history of the province.

On 28 June 1914 the Ukrainian youth organisations — Sich, Sokil and Plast — paraded in Lviv, and the Ukrainian leadership announced its intention to raise a legion of ten thousand riflemen. On the same day, in Sarajevo, an archduke was shot.

The ten schools never opened.

Nothing in Galicia caused what followed. The seventy-year contest reconstructed in the previous module was, in February 1914, running its normal course toward a negotiated settlement; and by the following August that course had been made irrelevant by a chain of events beginning in Bosnia, decided in Berlin, Vienna, St Petersburg and Paris, and involving no Galician at any point.

That is the module's premise and the reason the seed for this study insisted it begin in Vienna. Of the four ways a floor of force cracks — the elite fractures and arms the people against itself; it exhausts itself in great-power war; it is conquered by a rival elite;

or it breeds more claimants than it can seat — Galicia is the second, and it is one of the cleanest specimens the collection will find, because the destruction was total, external, and had no relation whatever to the province's internal politics.

Not a crack. A demolition.

Galicia was not a province that watched a war. It was the ground the war was fought on.

Lviv fell to the Russian army on 3 September 1914, five weeks after the declarations. Eastern Galicia was occupied and administered by Russia until the middle of 1915, under a governor-general who set about converting Greek Catholic parishes to Orthodoxy and deported the Greek Catholic metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytsky, into Russia, where he was held until 1917. The fortress of Przemyśl, which the sixth module noted the empire had built to face exactly this contingency, was besieged and surrendered in March 1915 in what was, by numbers of prisoners taken, one of the largest capitulations of the war. The Gorlice–Tarnów offensive of May 1915 recovered most of the province; the Brusilov offensive of June 1916 took much of it back again.

Behind the front, the state that had governed the province since 1772 was being consumed. The Reichsrat was prorogued from March 1914 and the Austrian half was governed for three years by emergency decree. Franz Joseph, who had reigned since 1848 and whose person was a substantial part of what the peasantry of Galicia had been formed to be loyal to, died on 21 November 1916. His successor recalled the parliament in May 1917. By 1918 the monarchy could not feed its own cities.

None of that is a Galician event. All of it is the floor of force being ground away by other people's armies, which is the second crack in its textbook form: nobody opens the door on purpose, and the population walks through a gap that the war and not they have torn.

Why the counter-elite was not simply killed

The framework's standing question about an ending is the blunt one: an emerging counter-elite had been visible in Galicia for fifty years, and orders of this kind have generally dealt with such things by killing them. Why not here?

Galicia's answer is that in 1914 and 1915, under war conditions, the state tried — and the way it tried is the finding.

From September 1914 the Austro-Hungarian authorities interned Galician and Bukovinian Ruthenians suspected of pro-Russian sympathies. The main camp was at Thalerhof near Graz, opened on 4 September 1914; another was the fortress at Terezín. Beyond the camps there were denunciations by neighbours, beatings by troops and local mobs, courts-martial for treason, and summary hangings and shootings in the districts behind the front.

The figures are contested and must be reported as contested, because this is now an actively instrumentalised memory. Field Marshal Schlee's official report of 9 November 1914 records five thousand seven hundred internees at Thalerhof. Something over twenty thousand people are generally said to have passed through the camp between September 1914 and its closure in May 1917. Deaths in the first eighteen months are commonly given as about three thousand, with one account attributing a large share of that to a typhus epidemic that killed roughly a third of some seven thousand internees in the winter of 1914–15; a Czech deputy told the Reichsrat in June 1917 that testimony from seventy prisoners put the deaths at two thousand. Maximal figures circulating in Russian and Russophile national memory run to tens of thousands killed across the province. This study takes no position on the upper end of that range and notes that the Thalerhof Almanacs, published at Lviv between 1924 and 1932, were themselves a memorial project with a case to make.

What is not in doubt is the selection criterion, and it is what matters here. The target was the **Russophile** wing of the Ruthenian movement. Internees who renounced the Russian literary language and declared themselves Ukrainians were released. The commandant of Lviv after the Russian retreat reported that the Galician Rus' divided into Russophiles and Ukrainophiles and that the former, being traitors to the state, should be destroyed. And the arrests were abetted by the Polish-dominated provincial civil service, which used Austrian wartime fear to strike at the organised Ukrainian community more broadly than the criterion warranted.

So the state's last great exercise in repression did not destroy its opposition. It **sorted** it. The branch of the Ruthenian counter-elite that would have delivered eastern Galicia to Russia was broken, its leaders imprisoned, hanged or driven into exile. The branch that intended to take the province for itself was not merely spared but validated — it had, at that moment, a legion in the imperial army and a General Ukrainian Council publishing calls to arms against Russia in *Dilo*.

That is worth stating as a general observation, because it inverts the usual expectation. A threatened order under wartime conditions does not repress its

opposition; it selects among it — because the operative test under war is loyalty to *this* war rather than loyalty as such, and the faction that passes that test is, by construction, the faction with an organisation, a press, and men already in uniform. Austria's terror of 1914–15 eliminated the Ruthenian faction that was dangerous to the empire and left standing the one that would be dangerous to its successors. Four years later that faction declared a state.

The repricing, and its price in tons

Then the apex repriced, and the document in which it did so is the most eloquent single artefact this study has found.

On 9 February 1918 the Central Powers signed a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk with the Ukrainian People's Republic — the *Brotfrieden*, the Bread Peace, so called because its object was food. Vienna's negotiators had refused throughout to admit Galicia into the general treaty, insisting it was an internal Habsburg matter. What they signed instead was a secret protocol.

Austria-Hungary undertook to unite the districts of eastern Galicia and Bukovina where the Ukrainian population predominated into a single crownland, by 31 July 1918. The Ukrainian People's Republic undertook to deliver over a million tons of grain to the Central Powers before July. Two copies of the instrument were to exist, and Berlin was to destroy its own if the grain did not arrive.

Hold that against the seventy years reconstructed in the previous module. The partition of Galicia along national lines was the thing the Ruthenians had asked for since 1848; two hundred thousand of them had signed a petition for it that year; it had been shelved by Gołuchowski, refused by every subsequent administration, and remained the one demand that fifty years of Diet obstruction, franchise reform and imperial mediation had never come close to obtaining. In February 1914 the most they had achieved was twenty-seven per cent of a provincial chamber.

It was conceded in six weeks at a railway junction, in exchange for wheat.

And on 4 July 1918 the Austrian minister at Kyiv declared the secret agreement annulled, on the stated ground that the grain had not been delivered, and in fact under Polish pressure supported by the Hungarians — the Poles insisting on the indivisibility of the province in which they held the preponderance, and the Austrian government continuing to attach great weight to Polish opinion because it was still dreaming of an Austro-Polish solution to the Polish question.

The repricing was done by a quartermaster and it was unwound by a whip count. This framework has held that the most consequential actor in the ending of such an arrangement is frequently an accountant; here a nation's constitutional status was drafted as a delivery contract with a destruction clause and cancelled for non-performance. Nothing the Ruthenians did between 1848 and 1918 moved that question. A shortfall in tonnage moved it twice in five months, in both directions.

Sixteen days

The rest is quick and the speed is the point.

On 16 October 1918 the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto federalising the Austrian half of the monarchy — with the Polish lands excepted, because Poland was already being reconstituted by other hands. On 18 October the Ukrainian deputies of both houses of the Reichsrat and of the Galician and Bukovinian diets constituted themselves in Lviv as a Ukrainian National Rada and proclaimed the intention of founding a state. On 28 October the Polish Liquidation Committee was formed at Kraków under Wincenty Witos and Ignacy Daszyński, and announced that it would move to Lviv.

That announcement forced the timetable. The Ukrainian seizure of Lviv had been planned for 3 November. On 31 October, Dmytro Vitovsky told the council that if they did not take Lviv that night the Poles would take it the next day. Between half past three and four o'clock on the morning of 1 November, Ukrainian soldiers of the imperial garrison occupied the city's public utilities and military objectives, Teodor Martynets disarmed the 41st Infantry Division of the Common Army, Ukrainian flags went up across Lviv, and the West Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed. The viceroy, Karl Georg Huyn, declined to hand over authority without the emperor's permission, and was simply overtaken by events.

Sixteen days from the manifesto to the state.

Then the contest. Polish residents of a city that was substantially Polish organised resistance within hours; a Polish assault took the main railway station and two Ukrainian supply trains, largely cancelling the Ukrainian advantage in arms; by 5 November the Ukrainians had been pushed out of the western districts and the front stabilised in the centre. On 11 November Poland declared independence and on the following day the first regular units of the Polish army entered Przemyśl, seventy kilometres away. On 21 and 22 November the Ukrainians withdrew from Lviv, and in

the three days that followed a large number of the city's Jewish inhabitants were killed or injured and Jewish and Ukrainian property looted and burned. The Polish-Ukrainian war ran on until July 1919 and the West Ukrainian government ended in exile.

Who actually made the transfer

Look closely at the mechanics of 1 November, because they are the framework's claim about how change happens with all the romance stripped off.

The transfer of Lviv was not made by a crowd. It was made by soldiers, in uniform, under an officer, disarming another unit of the same army. What happened at half past three that morning was one part of an imperial garrison overpowering another part of it inside an apparatus that its own state had effectively abandoned.

And consider who those soldiers were. They were Galician conscripts, drawn under the universal service law that had run since 1868, drilled and disciplined by the Habsburg army, and formed — in the sense the fourth module established — in village reading rooms, in the Prosvita branches, in the Sokil and Sich societies that had begun military training in 1912. Two regiments composed mainly of Ukrainians had been brought into the city that October.

Conscription is the mechanism by which a war-exhausted empire hands its counter-elites an army. Vienna spent half a century taking the younger sons of Galician villages, teaching them to march, shoot and obey an order, and posting them where they had no local ties. In November 1918 it discovered that it had trained the infantry of two successor states, and that they were about to use it on each other over the province the empire had governed for a hundred and forty-six years.

What broke, in the framework's terms

The eighth module classified this order as **Co-opt** in its modern form — a grant purchasing political compliance rather than armed service — blended with **Divide and balance** at the imperial level. Both failed within the same month and for the same underlying reason.

The co-optation's consideration was votes in the Reichsrat. When the Reichsrat became worthless the consideration became worthless, and the grant simply stayed where it was: the Polish Liquidation Committee of 28 October did not have to seize Galicia from Vienna, because the Polish elite had been administering the province for

fifty-one years and merely continued doing so after the granting authority evaporated. **A co-optation whose grant is an administration rather than an estate does not need to be defended at the end. It converts into possession by default.**

The divide-and-balance failed more sharply and its failure is the more general finding. That arrangement had worked because neither Galician nationality could obtain anything except through Vienna: the Poles could not hold the province without imperial appointment and the Ruthenians could not extract concessions except through imperial pressure on the Poles. **An order of that kind does not die when one party wins. It dies when the arbiter becomes irrelevant** — and when it does, it dies violently, because both parties have spent decades building the capacity to press their claims and have never once had to settle anything with each other except through the centre. Fifty-four months separated a signed compromise from a war between the two nations that had signed it. That is a real addition to a menu family this framework lists as documented but never yet run as a full case, and it should be carried: the danger in divide-and-balance is not that the balance tips but that the balancer disappears, and its subjects are least equipped to deal with one another at exactly the moment they must.

Did seventy years of pressure matter?

This framework holds, against its own harder statement, that pressure from below is a genuine cause even though it is never the proximate agent — that the credible threat of rising is the lever that forces a cornered elite to widen a settlement, and that the line to hold is between proximate agent and causal load.

For Galicia the honest answer is not the standard one and it is worth stating precisely.

Ruthenian pressure did not crack the Habsburg floor. It came nowhere near. Nor did it raise the standing cost of the settlement to the point where Vienna had to concede: the province's politics in February 1914 were converging on a negotiated compromise that both sides could live with, and the imperial government's interventions had been driven by fear of Russia rather than by fear of Ruthenians. On the framework's own credible-threat channel, the Galician Ruthenians register weakly.

What seventy years of losing produced was something else, and the calendar demonstrates it. Between the emperor's manifesto of 16 October and the proclamation of a state on 1 November there were sixteen days. In that fortnight the Ruthenians of Galicia produced a national council drawn from sitting deputies, a government, a claim

to territory, a plan for seizing the capital, and an armed force capable of executing it before dawn.

Nothing is assembled in sixteen days. All of it had been built between 1848 and 1914 — the party founded in 1899 whose chairman, Kost Levytsky, now headed the government; the deputies elected in 1907 and 1913 who now constituted a council; the press that carried the call; the three thousand reading rooms that had produced literate villagers; the co-operatives that had produced men used to administering something; and the gymnastic societies that had been drilling for six years. The men who declared the West Ukrainian People's Republic were the men named in the eighth module's list of National Democratic leaders of 1899, nineteen years older.

So the refinement this module returns is a timing finding, and it modifies the account of change rather than contradicting it. The crack is made from above and outside, and it is exogenous — nobody in the periphery causes it and nobody can predict its date. Which means that the variable determining what happens is not *who is pushing when it comes*, but **who is assembled when it comes**. Pressure is not the asset. Readiness is. A faction that spends decades losing arguments inside an order is, whatever it thinks it is doing, building the organisation that will be the only thing standing when the order stops existing — and the value of that organisation is realised entirely in the weeks after a crack that the faction neither caused nor foresaw.

Which reframes the whole of the previous module. The chairs, the seats, the schools and the compromise of February 1914 turned out to be worth nothing, because the state that granted them ceased to exist within four years. **What the seventy-year contest actually produced was the apparatus that fought the contest**, and that was the durable asset. The gains were not the residue. The claimant was — and here the claimant, having survived every defeat, walked into the vacuum with a cabinet ready.

And the same proposition explains the outcome, which was not a Ruthenian victory. The Poles had been assembling too, for longer, with more resources and with fifty-one years of an actual administration attached. So the vacuum was contested rather than filled, and the better-assembled party won it. Readiness decided that there would be a fight; relative readiness decided who won it.

The people, and the toll

The population's role at this opening is the one the framework predicts and it is unusually stark, because in Galicia the population was also the terrain. Galician

peasants served in the imperial army in hundreds of thousands and died in it. They were fought across three times, occupied twice, interned by their own state on suspicion of the wrong sympathies, deported by the occupying one on suspicion of the others, and then handed a war between their own two nations that ran another eight months after the empire had gone. At no point in the sequence does a Galician crowd appear as the author of anything. The province is, in this collection, the clearest illustration of the proposition that at an opening the common man is the ground and not the agent.

One framework test can be applied here and its result passed to the next module. The coordination the Habsburg state actually performed in Galicia was governance, courts, schooling, taxation, railways and a sanitary administration — it was not the subsistence metabolism itself, which remained peasant agriculture on two hectares. The prediction is therefore that the mass death of this collapse should be war death rather than the metabolic death that follows the destruction of a coordinating apparatus on which food itself depended. Counting that, and setting it beside what the order built while it stood, belongs to the accounting.

Reading the collapse against the framework

Three things to carry.

First, and principally: the crack is exogenous, so assembly beats pressure. Change comes when the floor breaks from above or outside, and the date of the break is not something a subject faction can influence or foresee. What such a faction can do is be organised on the day. The Galician Ruthenians did not push the Habsburg monarchy over — an entente of great powers did that — but they had a council sitting within forty-eight hours of the emperor's manifesto and a state within sixteen days, because they had spent seventy years building the institutions that a vacuum can be occupied with. **Where a study finds a subject population that fails for decades and then appears fully formed at an opening, the decades were not wasted and they were not the cause; they were the assembly.**

Second, wartime repression selects rather than destroys. An order under existential pressure applies a loyalty test framed by the war it is fighting, not by the threat it faces long-term. Austria interned and hanged the Ruthenian faction that leaned toward its enemy and validated the faction that supplied it a legion — and the validated faction was the one with the organisation. Look, in every case where an order

represses under war conditions, at which branch of its opposition the criterion actually selects for, because it is very often the one that will inherit.

Third, divide-and-balance ends with the balancer. The arrangement does not require either subject party to be reconciled to the other; it requires only that both need the centre more than they need a settlement. When the centre goes, the parties discover that they possess mature capacities to press their claims and no experience whatever of negotiating without an arbiter. The framework should expect that family of solution to end not in a transfer of power but in a war between its own beneficiaries.

The last question is the one the framework refuses to let a collapse settle. Read as the filter's verdict, the Habsburg arrangement in Galicia failed a test it did not set and could not have passed: no configuration of provincial politics would have preserved a monarchy destroyed by four years of industrial war on three fronts. That is a finding about structural fit under the pressure this order happened to meet, and it is not a judgement on the men who ran it, nor evidence that the compromise of 14 February 1914 was doomed or hollow. It was signed by people who expected to implement it. Six months later a Serbian nationalist made it a curiosity, and the ten schools that were to open that autumn opened in a different country, under a different flag, for a different purpose.

A note on sources.

No primary text is quoted in this module; Vitovsky's remark of 31 October 1918 about taking Lviv that night is paraphrased from the Ukrainian literature, and the commandant of Lviv's report about the Russophiles being traitors to be destroyed is paraphrased from a Russian-language account whose provenance I could not verify and which I have therefore not quoted.

The compromise of 14 February 1914 and its terms are as sourced in the previous module (Rudnytsky, resting on Levytsky and Buszko). The parade of 28 June 1914 and the projected ten-thousand-strong Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen are from the Ukrainian literature on the formation.

The military sequence — Lviv taken 3 September 1914, the Russian occupation to mid-1915, the surrender of Przemyśl in March 1915, Gorlice–Tarnów in May 1915, Brusilov in June 1916 — is from the general literature and I have not checked any of it against a campaign history. Sheptytsky's arrest and deportation into Russia and the

Russian administration's pressure on Greek Catholic parishes are from the Ukrainian ecclesiastical literature.

The Thalerhof material is the most contested body of evidence in this study and I have handled it as follows. Schleer's report of 9 November 1914 giving 5,700 internees, the opening date of 4 September 1914, the closure in May 1917 under Charles, the figure of something over twenty thousand passing through, and the commonly cited three thousand deaths in eighteen months appear across the reference literature and the 1914-1918-Online handbook entry. The attribution of much of that mortality to typhus in the winter of 1914-15, and the Czech deputy's statement to the Reichsrat in June 1917 putting deaths at two thousand on the testimony of seventy prisoners, come from separate accounts. Figures of tens of thousands killed across the province circulate in Russian state media and in Russophile memorial literature; I have flagged them as claims and used none of them. Thalerhof is a live site of political memory instrumentalised by more than one government at the time of writing, and the specialist study — Anna Veronika Wendland's *Die Russophilen in Galizien* (Vienna 2001) — is where this should be settled by anyone who needs the numbers rather than the mechanism. The mechanism, which is what my argument uses, is not in dispute across the sources: the criterion was Russophilism, those who declared themselves Ukrainians were released, and the Polish-dominated provincial administration took the opportunity to widen the net.

The Brest-Litovsk material is the module's centrepiece. The Bread Peace of 9 February 1918, the secret undertaking to unite the Ukrainian-majority districts of eastern Galicia and Bukovina into one crownland by 31 July 1918, and the annulment of 4 July 1918 on the pretext of undelivered grain and in fact under Polish pressure, are from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and are corroborated by Doroshenko's contemporary history, which names Count Forgách as the minister who delivered the annulment at Kyiv and states the Hungarian support for the Polish position. **The specific terms of the so-called Galician Protocol — over a million tons of grain before July 1918, two copies only, and Berlin to destroy its copy on non-delivery — rest on a single citation to Isidore Nahayewsky's *History of the Modern Ukrainian State 1917-1923* (Munich 1966), which I have not seen.** That detail is the sharpest thing in the module and a reader should know it stands on one source at two removes; the existence and substance of the secret agreement, and its annulment, are much better attested than its drafting particulars.

The events of October and November 1918 — Charles's manifesto of 16 October, the constitution of the Ukrainian National Rada on 18 October, the Polish Liquidation Committee of 28 October, the seizure of Lviv in the small hours of 1 November with Martynets disarming the 41st Infantry Division, Huyn's refusal, the Polish counter-attack and the capture of the station, the Ukrainian withdrawal of 21–22 November and the violence of 22–24 November — are from the standard accounts of the November uprising and the battle for Lviv, which exist in sharply divergent Polish and Ukrainian versions. I have taken the sequence and the dates, which they agree on, and avoided the characterisations, which they do not. The November violence against the Jewish population of Lviv is stated here in the barest terms because it belongs to the accounting module and deserves better than a clause.

Two gaps. I have **no figures for Galician war mortality, military or civilian**, and have therefore described the toll qualitatively; that is the accounting module's first task. And I have not established what the Polish side of the province was assembling between 1914 and 1918 — the Legions, the Naczelny Komitet Narodowy, the Liquidation Committee's antecedents — which means my claim that the better-assembled party won the vacuum is stated from the Ukrainian side only and is, on the evidence I have set out, an assertion rather than a demonstration.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 11 · THE GRIM ACCOUNTING

FORTY-FIVE PER CENT

Module 11, the grim accounting: what the order cost while it stood and what it cost when it fell, counted on every side — and why the single number that is the strongest thing the Habsburgs can claim in Galicia is also the measure of the debt they left there.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The settling

An arrangement that lasts long enough stops looking like an arrangement. The violence that made it recedes into a chapter nobody reads, the settlement of who got what becomes simply who has what, and the thing that was imposed on a particular date by particular men with an army becomes the way the world is. That is what a durable order is *for*, and it is the reason an accounting has to be done deliberately: nothing in the ordinary operation of memory will do it.

For Habsburg Galicia the forgetting has a specific shape and it is not the peasant's. The Galician peasant did not forget; his descendants have three national historiographies keeping the score, and none of them is gentle. The forgetting is in the literature that has grown up around the monarchy — the reading in which Austria-Hungary appears as a tolerant, multinational, faintly comic old order, and Galicia as its most colourful province, a lost world of shtetls and manor houses and Greek Catholic bells, destroyed by twentieth-century barbarians who came later. That reading is substantially the Anglophone one and it is not manufactured out of nothing: some of what it says is true, and this module will count it. But it is a reading in which nobody is ever hungry, and the arithmetic below is offered against it, and equally against the opposite reading in which nothing the order did counted for anything at all.

The number in both columns

Start with the one figure that carries the whole module.

The population of Galicia was about 4.9 million in 1849 and about 7.9 to 8.0 million in 1910. It rose by roughly forty-five per cent between 1869 and 1910 alone — and it did so while something on the order of seven hundred and fifty thousand people crossed the Atlantic and left.

That number is the strongest single thing the Habsburg administration can claim in this province, because a population that grows like that is a population whose death rate has fallen. Behind it stand things that were built and paid for: a sanitary administration, vaccination, the beginnings of a medical service, railways that could move grain into a district that had none, courts, and — the largest item and the easiest to overlook — the fact that no foreign army crossed Galicia between the end of the Napoleonic wars and August 1914. The internal violence of 1846 and 1848 was real and the fifth and first modules counted it, but a century without invasion on the ground between the Carpathians and the Zbruch is a historically unusual condition and it is the precondition of everything else in the credit column.

And the same number is the debt.

Because look at what did *not* lift it. Galician agricultural yields were the lowest in the monarchy throughout. Holdings shrank rather than consolidated, under an inheritance law of 1868 that required equal division among sons; the average fell toward two hectares and below, scattered across as many as twenty strips. Industry did not absorb the surplus: industrial employment in the whole province had not reached a hundred thousand at the turn of the century, and by 1914 Galicia held some nine per cent of the monarchy's industry while carrying a much larger share of its people.

So this was a population lifted above the land's carrying capacity not by intensification — the ordinary mechanism, in which better farming feeds more mouths off the same acres — but by **coordination alone**: peace, public health, and the closing of the eastern frontier down which peasants had once fled to the steppe. A state can add two and a half million people to a province that way without adding a bushel of grain to it, and Habsburg Galicia did.

That is a metabolic debt in the framework's exact sense. The coordination that produced those people was real; the food to sustain them was not produced with it; and the difference is an obligation that will be presented to somebody.

The note serviced in instalments

The framework's usual expectation is that the note falls due at the collapse: an advanced order raises a population above what the land alone can bear, conquest or revolution destroys the coordination, and the debt is paid in a famine that follows the fall.

Galicia is unusual in that it paid a great deal of it **while the order stood**, and this is the module's first finding.

The instalments are in the record and the fifth and sixth modules have already counted most of them. Seven major famines between 1847 and 1889 by the commonest count, an average of one every six years. The chronic hunger mortality that produced the phrase *nędza galicyjska* and the estimate — an estimate, and a polemical one — of fifty thousand deaths a year from want. Holdings falling below viability. Usury and forced sales. The servitudes lost. The propination running to 1889.

And then the payment that does not look like a payment, because it appears in the record as a ship's manifest rather than a burial register.

Emigration is metabolic debt service. A population above carrying capacity with an open exit pays continuously, in departures, rather than periodically, in famine — and the payment is nearly invisible in the mortality series, because it has been exported to Pennsylvania and Manitoba and Paraná. Something like three-quarters of a million people left Galicia across the Atlantic between 1880 and 1914; between seven and eight hundred thousand Austro-Hungarian Ukrainians left between 1890 and 1913, which was between a third and a half of the entire natural increase for the period; some seventy-five thousand a year went seasonally to Germany between 1907 and 1912. That flow was the province's principal metabolic mechanism in its final generation, and it was not built or paid for by the state. It was built by the emigrants, one remittance at a time, as the fifth module established.

Which means the debt was being serviced by an instrument the order neither owned nor controlled — and could not restore when it stopped.

In August 1914 the valve shut.

The balance presented, 1914–1919

What follows has to be given in ranges with the estimators named, because this is the part of the Galician record where the numbers are worst and most contested.

The military column. Austro-Hungarian armed forces losses are estimated at 1.1 to 1.2 million dead, with a further 450,000 dying as prisoners of war and 300,000 still missing at the end. Some 450,000 Poles died fighting in the Austrian, Russian and German armies together. Galicia's own share of any of these is not separable from the totals, and I have not found a study that separates it. What can be said structurally is what the first module established: the province had been a recruiting reservoir since 1782, its Ukrainian and Polish conscripts filled the eastern regiments, and the war was fought where they lived.

The province as terrain. Lviv fell in September 1914; eastern Galicia was under Russian occupation until mid-1915; Gorlice–Tarnów recovered it; Brusilov took much of it again in June 1916 and it was held under a second Russian occupation until January 1918. Villages were burned, fields left unharvested, transport wrecked. Przemyśl was besieged twice.

Violence by the occupier. The Russian administration targeted Jews, Germans, Polish notables and pro-Austrian Ukrainians, interning or deporting thousands; Metropolitan Sheptytsky was taken into Russia and held until 1917; Greek Catholic parishes were pressed toward Orthodoxy. Cossacks killed something in the range of twenty to forty Jewish civilians in Lviv in November 1914, and synagogues were burned at Horodenka. The second occupation attempted moderation and delivered requisitioning and forced labour that fell hardest on the Ukrainian poor, with discipline deteriorating into looting, rape and murder, and further pogroms in 1917.

Violence by the sovereign. Habsburg troops killed a large number of Galician civilians suspected of betrayal. During the reoccupation of 1915 the commander of the Fourth Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, ordered civilians hanged as a warning to a population allegedly cooperating with the enemy — and the reading in the specialist literature is that these people died because the chief of staff needed scapegoats for his own failures on the eastern front in 1914. Wartime estimates of the total ran as high as eighty thousand. That is a wartime estimate made in the middle of a propaganda contest and it should be treated as an upper bound of a claim rather than a count; the lower end of the range is not established either, and the honest statement is that nobody knows.

And beside it, one number that should be set out on its own, because it is the module's discipline in a single line. **Austro-Hungarian figures put the total of civilians killed under Russian occupation to the end of 1915 at fewer than one hundred.** That is a state counting its enemy's crimes on its own territory, and arriving

at a figure lower than any other estimate in the field, in the same period in which its own army was hanging civilians on an archduke's order. Note what the figure demonstrates about the counter and not about the dead.

Displacement. Something under a million people were displaced in successive waves, with forced evacuations from Lviv and Przemyśl. Around a hundred thousand of them were Jews from Galicia and Bukovina. The camp at Gmünd held over twenty-eight thousand Galicians on a ration allowance of seventy heller a day for an adult, against wartime inflation.

Epidemic and hunger. Indirect Austro-Hungarian losses — famine, cold and epidemics — are estimated at some 460,000, with the influenza pandemic adding a further 250,000. These are empire-wide figures and Galicia's share is not extracted in them; the province was a war zone with a destroyed transport system and a population already at the edge, which is the configuration in which such losses concentrate.

The succession. The empire's departure did not end it. The Polish-Ukrainian war ran from November 1918 to July 1919 across eastern Galicia. In Lviv on 21–23 November 1918, after the Ukrainian withdrawal, Polish soldiers and civilians attacked the Jewish quarter; contemporary Jewish relief and investigative reports of 1919 give seventy-two or seventy-three Jewish dead, the modern range runs from fifty-two to a hundred and fifty Jewish victims and up to three hundred and forty in all, with over four hundred and forty injured. A wave of pogroms had already swept western Galician towns earlier that year, largely carried out by demobilised soldiers and deserters.

And the only real handle on the civilian total. The literature on Austro-Hungarian war losses states plainly that direct and indirect civilian losses on the eastern front are unknown, and points to the one available measurement: the reduction in the population of eastern Galicia between the last Austrian census of 1910 and the first Polish census of 1921. That gap is the metabolic note, presented and paid, and nobody has separated it into war dead, epidemic dead, hunger dead, refugees who did not return, and emigrants.

The column that leaves no trace

The framework requires one further exercise here and it is the one this case most needs, because every instrument this collection owns is built to register commissions — casualty counts, extraction tonnages, displacement figures — and returns a null where the harm was something that was not done.

Galicia is the corpus's clearest case of a cheap order, and the parsimony has to be counted as an item rather than credited as a virtue.

Nine per cent of the monarchy's industry, in the crownland with the largest population. Fewer than a hundred thousand industrial workers at the turn of the century in a province of seven million. Agricultural yields the lowest in the monarchy across the whole period, with no state programme that changed them. Compulsory schooling legislated in 1869 and an elementary infrastructure that only reached the periphery around 1900 — thirty years of a right that existed and could not be exercised. In 1911–12, one Ukrainian gymnasium for girls in the entire province. A Ukrainian university promised for 1916 and never opened. And an oil field that made Austria the world's third producer in 1909, was worked by thousands of undercapitalised wildcat operations because the province's own elite had defeated centralisation, crashed its own price, and was substantially depleted within three decades, leaving the district poorer than the boom had found it in every respect except the fires.

None of that appears in any casualty return. All of it is a cost, and the people who paid it are the same people the credit column is about.

And here is the part that must not be softened into a compliment. **The same parsimony produced the gentleness and the poverty.** Habsburg Galicia had no pass law because nobody needed Galician labour anywhere in particular. It had no settler colonisation because nobody wanted the land. It had a light police because there was nothing worth defending against. It was cheap to hold because it was not worth holding — and its comparative mildness beside the Russian and Prussian partitions is therefore a fact about the endowment rather than about the character of the men who governed it. A corpus that measures only commissions will read that mildness as benevolence, and it is not benevolence; it is the absence of a motive.

Who wrote every number

The framework requires the provenance of the figures to be an item in the accounting, and in Galicia the provenance is startling enough to be a finding of its own.

The standard indictment of Habsburg Galicia is *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* — Galician Misery in Figures — published in 1888, and it is where the fifty-thousand-hunger-deaths figure and most of the surrounding statistics come from. Its author, Stanisław Szczepanowski, was a Polish autonomist, an economist and an industrialist; he was the man who introduced steam drilling to the Boryslav oil field in 1880; and he

belonged to the class that had administered the province since 1867. He wrote the book as an argument for an industrial policy and for investment. **The most-quoted numbers about Galician poverty were produced by the province's own governing elite in order to move the responsibility upward, to Vienna.**

Set that beside the others. The Ukrainian historiography reads the same poverty downward, as Polish misgovernment after 1867. The Polish national historiography reads it upward, as Viennese neglect of a Polish land. The Anglophone literature has read the whole province backwards through 1941 and produced a nostalgia. The Thalerhof numbers are curated by a Russophile memorial project with a case to make, and are currently instrumentalised by a state. And the Austro-Hungarian army wrote “fewer than one hundred.”

Five parties, one set of figures, and every party pointing them at somebody else. What none of them is, is the man on two hectares. He wrote nothing. The powerful leave paper and the powerless leave silence, and a method that mines the paper will read the silence as absence unless it enters it as an item — which is done here, and which does not fill it.

The credit column, at full weight

The discipline requires this at the same weight and in the same breath, and it is substantial.

A Galician peasant in 1770 was bound to his village, owed labour without a statutory ceiling, could not marry without permission, and had no court but his lord's. A Galician peasant in 1910 was personally free, owned his plot, could leave the empire by right, could vote in imperial elections, could sue the administration in a court that would hear him, could read a newspaper in his own language if he could read, could join an association and did — and lived, on average, longer than his great-grandfather. Roman Rozdolsky's summary of the first stage of that change is deliberately small and it is the honest one: the Galician peasant became an object of law, where before he had been outside any law. The distance between those two conditions was not travelled anywhere else in this collection.

Beside it: a century without invasion. Two universities. Railways. A sanitary administration. Some two and a half thousand Ruthenian-language primary schools by 1910. A constitutional order with a press that could not be pre-censored, a right of

petition, a right of assembly and, from 1867, a court obliged to hear a complaint that a political right had been violated.

And one thing that fits in no column and has to be stated anyway. The Habsburg endowment of the Greek Catholic clergy from the 1770s — undertaken to buy a counterweight against the Polish nobility, as the third module established, and paid for out of the liquidated wealth of dissolved monasteries, as the second one did — produced across five generations a literate class, a press, a scholarship, a co-operative movement, a political leadership and, in November 1918, a state. When the Russian Empire prohibited Ukrainian publication in 1876, Galicia was the sanctuary that made the prohibition survivable, and for thirty years the printing house of a nation that another empire had forbidden to exist. That was nobody's intention. It is the largest single consequence of Habsburg rule in this province and it did not appear in any ledger in Vienna.

Reading the accounting against the framework

Three things.

First, and principally: emigration is metabolic debt service, and it disguises the debt. The framework has treated the metabolic note as something presented at the collapse — a population raised above carrying capacity by coordination, and a famine when the coordination fails. Galicia shows a variant in which the note is serviced continuously *while the order stands*, in departures rather than deaths, through an exit the state neither built nor controlled. The consequence is a systematic distortion in the record: a province paying its debt in emigration looks healthier in the mortality series than one paying it in famine, while carrying an identical and growing obligation. **Where a case shows heavy sustained emigration, ask what it is substituting for, and treat the departures as an entry in the metabolic column rather than as an economic curiosity.** And note the corollary, which is what happened here: an exit the order does not own is an exit it cannot reopen. The valve shut in August 1914 for reasons that had nothing to do with Galicia, and the payment resumed immediately in the older currency.

Second, the omissions are the whole accounting in a cheap order, and the mildness is not a credit. The same parsimony that spared Galicia a pass law, a settler colonisation and a police state left it with nine per cent of the monarchy's industry, the lowest yields in it, and a promised university that never opened. A framework whose

instruments count commissions will rate such an order as the benign one in its sample, and it will be wrong — not because the mildness is fictitious but because the mildness and the underdevelopment have a single cause, which is that nobody in Vienna wanted anything from Galicia badly enough to pay for it. **Where an order is cheap, find out first what it was cheap about.**

Third, on the settling. The forgetting this module was written against is not the peasant's and never was. Three national historiographies and a memorial literature are keeping Galicia's accounts with great energy, and each of them is keeping the accounts of a case it is party to. What has actually settled into being the way the world is, is a picture assembled at a distance by people with nothing at stake — the tolerant empire, the colourful province, the world we lost — and the specific service an accounting can perform against a picture of that kind is not to replace it with an indictment but to put the arithmetic under it. A century without invasion and seven famines. Two and a half million more people and three-quarters of a million departures. A constitution with a court behind it and one girls' gymnasium. All of that is one province, at one time, and all of it is true.

The last module has to set this case beside the others, state the strongest thing that can be said against the whole reading, and answer it.

A note on sources.

No primary text is quoted in this module.

The demographic frame — a population of about 4.9 million in 1849 and 7.9 to 8.0 million in 1910, and growth of some forty-five per cent between 1869 and 1910 — is from the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter's demographic survey, which draw on Magocsi. The emigration figures are as sourced in the fifth module: roughly 750,000 transatlantic departures 1880–1914 from the general reference literature, and 700,000–800,000 Austro-Hungarian Ukrainians in 1890–1913 amounting to between a third and a half of the natural increase, which is Rudnytsky's on Bachynsky and Kubijovyč. The industrial and agricultural comparisons — nine per cent of the monarchy's industry, under 100,000 industrial workers, the lowest yields in the monarchy — are as sourced in the fifth and sixth modules and share their weaknesses: several trace ultimately to Szczepanowski, which is the point the module makes about them rather than a defect it has overlooked.

Szczepanowski's *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* (1888) is treated here as evidence about its author's position rather than as a measurement, and the fifty-thousand-deaths figure is reported as an estimate made in the course of an argument for a policy. His introduction of steam drilling at Boryslav in 1880 is from the reviews of Alison Fleig Frank's *Oil Empire*. The count of seven famines between 1847 and 1889 comes from popular writing and I have not traced it to a demographic study; it should be checked before anyone builds on it.

The war figures are from the 1914-1918-Online handbook entries on war losses, atrocities, and health and mortality, which are the current specialist syntheses and which are unusually candid about what is not known. Austro-Hungarian armed forces losses of 1.1–1.2 million dead plus 450,000 dead prisoners and 300,000 missing, the indirect losses of some 460,000 and the further 250,000 from influenza, and the statement that direct and indirect civilian losses on the eastern front are completely unknown, are all from that source, as are Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's order during the 1915 reoccupation, the reading that the victims served as scapegoats for Conrad's failures, the wartime estimate of up to 80,000, the Russian occupation's targets and methods, the Lemberg pogrom of November 1914, and the Austro-Hungarian figure of fewer than a hundred civilians killed under Russian occupation to the end of 1915. The figure of 450,000 Polish dead across three armies and roughly 1,128,000 total deaths within the later Polish borders is from the general literature on Poland in the war and covers a much larger area than Galicia.

The refugee figures — under a million displaced, about 100,000 of them Jews, and over 28,000 Galicians at Gmünd on 70 heller a day for an adult — come from a single secondary compilation and I have not verified them; the Gmünd detail in particular is the sort of specific that deserves a source I have actually read.

The Lviv pogrom of 21–23 November 1918 is given as a range because the estimates diverge sharply and are politically live: 52 to 150 Jewish victims and up to 340 in all with over 443 injured in the general reference literature, against the contemporary figures of 72 and 73 Jewish dead published in 1919 by a Jewish relief committee report and by an investigative brochure respectively. William Hagen's and Christoph Mick's work is where this should be settled.

The largest gap in this module is the one it is most about. There is no Galician war-mortality series, military or civilian; the specialist literature says so explicitly and offers the 1910-to-1921 census gap as the only available measure, which nobody has decomposed. That means the module's central metabolic claim — that a debt

accumulated across sixty years was presented between 1914 and 1921 — is argued from structure and from the shape of the record rather than demonstrated from a count. It is the right shape and I cannot put a number on it. A demographer working the 1910 Austrian and 1921 Polish censuses against the emigration and military returns could, and until somebody does, this module's conclusion should be held as a reading rather than as a finding.

Two further limitations. I have said almost nothing about what the order cost the Polish population, whose gentry lost estates to creditors after 1848 in numbers I have not established and whose peasants emigrated first and in comparable proportions. And the credit column here is assembled from the modules that preceded it rather than from any independent measurement of Habsburg provision — I have no expenditure figures for Galicia in any year, which means the claim that Vienna invested little is, like almost everything else fiscal in this study, qualitative.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE 12 · CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND SIGNATURES

Module 12, convergence and divergence: Habsburg Galicia read against the corpus and against the same ground under a later overlord; what the case confirms, complicates and leaves standing; which of this study's claims are contributions and which are applications in a contribution's coat; and the strongest case against the whole reading, stated in its own voice.

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The comparison the case was chosen for

This study was taken up for one reason. The collection now holds some thirty accounts of foreclosure — orders in which liberty was absent, captured, or confined to an estate — and the framework's positive claim had therefore never been tested. That claim is that liberty is residue: the by-product of factions inside a hierarchy fighting each other for protection, drafted generally enough that parties nobody had in mind can later pick it up. A conditional tested only on the arm where the antecedent fails is not tested.

Galicia was chosen because the residue accumulated, and because the collection had just finished studying the same ground under a different overlord. The Soviet study of western Ukraine ran from 1939 to 1991 over the eastern half of this province; this one runs from 1772 to 1918 over the whole of it. Same people, largely the same villages, two orders, one variable changed.

The Soviet study's finding on this question was that liberty's residue requires not that factions exist but that a defeated faction can survive its defeat — and that under the Soviet arrangement no faction in western Ukraine had a base, because everything was on a list and a man who lost his position lost everything attached to it. Nothing accumulated in fifty years.

The prediction handed to this study was that the Ruthenian gains after 1867 would track the growth of the Ruthenians' independent base — church, land, co-operatives,

press — rather than the generosity of Vienna or the ideology of the age, and that the way to test it was to date the gains against the base.

The dating test came back with a split verdict, and the split is this study's central finding.

The gains do *not* track the base. Every single opening in seventy years was made by somebody else for reasons of their own: Stadion needing to outbid the Polish democrats in 1848; Schmerling needing Slav counterweights in 1861; the crown settling with Hungary in 1867, which took back everything; Kálnoky fearing a Russian war in 1890; Vienna managing Hungarian obstruction after a revolution next door in 1907; the general staff facing a war in 1914; a quartermaster wanting a million tons of grain in February 1918. Not one Ruthenian gain is dated to a Ruthenian victory in argument.

But the *retention* tracks the base exactly, and so does the capacity to be present at the next opening. In 1861 the Ruthenians held a clergy and were given forty-nine Diet seats; by 1867 the seats were gone, because they rested on somebody else's alignment. In 1890 they held a press and an intelligentsia; the agreement evaporated and the chair survived to become an academy. In 1907 they held mass organisation and were given a parliamentary delegation that could not be withdrawn. And the decisive fact of the whole study is that Prosvita was founded in **1868** — one year after the most complete political defeat these people ever suffered, by the men who had just been beaten, who were still in a position to found anything because the thing they were was not in the state's gift.

So the inherited prediction is half right, and the half it got wrong is the more important half. **A base does not win concessions and does not prevent their withdrawal. What it guarantees is that the claimant survives the withdrawal and is standing there when the next crack opens.**

Convergence: what Galicia confirms

Set beside the corpus, a great deal of this case simply behaves as the framework says it should, and it is worth listing because a study that only reports its surprises has stopped testing anything.

Change is elite, and the floor cracked from above and outside. The Habsburg order in Galicia was not overthrown by Galicians. It was destroyed by four years of industrial war against an alliance of great powers, and the transfer of Lviv on 1

November 1918 was executed by soldiers of the imperial army disarming other soldiers of the imperial army inside an apparatus their own state had abandoned. The population is present at the opening as conscript, refugee, casualty and terrain, and is the author of nothing.

Legitimacy is borrowed from a currency the audience already honours, and the revealed-preference test works. Vienna held Galicia absolutely and owed the Ruthenians nothing, and nonetheless built them a seminary in Vienna, a seminary in Lviv, a university course taught in Ruthenian, a restored metropolitanate and a salaried clergy at parity with the Latin. Force never pays for what it does not need. The expenditure is the evidence, and what it bought was a counterweight.

Law cannot legitimate unless it genuinely constrains. The December Constitution created a court obliged to hear complaints that a political right had been violated, and the nationalities used it; the press could not be pre-censored; officials lost cases. That is not an embarrassment to the analysis, it is the mechanism running as designed — and the previous modules recorded, in the same breath, that Article 19 was law from 1867 and produced one Ukrainian girls' gymnasium in forty-four years.

Extraction ran the tributary fork and settled at the just-enough equilibrium. Nobody wanted the Galician peasant gone; everybody wanted him working. There was no clearance, no settler frontier, no logic of elimination — and the rate sat where the framework says it sits, at the edge of what the household would bear, held there for a century by the fact that the household could not afford to leave.

The default worked exactly as described. Two factions of the Polish elite who disliked each other coordinated for forty years because the Stańczyks needed Podolian votes for a Diet majority, and the most reactionary content of Galician government was the output of that arithmetic rather than anybody's programme.

And formation is generational and cannot be installed at speed. Herz Homberg was given money, compulsion, imported teachers, over a hundred schools, a teachers' seminary, and control of the marriage licence — and nineteen years later the whole apparatus was abolished and what had grown instead was Hasidism.

Divergence: what Galicia complicates

Six inherited claims needed widening, and one broke.

The one that broke is the mechanism the Soviet study named for keeping a true robe's bill payable: *permit the function and forbid the ownership*. Vienna permitted

both. The Lviv seminary was the Greek Catholics'; the restored metropolitanate was held by Ruthenians and every successor was one; the university chairs, when they came, were held by Ruthenians and one of their holders became rector. The general finding shrinks to a specialisation, and the variable that selects it is not the truth of the claim but **the purpose of the funding**: an apex endowing an institution to carry its own message must keep the appointments, and an apex endowing one to check a rival faction cannot, because a counterweight in the apex's own hand weighs nothing and is seen by everyone to weigh nothing.

Non-portability as the elite tie does not survive contact with a province that supplied the monarchy with two Minister-Presidents, a foreign minister of eleven years' standing, two finance ministers and two presidents of the lower house, and held together for fifty-one years anyway. The replacement is stated in the eighth module and it is testable: an elite is bound by the ladder above it, not the anchor beneath it.

The exit dial needs a second component. A door is shut by permission or by price, and the Galician peasant had a constitutional right to emigrate from 1867 that he did not exercise for two decades, because the fare was more money than his family had ever held at once. Where a state cannot lawfully close a door it attacks the doorkeepers — and prosecutes them, as at Wadowice, in the language of protecting the people who are leaving.

The metabolic note needs the emigration variant. A population above carrying capacity with an open exit services its debt continuously in departures rather than periodically in famine, which makes the debt nearly invisible in the mortality series while it goes on accruing.

The robe's audience structure needs a second configuration. Where an apex's audiences occupy one province, read one another's newspapers and sit in one Diet, the several-ropes arrangement is unavailable and it must run one text whose incidence differs by position — which is more expensive, because a default toward one audience is visible to all of them, and which is why the claim could be quoted back.

And the settlement's fiction taxonomy needs a fourth entry, because the largest single transfer in this province was not land held by living people. Vacancy, recognition and divisibility all operate on persons; the dissolution of the monasteries operated on an institution, by redefining what a religious house exists to do and abolishing those that failed the test, whereupon their endowments fell to the sovereign by wholly conventional law and no seizure had to be defended.

What the case refutes outright: nothing. That should be said plainly rather than buried. Every inherited claim either held, or needed to be widened, or turned out to be a special case of something more general. The framework came through this case intact and larger, which is what a good case does and is less exciting than a refutation.

Which of these are contributions

The field manual warns that a study claiming a revision in every module has usually manufactured eleven of them, and that one real contribution built across twelve modules is worth more than twelve asserted ones. This study made claims in every module and it should now sort them honestly.

There is one central contribution and the rest of the study is its supporting structure.

The claimant is the ratchet, not the gains. Openings are exogenous — nobody in the periphery causes them or can predict their date. Gains are reversible, and 1867 proves it: everything won in 1861 was taken back within six years. Therefore what determines a subject faction's trajectory across a long period is not what it wins but **whether it can be liquidated between openings**. A faction whose position *is* its concession disappears when the concession is withdrawn and there is nobody left to present the bill next time. A faction with holdings outside the state's gift survives the withdrawal with its capacities intact, is on the doorstep within the year, and compounds across five or six openings into everything.

Everything else in this study is either a precondition of a claimant having such holdings, or a mechanism that interacts with them, and stating it that way is more honest than presenting a list:

- A faction acquires holdings outside the state's gift when an apex **endows an existing formation rather than installing a new one** (Module 4), which it does because it wants a counterweight, and **a counterweight it owns weighs nothing** (Module 3). The two are the same decision seen from the population's side and the institution's side.
- It acquires the standing to make a claim when it has **a category in the state's own instruments** — a box on the census schedule, a *Volksstamm* under Article 19 (Modules 7 and 9). Without one, its members may prosper individually and its people accumulate nothing, which is the Galician Jewish trajectory and the sharpest control this study found.

- It becomes a counter-elite rather than being absorbed when **the ladder above it is closed** (Module 8), and the danger is proportional to how visible the closed rung is, not to the size of the surplus.
- And it converts its accumulated capacity into a state when the crack comes, because **assembly beats pressure** (Module 10): sixteen days from the emperor's manifesto to a proclaimed republic, and nothing is assembled in sixteen days.

Four further findings are separable mechanical additions rather than parts of that argument, and I would defend each of them on this case's evidence:

- **The purpose test** as a fourth settlement fiction, with its four preconditions: a holder that is rich, unarmed, unrepresented, and already subject to a doctrine of state supervision.
- **The devotional levy** — that the extractor's ideal base is an act the subject cannot decline, that formation manufactures that inelasticity far more cheaply than law does, and that the instrument is therefore structurally a caste tax available only against a formation the state did not install.
- **Non-enumeration as pre-emptive foreclosure**: what a regime declines to count maps what it intends never to have to answer, and the diagnostic is to read the classification schedule before the censorship files.
- **Emigration as metabolic debt service**, with the corollary that an exit the order does not own is an exit it cannot reopen.

And three claims should be downgraded, because on inspection they are applications of things the framework already holds rather than additions to it. The observation that an unredeemed written promise is an unexercised option held by a faction rather than by the promisee is a restatement of the forum finding and of the collection's own anti-Whig premise. The observation that a conqueror's floor need not be his own men is careful counting rather than a mechanism, except in its delegated-downward form, which is the default operating on the violence leg and which I would keep. And the finding that wartime repression selects rather than destroys rests on one case and should be held pending a second.

One further addition belongs on the card because the field manual asks for it explicitly: **Divide-and-balance**, listed as documented but never run as a full case, has now been run. Galicia adds that the balance need not be manufactured — an inherited

antagonism, correctly managed, is cheaper and carries no risk of being detected as policy — and that the family ends not when one party wins but **when the arbiter becomes irrelevant**, at which point both parties discover mature capacities to press their claims and no experience of settling anything without a centre. It ends in a war between its own beneficiaries.

Galicia and the same ground under the Soviets

The two studies laid side by side produce a comparison the collection has never had, and it should be stated without either side being flattened.

Both orders acquired the territory without a war for it — Austria walking into ground the Russian army had cleared in a war it was not fighting, the Soviets by a secret protocol. Both extracted heavily. Both ran a formation policy on the Greek Catholic Church, and this is where they diverge absolutely: Austria built the church up and could not steer it, losing an alphabet war and a calendar to an institution it was paying for; the Soviet state liquidated it at the Lviv sobor of March 1946 with its entire episcopate arrested beforehand, and it survived underground for forty-three years and resurfaced in December 1989. Both faced a nationality question and answered it in opposite directions: one gave the Ruthenians a census category, a constitutional clause, a court and eventually a vote; the other gave them a republic with a foreign ministry, a seat at the United Nations and a written right of secession, and no forum before which any of it could be invoked.

The results are the framework's claim in a controlled pair. Under the arrangement with fora and categories and an unowned church, seventy years of unbroken defeat produced sixty-two of two hundred and twenty-eight Diet seats, two places on a provincial executive, control of its own schools, and — when the state died — a government within a fortnight. Under the arrangement with none of those, fifty years produced nothing that accumulated, and independence arrived in 1991 because the metropole's will emptied in Moscow for reasons largely unconnected with the territory.

But the precision rule forbids letting that comparison do more work than it can carry, and two differences must not be flattened. The Habsburg order was not attempting to remake the population and the Soviet one was; a state that wants only revenue and quiet will always look better than a state that wants belief. And the Soviet case includes a famine, a deportation apparatus and a liquidated church, which is a different order of harm from anything in this study — while this study includes three

and a half centuries of corvée before 1848 that the Soviet case does not, and seven famines between 1847 and 1889 that were nobody's policy and killed people anyway.

The strongest case against this reading

Here is the counter-position, in its own voice, at full strength. It is not a straw figure; it is the reading held by serious historians and by a great many descendants of the people in this study, and every sentence of it is defensible on the evidence assembled here.

Habsburg rule in Galicia was not a conquest, and running a vocabulary of floors and robes and extraction over it is a category error.

Austria acquired the province without fighting for it, from a state that had ceased to be able to govern itself. It found a peasantry in the harshest serfdom in Europe, held by a nobility that owned the courts and the prisons and the rods, and it abolished that — capping the corvée within three years of arrival, abolishing personal subjection within a decade, and ending the whole system in 1848. It found a despised Eastern-rite clergy that was semi-literate, trained by its own fathers, and required by a document its own bishops had signed to defer to the local landlord and not to sue him. It renamed them, endowed them, educated them, restored their metropolitanate, put them on the state payroll at parity with the Latin clergy, and taught their ordinands philosophy and theology in their own language at an imperial university. It did all of that in the 1770s and 1780s, before anybody in Europe had a theory of nationality to be cynical about.

It then gave the province a written constitution with a bill of rights, an independent judiciary, an imperial court that would hear a subject's complaint that his political rights had been violated, a press that could not be pre-censored, a right of assembly and petition, and eventually universal, equal and direct male suffrage. Under that regime a nation came into being where there had been a peasantry: a standardised language, a literature, a scholarly society that was an academy in all but name, a co-operative economy, a network of three thousand village reading rooms, political parties, thirty-one Diet seats, and finally a state. When the Russian Empire forbade publication in Ukrainian in 1876, Galicia was the only place on earth where a Ukrainian book could be printed, and for thirty years it was the printing house of a nation another empire had ruled out of existence.

And the people knew it. Ivan Franko — a socialist, an anticlerical, a man that state prosecuted in 1878 and denied a university chair for the rest of his life — wrote on the eve of the war that his people had not forgotten Joseph II. When the monarchy fell in 1918 the

Ukrainians of Galicia did not celebrate a liberation. They mourned a framework and went immediately to war to keep what it had given them. And what came afterwards, on the same ground, to the same people, is the answer to any question about what the alternatives were: the Ems decree under Russia, the pacification of 1930 under Poland, the liquidation of their church in 1946 and forty-three years underground under the Soviets, and the extermination of the third of the province that was Jewish under the Germans. On every comparison actually available, Habsburg Galicia was the best century that ground has had.

That is the case, and this study will not soften it. Three of its claims are established in the preceding modules and are not in dispute here: the expenditure was real, the constitutional protections were real and were used, and the nation was really made.

Four refusals

But the argument as a whole does not follow, and the reasons are the four this framework holds against any defence built on outcomes.

Refuse the syllogism. That the arrangement lasted a hundred and forty-six years and that the people in it did comparatively well are facts about incentive structures and about what happened to be adjacent. Durability is not a verdict; the filter has no foresight and no preference, and selects only for whether a configuration could bear the pressure it met. An order that survived and an order that was better than its neighbours are both descriptions, and neither is a justification of anything that was done inside it.

Refuse the rigged comparison — and here the refusal has a name and a date. Setting Habsburg Galicia against Soviet, Nazi and interwar Polish Galicia is not a comparison of this conquest with self-rule. It is a comparison of one conquest with three worse ones, all of them later, none of them the alternative on offer at the time. The alternative that *was* on offer is in the record. In 1848 the Ruthenians of Galicia asked for the partition of the province along national lines and self-government within the monarchy; a memorandum went to the Ministry of the Interior in July and again in October; in August a petition brought it before the Reichstag; and by the end the petition carried **two hundred thousand signatures**. It was refused. Gołuchowski buried it in the 1850s. It was refused again through the whole autonomous period. And in February 1918 it was granted in a secret protocol in exchange for a million tons of grain, and cancelled five months later for non-delivery.

That is the foreclosed option, and it is not the Holodomor. It is a proposal made in writing by the people concerned, through the constitutional channels the order itself provided, supported by two hundred thousand of them, and set aside because a settlement with the Polish elite was worth more to Vienna than a settlement with the Ruthenian one. Any accounting that measures Habsburg Galicia against what came in 1932 or 1941 or 1946 has quietly substituted a comparison the actors never faced for the one they did.

Refuse credit for parsimony. The mildness and the underdevelopment in this province have a single cause. Galicia had no pass law because nobody needed Galician labour anywhere in particular; no settler colonisation because nobody wanted the ground; a light police because there was nothing worth defending. It was cheap to hold because it was not worth holding — and at the end it had nine per cent of the monarchy's industry, the lowest yields in it, the highest rural density in Europe, seven famines within living memory, three-quarters of a million people gone across the Atlantic, one Ukrainian gymnasium for girls, and a university promised for 1916 that never opened. Every instrument this collection owns registers commissions and returns a null on omissions, which means a corpus that does not correct for it will rate the parsimonious orders as the benign ones. The gentleness is a fact about the endowment. It is not a fact about anybody's character.

Refuse cynicism — and this is the refusal that matters most, because it is the one a reader of the preceding eleven modules is most likely to get wrong.

Nothing in this study makes the Ukrainian nation a Habsburg artefact. The endowment was cynical in origin and we have that from the beneficiary's own hand: Bishop Lev Sheptytsky wrote to Vienna in 1773 arguing for a Galician Greek metropolitanate on the ground that it would extend Austrian influence among the Uniates still under Polish and Russian rule. Maria Theresa and Kaunitz wanted a counterweight to the Polish nobility and bought one. And what they bought became, across five generations, a class, a literature, a scholarship, a politics and a people — and none of that is less real for having had an origin.

A built thing that became real is not a lie; it is a different and far more durable thing than a lie could ever be. The Greek Catholic priest of 1900, whose great-grandfather had been a semi-literate villein owing a hundred and thirty-three days a year, was not a Habsburg instrument that had forgotten it was one. He was a man, formed as everyone is formed, holding what he held for reasons he could give. And his nation proved the point in the hardest way the twentieth century had available: it survived the loss of its

patron by four generations, and its church survived formal liquidation by forty-three years underground and came back.

The framework says only that the origin was built and that the building can be dated and costed. It says nothing whatever about whether the thing built is genuine, and the answer to that question is not in this framework's gift.

What must be conceded to the other side

And one concession is owed, because the precision rule forbids flattening a real difference to protect a similarity.

The counter-position is right that this framework's vocabulary can flatten, and this case is where the flattening would be most misleading. Galicia was not a plantation, not Saint-Domingue, not Kenya. The fifth module found a peasant with a constitutional right to emigrate that no colonial subject anywhere else in this collection possessed, and the ninth found a court obliged to hear him. The fork must be named rather than blurred: this was an extraction-as-rate order over a population the state needed alive and working, on ground nobody wanted for settlement, run by a state whose own legitimacy at home rested on governing by law and which was therefore genuinely constrained by that law a great deal of the time. Every one of those conditions was doing real work, and a study that files Galicia beside the sugar islands because both had a floor and a robe has stopped seeing.

What survives the concession is the structure. The same fiction of title, drafted so that a seizure reads as a discovery. The same settlement binding an elite by re-sourcing what it already held. The same extraction sorted by caste. The same claim addressed to whichever audience was actually paying. The same floor, mostly invisible, and the same demonstration in 1846 of what it was for. Those recur here as they recur in the sugar islands and in Northern Nigeria and in Turkestan, and the fact that they recur under a constitution with a bill of rights and an imperial court is the most useful thing this case has to say to the corpus.

The arithmetic

Two hundred thousand signatures in 1848, asking for the province to be divided and the eastern half governed by the people who lived in it. Refused, and refused again for seventy years, and granted in February 1918 for a million tons of grain, and cancelled in July for a shortfall in tonnage.

A hundred and thirty-three days a year on the lord's land before 1848, and after it an indemnity charged to the province that had done the work. A hundred years without a foreign army on that soil, and then four with three armies on it. A population up forty-five per cent in forty years, and three-quarters of a million people leaving in the same period. Seven famines. Two universities. Two kreuzer for every Sabbath candle, and the franchise in a man's own community set by how much of it he had paid. A metropolitan see restored in 1808 and a metropolitan deported to Russia in 1914. Three thousand reading rooms. One Ukrainian gymnasium for girls. Four hundred and seventy manor houses burned in 1846 and between one and two thousand people killed in them. A constitution guaranteeing the equality of peoples, and a census with no box for the language of eight hundred thousand of them. A promised university, for 1916. Sixty-two seats of two hundred and twenty-eight, agreed on 14 February 1914. Ten new schools, due to open that autumn.

They did not open.

A note on sources.

This module rests entirely on the eleven that precede it and introduces no new evidence; every figure, date and quotation in it is sourced in the module where it first appears, with the limitations flagged there. Three of those limitations bear on the conclusions drawn here and should be repeated at the point of use.

The dating argument at the head of this module — the claim that every opening was factional and that retention tracked the base — rests on Ivan L. Rudnytsky's chronology of Ruthenian gains and on his attribution of the imperial motives behind them, particularly Kálnoky's intervention in 1890 and the drivers of the 1907 franchise reform. Rudnytsky himself notes that the extent of the Austrian government's involvement in the New Era has never been fully explored. A different weighting of those motives would not overturn the finding but would change its sharpness, and the Polish historiography weights them differently.

The comparison with the Soviet case is drawn from the seed written for this study by the Claude that completed that one, not from the completed study itself, which I skimmed for the Landscape and for Modules 6 and 9 as instructed rather than reading whole. The Soviet findings I have set against my own — the household storage of formation, the liquidation of the church at the Lviv sobor of March 1946 and its forty-three years underground, the absence of any forum for the constitutional right of

secession, the metabolic currency finding — are therefore reported at one remove from a study I have not fully read. **A comparison between two studies is the collection's actual output, and mine is the weaker half of this one.** Anyone using it should read both.

The two hundred thousand signatures on the 1848 partition petition are Rudnytsky's figure, resting on Krevetsky's serialised study of the partition question in the *Zapysky* of the Shevchenko Society. That number is the hinge of the refusal of the rigged comparison in this module and it rests on one intermediary citing one Ukrainian source of 1910; the memorandum of 17 July and the second of 28 October 1848, and the August petition to the Reichstag, are better attested than the final total.

Bishop Lev Sheptytsky's memorandum of 1773 arguing the Austrian political advantage of a Galician Greek metropolitanate — which is the single document on which this study's refusal of cynicism turns, because it is the beneficiary stating the cynical case himself — is reported by Rudnytsky as reprinted in Chotkowski's *Historya polityczna kościoła w Galicyi za rządów Maryi Teresy* (Cracow 1909). I have not seen it. It carries more weight in the final argument than a text I have not read comfortably should, and if it says something other than what is reported, the refusal of cynicism stands on the general evidence but loses its best witness.

Finally, and as a matter of the discipline this collection holds against itself: the arithmetic set out above is a selection, and I made it. Another selection from the same eleven modules would produce a different set of pairs and a different impression, and a reader is entitled to know that the pairing is an act of authorship rather than a property of the record. The individual figures are sourced and defended in the modules above; the decision about which of them to set beside which is mine, and it is the one editorial judgement in this study that no note on sources can discharge.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.